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Abstract
In this dissertation I examine the relationships between metaphysical and
epistemological notions of agency and social practices. I argue that the methodological
framework of Dynamic Systems Theory (DST) is a fruitful way to discuss or explain
these relationships, and through this framework I develop an account of Dynamic
Embodied Agents (DEAs) in which agents can be understood both as dynamic systems
interacting with their environments as well as social persons engaging in social practices
and institutions. Through the conceptual lens of DST, DEA bridges the explanatory gap
between individual agency and social practices left by the received views.
In the philosophy of mind, the received view of agency stems largely from
treating cognition “methodologically solipsistically” which historically inherits its legacy
from largely Cartesian attitudes isolating the inner life of the mind from the outer
existence of the external world, and of other minds. By treating the mind as something
that can be examined separate from the “external” environment, I argue that the received
view fundamentally misconstrues the character of mental life. Instead, agents are
constitutively and inextricably tied-up in their worldly activities. It makes no sense to try
to understand cognition separate from the active, embodied, engagement of agents with
and in their worlds. Drawing from more recent approaches to cognition including
embodied, extended, embedded, enactive, and ecological accounts that actively attempt to
escape traditional Cartesianism; I develop an account that understands agents as dynamic
iv

systems sensitive and respondent to various aspects of their concrete situations. Such
aspects can include physical, social, cultural, perceptual, and conceptual constraints and
affordances; which together construct a situation’s meaningfulness for the agent.
However, these approaches to cognition – embodiment, extended and embedded
cognition, enactivism and ecological cognition – often fail to emphasize all of the
relevant ways that mental life is shaped or constituted. Ecological and enactive
approaches to cognition often miss the social and cultural dimensions of phenomenal
experience (what Shaun Gallagher has, perhaps maladroitly called “philosophical
autism”). The Embedded and Extended approaches to cognition often fail to adequately
transcend the Cartesianism that motivated them in the first place (e.g. they fell subject to
criticisms of “cognitive bloat” and charges of not satisfying the “mark of the cognitive”).
And some accounts of embodiment play-up the importance of one or some aspects of
mental life at the detriment of others (e.g. emphasizing the social nature of embodied
experience while downplaying physical or conceptual constraints). I develop Dynamic
Embodied Agency as a way of understanding agents as differentially sensitive to all of
these relevant aspects of mental life.
In the field of social theory there are two primary approaches to understanding
social activity. Either social activity is accomplished by independent autonomous
individuals and is reducible to the activities of each of the individuals involved (often
assumed by economic theorists), or social activity operates at an ontological level
irreducible to the independent and autonomous activities of individuals. Many social
theorists acknowledge the first view as an oversimplification, but see the second view as
v

positing a ghostly collective entity for which there isn’t enough empirical evidence.
Some theorists however – communitarians – see the order or ontological priority as
reversed. Social existence does not emerge out of the complex interworkings of
individual autonomous agents; rather understanding one’s self as an individual
autonomous agent is a genealogical or historical product or construction of a more
primordial social existence.
In either case, there is a difficulty in relating the activities of individuals to social
activities; in relating personal significance to social significance. There seem to be two
distinct and incompatible levels of analysis or explanation: the individual and society.
Here what is needed is some theoretical or explanatory construct that can bridge the
explanatory gap between individual agency and social agency. The most obvious locus
to look for a connection between the two is in the notion of social practices. Social
practices are activities in which individuals participate such that they align or attune
themselves to the way(s) that “one” – a member of the social community – does things.
So, for example, one uses a bicycle for transportation, or exercise, or recreation, or
relaxation. One rides a bicycle in a certain manner (e.g. one conforms one’s body to sit
on the seat, to move one’s legs in a certain fashion to pedal, to hold the handle bars in a
certain manner to help balance and steer the bicycle, and so on). Riding a bicycle is then
a straightforward example of engaging in a fairly well-recognized and structured social
practice. One could attempt to use a bicycle in relatively unrecognized or less-structured
ways (like using a bicycle as a musical instrument, or as a hammer), and this would make
such bicycle-related activities less identifiable as social practices but rather as deviant
vi

behavior – but behavior that nonetheless has social ramifications. Riding a bicycle, at any
rate, is a social practice.
So the question, or the issue, of social practices is in how to understand them in
terms of individual and social activities. Are social practices reducible to the activities of
(relatively) autonomous individuals; or are they social forces that impose themselves on
individuals? The DEA approach that I develop rejects this dichotomy. Dynamic
Embodied Agents are not independent, autonomous individuals – they are open, farfrom-equilibrium systems; which means they are highly dependent on dynamically
interacting with their environment. The environment, for a DEA, is anything to which
the system is differentially sensitive or responsive, and can include physical, social,
cultural, perceptual, and conceptual influences. To oversimplify matters, we can think of
physical influences as the material stuff one finds in one’s environment—one’s physical
environment. Perceptual influences include one’s bodily shape and sensitivities—the
ways in which one’s body can engage with the surrounding world. Social, cultural and
conceptual influences shape how an agent “understands” her situation; but this
“understanding” is not necessarily a conceptual or reflective understanding (though it can
be); it could be more of a pre-reflective sense of how the world directly “shows up” to the
agent. For example, a situation – perhaps a Catholic’s first communion – could be
fundamentally or pre-reflectively imbued with the phenomenal feeling of being engaged
in a sacred ritual, and this feeling “colors” the meaningfulness and active possibilities of
the situation for the agent.
So far, the sense of Dynamic Embodied Agency that I’ve given seems to privilege
vii

the pre-theoretical sense of what an agent is – an agent is a person, like you or me; and
we tend to pre-theoretically think of persons as autonomous individuals. I’m a person,
you’re a person, perhaps even my cat is a person, maybe Cylons are persons too; but we
aren’t a person. A nation isn’t a person, it is comprised of persons. A corporation isn’t a
person, it is comprised of persons; and perhaps that is one reason why the Citizens United
decision that affirms legal “corporate personhood” gives some pause. This pretheoretical intuition about what counts and doesn’t count as a person is in many ways
based on an historically established Cartesian folk-psychology that carves the world up
such that everything is either a mental (res cogitans) or a physical (res extensa)
substance.
However, DEA is neither methodologically nor metaphysically wed to this dualist
picture. Such things as national or corporate persons are, at least in principle, possible
from the perspective of Dynamic Embodied Agency. So long as the constraints of
personhood (or criteria for counting as a person) are satisfied (and as long as such
constraints don’t circularly presuppose that persons must fit our pre-theoretical
intuitions), then any dynamic embodied system can be a person; and anything that
constitutively factors into the composition of that system also gets included in the
system’s personhood. This, for example, accommodates some of the more radical results
of the extended mind thesis; which argues for the possible inclusion of entities “beyond
the bounds of skin and skull” into an agent’s cognitive architecture. The Extended Mind
thesis argues, for example, that an Alzheimer’s patient’s notebook – used in lieu of a
brain-bound biological memory – constitutes the memory of that agent, and thus counts
viii

as part of the agent’s cognitive apparatus. The Dynamic Embodied Agency thesis argues
further that if the notebook constitutively factors into the agent’s personhood (e.g.
without it, she wouldn’t count as a person) then it is part of the agential system – it is
included in who she is as a person.
Dynamic Embodied Agency, is, importantly, dynamic – so perhaps sometimes the
notebook is constitutive the Alzheimer’s patient’s personhood, and sometimes it isn’t,
depending crucially on the specific conditions of particular situations. DST provides a
wealth of conceptual tools through which one can fruitfully analyze the qualitative ways
in which systems change as a result of changes to the functions, parameters, and variables
that define (or constitute) a system. It can help explain how seemingly slight changes can
result in dramatically new system behavior – which helps explain the possibility of
emergent phenomena. With the possibility of emergence comes the possibility of
qualities or properties genuinely attributable at “higher” levels of analysis, including
social levels. This allows for the possibility that social practices may not reduce to the
activities of individual autonomous agents; but are instead attributable to the particular
complex relations between individuals and other contributing situational factors.
However, DST is merely a methodological framework, not a metaphysical doctrine. It
doesn’t make claims about or justify the existence of “higher-order” entities. It doesn’t
claim that social-level entities exist; rather it furnishes explanations for, and between
social and other levels of phenomena. This explanation may allude to emergent
properties or phenomena without reifying them metaphysically. The ontology utilized in
DST then is not a metaphysical ontology; but rather an epistemological or
ix

phenomenological ontology.
Further, while DEAs co-constitute and integrate with- and within their dynamic
(social, cultural, physical and interpersonal) environments in high-bandwidth,
differentially sensitive, non-linear, and open-textured relationships; Agents cannot share
or transmit meaningful information between each other. However, DEAs are not isolated
from each other—they interact meaningfully with those around them. While information
is not shared or transmitted, DEAs can and do engage each other in meaningful, dynamic,
high-bandwidth, differentially sensitive, non-linear, open-textured interplay. Just as
DEAs constitutively couple with their physical, social, and cultural environments, so to
can they constitutively (and meaningfully) engage each other “interpersonally” – this is
precisely in what interpersonal communication consists; on the account of DEA
proffered.
Dynamic Embodied Agency is then an account that draws on the resources
of Dynamic Systems Theory to explain how agents are social actors capable of
differentially engaging together, socially, in practices and institutions.
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Chapter 1: Cognition, Perception, and Agency
“One’s own body [le corps propre] is in the world just as the heart is in the
organism: it continuously breathes life into the visible spectacle, animates it
and nourishes it from within, and forms a system with it.” 1
- Maurice Merleau-Ponty
1.0

Introduction
Since the Modern era, theories of cognition have distinguished between active and

passive modes of experiencing. Locke’s empiricist theory was by-and-large passive,
requiring a good deal of training up from a tabla rasa, or blank slate, before cognitive
processes could capable of critical thinking or to synthesize sense experiences
(perceptions) into categories of understanding 2. To Locke, since all knowledge is a
posteriori, there is nothing innate or a priori about the categories humans tend to use,
rather they are conventions and artifacts of the sense modalities and the socially inherited
information available. Locke distinguished between the passive ‘simple’ ideas presented
through sense perception (e.g. colors, sounds, tastes, smells) and more ‘complex’ ideas
(e.g. numbers, causal inferences, abstract ideas, relations, etc.) that are built up through
the active work of cognition 3. Locke’s ‘active’ cognition was essentially a highly
complex associative machine capable of taking simple ideas and combining them 4.

1

2
3
4

Merleau-Ponty, M., & Landes, D. A. (2012). Phenomenology of perception. Abingdon, Oxon:
Routledge. p. 209 [245].
Cf. e.g. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Bk. II Ch's 1-3, 9.
Ibid. Bk. I, Ch's 1-4.
Ibid. Bk IV, Ch's 1-5
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Later, Kant introduced a theory of cognition that relied on the spontaneous
organizational or patterning work performed on incoming sense impressions or raw
perceptions, “schematizing” them into universal categories of understanding 5. This
schematization enlisted the help of the imagination – a cognitive faculty separate from
the understanding 6. Many “post-Kantian” cognitive theories stem from one or both of
these models of cognition 7, and paint the cognitive agent as a passive recipient of sense
impressions. That is, these cognitive theories focus on cognitive work as it is performed
upon internalized sense stimulus rather than the interactions with their local environment
in which, and through which, cognitive agents actively think. Kant’s introduction of
spontaneity was radical in that it made space for an agent; but this spontaneity only had a
chance to function within a limited scope, and only after sense impressions had been
internalized from the external world. In a sense, what lacked in Kant’s and post-Kantian
theories of cognition was agency: information flowed unidirectionally from the sensory
world to the understanding; never in reverse.
Such theories of cognition privileged, mostly tacitly, the inside/outside division
implicit in Cartesian Dualism 8. This distinction between the inner realm of beliefs,
desires, thoughts, and other experiences, and the outer realm of raw physical goings-on
available to sensation—the perceptual information that human sensory systems “take
in”—is still largely assumed in contemporary theories. For example, Jerry Fodor’s

5
6
7

8

Cf. e.g. Critique of Pure Reason A139-A142
Cf. e.g. Critique of the Power of Judgment, 20:211-20:216.
To be sure, Descartes and Hume also play a large role here. To a certain extent, however, both
Descartes' Rationalism and Hume's Empiricism are subsumed in Kant's and Locke's cognitive theories
as critical responses to their predecessors.
Cf. Descartes' Meditations I & II.

2

“methodological solipsism” depends explicitly on the inside/outside division, and
proceeds by automatically (or “methodologically”) assuming the fundamental soundness
of the boundary conditions supporting this division. 9 To Fodor, if we want to make any
progress on understanding how the mind works, we must treat the mind as a more or less
isolated and self-contained system.
Following Kant, Fodor and others treat cognitive processes as essentially
representational. If we—following Kant—understand the bombardment of sense organs
with perceptual information from the external world as the sense impressions’ being
“presented” to the agent as “intuitions”, then such mere presentation is, as Kant shows,
not enough for understanding. To achieve understanding, the cognitive agent must
synthesize these data into the natural categories to which they belong; and this requires
spontaneous and active work. The intuitions upon which this spontaneous cognitive work
has been properly performed are now “represented”; they are presented to the isolated
cognitive agent in a way that is suitable for understanding. Fodor understands such
representation as a structure articulated in a sort of “Language of Thought”, a language in
which the cognitive subject (in this case, a functioning brain) can shuttle information to
various compartments or modules of the brain specially trained up or adapted for certain
cognitive tasks 10.
Accordingly, sense-based experiences are the result of a series of successive
9

10

Fodor, Jerry (1980), “Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive
Science,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 63-73.
Here I have combined two theses central to Fodor's theory of cognition—the modularity hypothesis and
the language of thought (LOT) hypothesis. These two theses are necessarily related, as Fodor explains
in Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology (1983). His theorizing about LOT first appears
in his 1975 The Language of Thought wherein he expresses the hypothesis that, if cognition is
essentially representational, then cognitive relations must be essentially rule-governed in precisely the
same ways that formal languages are syntactically rule-governed.

3

layers of brain operations that eventually produce familiar subjective phenomenal
experiences. It seems then that there are still just two viable pictures of cognition for the
representationalist: first, of a cognitive subject well-insulated by layers of prephenomenal cognitive operations but still maintaining an inside/outside boundedness.
Second, if the first option doesn’t suit, the representational picture can afford a nondualistic, (often cashed out as materialistic) image. In this physicalist sense, cognition is
“matter in motion” all-the-way-down, reducing mental processes to brain processes such
as the physiochemical workings of firing neurons. The first in some respects recalls a
Cartesian substance dualism, the second—often called “Type-Identity Theory” 11—offers
a monistic reduction of the mental to the physical.
For most of the history of philosophy of mind and cognitive science, these two
were the only two proposals widely taken seriously—and of them, dualism was generally
thought to be extremely problematic at best, and completely untenable at worst. Because
of such basic difficulties, somewhat more recently cognitive models that focus on active
agent-world interaction have been introduced. These models situate agents and their
concrete local environment as active co-participants in the constitution of an agent’s
cognitive world 12. For our purposes, it suffices to begin with the efforts of Francisco
Varela, Evan Thomson, and Eleanor Rosch, who developed a novel, embodied approach
to cognition in the early 1990s. This new embodied approach to cognition acknowledged
that sense-experience (or perception) is shaped not only passively by whatever
11

12

Cf. Place, U.T. (1956). “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, British Journal of Psychology, 47, pp. 44–
50
Depending on which specifics one is interested in, one might begin in the 1910s with Husserl, the 20s30s with Heidegger, or for a more explicitly embodied approach, the 40s and 50s with Merleau-Ponty.
More on this later.
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phenomena impresses itself upon a cognitive subject, but also actively in the sense that
agents (rather than mere subjects) can and do dynamically engage with and effect change
upon the world around them. On this view it was no longer tenable to maintain a strict
boundary between inside and outside; between presentation and representation; or
between sense perception and phenomenal experience. The processes of cognition were
re-envisioned as a complex interaction of body interfacing with its local environment. In
this way, embodied cognition clearly opposes both Cartesian dualism—in particular the
strict division of separate substances (res cogitans, and res extensa), and purely
reductionist and representational accounts of cognition—in particular the idea that only
internalized representational content is cognitively meaningful.
Beginning with Brentano’s 13 and Husserl’s accounts of intentionality 14, and later
developed implicitly by Heidegger 15 and more explicitly by Merleau-Ponty 16, a
movement within the phenomenological tradition has emphasized the relevance of the
body in cognitive subjectivity. Rather than separating inner and outer realms, the
phenomenological tradition approaches the appearance of separate substances from an
interactive perspective. Mind and Body are not two separate (or separate kinds of)
entities; instead, the workings of one fundamentally implicate and depend upon the
workings of the other. To think otherwise is to fail to adequately account for the
fundamental evidence of actual lived phenomena 17. So on the embodied approach to

13
14
15
16

17

Cf. Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Bk. II
Cf. Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology.
Cf. e.g. Heidegger's discussion of readiness-to-hand in Being and Time (§§67-72).
The entirety of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception marks the first sustained
phenomenological meditation on embodied subjectivity.
The phenomenological intuition here is that the world dynamically presents itself as simultaneously the

5

cognition an agent navigates her world utilizing all available perceptual tools—regardless
of ‘where’ they are located or of what they are made. Some of these tools include various
types of intentions (conceptual, motor, emotive, etc.), others include the transparent and
skillful know-how incorporated in the deployment of the agent’s body, while still others
differentially adapt to and utilize the resources, constraints, and other perceptual aspects
afforded by the perceptual agent’s dynamic environment.
No longer constrained by the strictures of methodological solipsism,
phenomenological embodiment allows cognitive theorists to model the mind as a
complex inter-action between the functional workings of the brain, the transparent skillful
know-how of the body, and various physical availabilities or “affordances” 18 of the local
environment. In this way, embodiment theorists took themselves to be giving a more
authentic account of what is phenomenally given—the actual kinds of perceptual
encounters that human agents experience.
1.1

Embodied Agency and Free Will
Primitive to this way of understanding cognition is the notion of agency. With the

assumption of agency comes a new collection of problems. When we think of ourselves
as agents we understand ourselves as in some ways free and in other ways constrained.
No agent can be completely constrained, and to the extent that the physical world obeys
deterministic laws, there must be some accounting for the degrees and dimensions of

18

kind of thing that can affect and be affected by the perceptive subject. This is the functional difference
between a mere perceiving cognitive subject, and an embodied agent. What is important to the
phenomenological approach is that we in fact experience bidirectionality in causal efficaciousness.
This is a term of art introduced by J.J. Gibson. His “Ecological” theory will be discussed in further
detail shortly.

6

freedom required by an embodied account of cognitive agency. That is, how does an
embodied account of cognition pare with a thoroughgoing naturalism? How is it possible
to account both for phenomenal experience and physical laws in a consistent manner?
Surely a theory of embodied cognition—one that privileges the body—is on better
physical footing than a dualistic conception of the mind; but an embodied agent’s body is
not the same kind of thing as either an unused, inanimate object or a tool. An embodied
agent’s body is a lived body—the kind of thing that reliably, continually, consistently,
and transparently factors into the agent’s perceptual cognition—that is, the embodied
agent’s lived body constitutes that agent. 19
Further, free agents are free in some ways, and not in others. For example, I am
free to move my left arm in certain ways because my current environment constrains it in
such a way that allows it to be moved in a specific fashion. The amount of energy
afforded by complex metabolic processes similarly constrains and affords certain types of
movement, and can include, under such circumstances a class of possible movements.
And, just as the amount of energy in an open system is a differential function of the
activities and movements within that system, the local system containing my body can
differentially acquire and lose various amounts of energy depending on the kinds of
activities in which I engage 20.

19

20

The distinction here is akin to Husserl's well-known discussion of the differences between Leib and
Körper (cf. e.g. Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Mediation, §§42-62) . Leib is the body as an active locus of
lived experiencing, while Körper designates an objective physical object. Importantly, nobody holds the
position that these two notions are mutually exclusive. A body can factor into situations significantly
and simultaneously as both Leib and Körper. What is important here is that the body qua Leib is a
necessary condition for agency.
For an elaboration on the idea of metabolic constraints on action and the kinds of activities available to
(or afforded by) the interfaces between embodied agents and their interactive environments, see
Norman, Donald A. (1999). “Affordances, Conventions and Design.” Interactions 6(3):38-43, May
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But what about social factors? Consider the situation in which nobody is telling
me not to move my left arm in the way I would like to, and in which there are no social
strictures or taboos preventing my doing so—so in this way I am again in certain ways
“free” to perform various possible actions, including moving my arm like so. Thus, the
constraints on and motions afforded to my arm in this situation are importantly
influenced by how I see the action in social terms. Additionally, when I do move my arm,
its reach can only extended so far. If I wanted to reach further I could expand my reach
by taking up some tool to extend beyond my arm span. Or, I could stand up and move my
entire body closer to what I’m attempting to reach. My body is, as is the grasping tool, a
useful thing—but it is not merely a thing—it is that through which experiencing occurs; it
is itself the condition for any usefulness. If there are no tools available in my local
environment, or if I am unable to successfully incorporate a tool, these shortcomings
constitute real forms of constraint in my concrete situation. So too for social factors. If I
am unable to conceive of certain forms of action, or I perceive there to be social norms
prohibiting certain modes of activity—this affects the kind, and quality of action I can
undertake. Further, if social taboos are well-established, certain actions may not show up
at all as available or possible ways to act. Thus there are myriad ways of constraining and
affording embodied agency, and in many cases what counts as a constraint or affordance
depends on the particular intentions of the particular embodied agent in her particular
social, cultural, historical, and physical situation. Put simply: affordances and constraints
are functions of an agent’s embodied ‘grasping’ of her situation 21.

21

1999, ACM Press
Here I shrink from using the word “understanding” rather than “grasping”. The word “understanding”

8

In a more fundamental way however, freedom and in particular the idea of free
will entail a certain subjectively felt sense of agency—that I am the one in control of my
actions. An adequate cognitive theory must give some accounting for this qualitative,
phenomenal sense of freedom. Embodied agents are intentional, and the basic issue with
the project of naturalizing free will is of accounting for the basis of intentionality. Where
does intention come from? Are we strictly physically determined? Socially determined?
If not, why not? How not? In some sense the embodied account attempts to skirt this
issue by taking agency as both metaphysically and epistemologically primitive.
According to many construals of embodied cognition and other phenomenological
theories, agency is—like electromagnetism and gravity—a thoroughly natural
phenomenon 22. It is something that is “in”, and “of” the natural world. It is, like other
natural phenomena, a dependable and law-like way for things to go. The fully naturalistic
view of embodied agency sees agency as an emergent property of the parts of certain
kinds of systems (perceptual systems) in the same way that a hurricane is an emergent
property of more micro-scale physical processes. 23

22

23

carries with it considerable conceptual baggage. If “understanding” is understood cognitively in the way
that Kant does, then one can interpret what I mean here subjunctively—it is what the body would do if
it were the kind of thing that could understand. Of course, much of the argument for embodied
cognition goes against this way of understanding “understanding”. Instead, we should think of
“understanding” as the way in which an agent is able to make meaningful her situation. In this sense
when we think of agents as essentially embodied it should be clear that bodies are precisely what can
“understand” in a non-subjunctive sense. To avoid these pitfalls, I opt for “grasping” here as a term of
art. It is not meant to evoke Frege's usage of the term, but rather a new usage—whose embodied
entailments (actively reaching out to grab a hold of) are fully intended.
Cf. e.g.: Franck Grammont and Dorotheé Legrand (2005, 2010), Pierre Livet (2002, 2006), Jean-Luc
Petit (1999a, 1999b).
For example, something like this is suggested by David Chalmers' “Type-F” neutral monism (cf. eg.
“Consciousness and its Place in Nature” in Stitch & Warfield (ed.'s) Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy
of Mind. 2002). Chalmers suggests that there is perhaps some more primoridal substance (which he
calls “protophenomenal”) from which all of consciousness, qualia, physical substance, and physical,
psychological, and psycho-physical laws emerge.
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1.2

Embodiment, Dualism, and Reductionism
Much of the motivation for adopting an embodied account of agency is to avoid

the problems associated with dualism and reductionism. Concerning the issue of agency,
there are two basic problems with dualism: First is the problem of separate substances.
Dualism attempts to straddle both sides of the issue when it comes to our intuitions about
on the one hand our inner, personally-felt experiences—our phenomenal sense of being
intentional agents with free will; and on the other, intuitions about the mechanistic
lawfulness of physicalist explanations of the world around us that overwhelmingly seem
to accurately describe and explain the way things work. For the dualist, there are simply
two separate kinds of substance: the inner, experiential substance of cognition (res
cogitans) and the outer, physical substance of the world (res extensa) that obeys physical
laws. The problem of separate substances is then the problem of how to make two
entirely unrelated kinds of substance interact—and to do so in a way consistent with the
known modes in which agents qua res cogitantia affect their environs, as well as the
ways in which environs qua res extensa affect agents. No dualist has ever adequately
solved this problem. 24
The second problem is the classic “problem of other minds”. Even if dualism
succeeds at coherently explaining the seemingly conflicting intuitions of inner

24

That is, the Dualist faces the double-problem of explaining the causal efficaciousness of the physical on
the mental, and (more problematically) vice versa. Without explaining this, mental causation of
agentive action is a miracle.
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phenomenalism and outer physicalism 25, it still faces the difficulty of determining what
kind of entities other people are 26. We have a social sense of others. This means that
when one (who takes herself to be a res cogitans) encounters another, she encounters the
other as another person or res cogitans. This raises a couple of related issues. Is the other
res cogitans the same kind of substance as I? Or is he an entirely different kind of
substance (perhaps not res cogitans but a third res altera 27?). How can I know whether
the other is the same kind of substance as I? There is a worry here that a condition for the
possibility of knowing whether two substances are of the same kind, the two (I and the
other) must at least be able to come into substantial contact—but if this can occur, the
new problem of being able to determine a basis for individuation between me and the
other arises. We run the risk of substantial indiscernibility, and therefore of the possibility
that we are [sic] identical 28. Thus, the only way one would be able to know that I and the
other are of a kind is to infer it from experience 29. Otherwise we are left only with the
possibility that the other is merely res extensa—the other is not a subject but a mere
physical object; and this collapses the dualist’s position into one of cognitive solipsism.
25
26

27

28
29

It doesn't.
This is a more metaphysical formulation of the problem of other minds, which is usually understood as
an epistemological problem – the question as to how one can know the existence and content of other
minds. To be sure, one cannot separate the metaphysical from the epistemological concerns in
addressing the problem of other minds because any explanation that addresses epistemological concerns
necessarily commits one to metaphysical assumptions, and vice versa.
“Other thing”. But here too once faces myriad difficulties: In what way is this res altera an “other”. To
be an other is to be, in some way, similar to one's self; and if the other must be similar, then it cannot be
understood as being an entirely separate or distinct substance at all. Further, if one other is a distinct
separate substance, then how about a second other? Are two others alike in kind (e.g. they are both res
altera) or are they distinct in kind (e.g. that each case of res alterae is a separate substance from the
other)? The effect of these issues is of expanding dualism into a triism or pluralism which only
compounds the problems outlined above. Kant faced a similar difficulty in attempting to characterize
the role of the imagination in schematization of sense impressions data for organization by the
understanding. The third critique is largely Kant's failed efforts to reconcile this problem.
An absurdity.
To add to the difficulties, at best this inductive inference is made from a single, decidedly biased case.
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Thus, the problem of other minds is the problem of reconciling our sense that others are
subjects, both “like me” and “other”. Like the problem of separate substances, the
problem of other minds has never adequately been solved by the dualist. Unlike the
problem of separate substances, the problem of other minds poses a formidable difficulty
for monist theories as well—especially in attempting to develop adequate theories of
interpersonal communication.
Regarding reductionism, we once again face an impasse of intuitions. In our
regular, unreflective, everyday use of language we tend to draw upon both physicalistic
and mentalistic concepts—that is, as social linguistic agents who have inherited a dualistc
folk-psychological tradition, our encultured attitudes assume a form of dualism. 30
Reductionism is the attempt to subsume all of either physicalistic or mentalistic language
under the other. As a matter of historical fact most reductionists tend to be materialists,
intending to subsume mentalistic language under physicalist descriptions. As such, for
example, when one says “I desire Malbec and believe the distributor has some in
inventory”, the reductionist suggests that we should understand terms like “desire” and
“believe” rather in terms of the underlying physical states or processes that accompany
them. The mental is said to “supervene” on the physical. To compare: a physicalist
eliminativist (contra the physicalist reductionist) holds that mentalistic terms like “desire”
and “believe” are strictly nonsense—they do not express anything physically meaningful
(and thus do not express anything about reality) 31,32. They should not be subsumed under

30

31

Edmund Husserl addresses precisely this in his discussion on the “natural standpoint”. Cf. Husserl,
Edmund; trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson. (1962). Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology.
New York: Macmillan. 96–103, 155–67.
It is not that eliminativists believe that all mentalistic language has no relation to physical reality—
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a better description, but should rather be supplanted whole-cloth. I will not here discuss
the eliminativist position because it refuses to take seriously precisely what is in need of
explanation 33. The problem the reductionist faces is predominantly in providing a
functional mapping from the linguistic and conceptual domain that utilizes mentalistic
language and concepts to the physicalist domain. Try as she might, the reductionist’s task
resembles that of playing Whack-a-mole: every time she appears to make an inroad in
bridging the gap between mentalistic and physicalistic language, the process of reduction
itself opens a new rift in need of bridging 34. Further, some mentalistic terms seem to be
irreducible to the current stock of physical concepts 35. One well-identified example is
that of the “hard problem” of consciousness. “Consciousness”, it appears, is irreducible to
purely physicalist description. The “hard problem” of consciousness is in giving a
naturalized account of consciousness that adequately retains the richness of the concept.
If consciousness cannot be explained by using an exclusively physicalistic description 36,
it must then “emerge” from or “transcend” the purely physical—which then requires
some irreducible, nonphysical explanation. However, the possibility of a non-

32

33

34

35
36

rather that qua mental, mentalistic language can do nothing but distort or mislead about reality (which is
monistically physical). Thus, for eliminativists, all mentalistic terms unnecessarily distort reality—even
if they can be cashed out in terms of physical goings-on (and thus eliminated). According to the
elimitivist, the only way to know which mentalistic terms can (or cannot) be cashed-out in physicalistic
language is through scientific, empirical investigation.
For a sustained argument on behalf of eliminative materialism see Paul Churchland's Scientific Realism
and the Plasticity of Mind (1979). For a critique, Lynne Rudder Baker's Saving Belief: A Critique of
Physicalism (1987)
That is, it explicitly refuses to play by the rules of persuasive dialogue. The eliminativist claims that he
does not need to acknowledge the plausibility of the opposing viewpoint. Essentially, the eliminativist
suggests that the only way to explain the seeming existence of mental phenomena is to explain them
away. This is precisely a refusal to acknowledge that there is something in need of explanation - and
thus constitutes a mere refusal to participate in the dialogue.
Cf. e.g. Hellman, Geoffrey, and Frank Wilson Thompson (1975), “Physicalism: Ontology,
Determination, and Reduction”, Journal of Philosophy 72: 551–564.
Cf. e.g. Fodor, Jerry (1974). “Special Sciences,” Synthese, 28: 97–115.
That is, using only the stock of concepts and [causally-closed] laws that current physics admits.
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physicalistic explanation is precisely what the reductionist methodologically prohibits. It
should come as no surprise that despite concerted effort over the past sixty years or so
reductionism has not yet succeeded, and that the “hard problem” has not yet been
solved. 37
If the embodied account can avoid these problems, it begins to look comparatively
attractive, given the seeming intractability of the problems inherent in dualistic and
reductionistic accounts of cognition. Both dualism and reductionism share the same
Cartesian history, and as such have inherited the same paradigm for thinking about
cognition—namely that propositional attitudes are the meaning-bearing objects that
signify the [purported] differences between the mental and the physical 38. This tradition
sees cognition as a two-way flow of discrete packets of information (representations).
Information flows from outside in through a process of representing sense-impressions.
Information flows from the inside out through an intentional process of agential action.
The former has its source in the extended world, the source for the latter is in the agent’s
internal phenomenal experience and will. The traditional approach has been to reveal the
mechanisms by which these two, unidirectional, linear streams of information come

37

38

It should be noted that while the “hard problem” of consciousness has provided difficulty for
reductionism since the rise of Type-Identity theories of the mind (cf. e.g. Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of
Mind, Hutchinson, 1949; U.T. Place's “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, British Journal of
Psychology, 47:44-50. 1956; and J.J.C. Smart's “Sensations and Brain Processes”. Philosophical
Review, 68:141-56. 1959) the term “the hard problem of consciousness” itself appears only with David
Chalmers' “Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness” in The Journal of Consciousness Studies (2:3,
200-219) in 1995.
Bertrand Russell first described propositional attitudes in his 1912 The Problems of Philosophy.
Nonetheless, it is fairly clear that propositional attitudes are what Descartes had in mind in his
formulation of res cogitans in the second meditation when he says “But what then am I? A thinking
thing. And what is that? Something that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and also
senses and has mental images.” Later W.V.O. Quine took issue with the elusiveness in providing
adequate translation of propositional attitudes in first-order predicate logic. Alternatively, Daniel
Dennett uses propositional attitudes as the basis for his concept of “the intentional stance”.
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together to constitute one cognitive agent 39. By contrast, the embodied account rejects
this traditional picture of separate, linear channels of information flow and replaces it
with a nonlinear, mutually causal and reciprocally constitutive interactive and dynamic
system of body and local environment 40. The “nonlinearity” of the embodied account is a
significant divergence from the linear Cartesian tradition in that it puts the agent and
world into direct, “high-bandwidth,” 41 and continuous contact with one another—rather
than requiring a series of translations, distillations, conversions, and other mechanisms
that function as simultaneously separating and connecting agent and world.
This fundamental change in approach both complicates and simplifies the
argumentative burden for the embodiment theorist. It complicates things in the sense that
moving from a linear theory to a nonlinear theory usually increases the degree of
complexity of the system the theory is capable of modeling. In a sense, this is a trade-off
between simplicity and accuracy in theory description. The anomalies faced by the linear
approximations of information flow in dualism and reductionism became too much to
bear for some who identified the source of the problem as arising from an unwarranted,
linearizing, simplification. Such simplification was seen as a distortion of what really
goes on in cognition: thinking and perceiving are simply not “low-bandwidth,” serial,
exchanges of discrete packets of information. Alternatively, things are simplified for the
embodiment theorist by shifting to a nonlinear approach because the old, seemingly
39

40

41

For the dualist this means explaining how mind and body can interact; for the reductionist this means
explaining how the mental is expressible in purely physical terms. Both agree that there is a wellbounded 'something' pertaining to mentality that needs explaining.
To be clear, locality of environment is a matter of degree (of influence), and the notion of 'environment'
I mean to use here is maximally inclusive—so contains things like social, cultural, historical,
biographical, and physical influences. The idea of “degree of locality” is similar to the concept of
“horizon” as it is deployed by many in the phenomenological tradition.
This phrase is taken from John Haugeland's Mind Embodied and Embedded, 1998.
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intractable problems of separate substances, other minds, and the hard problem of
cognition are dissolved by this shift in paradigm. Thus, much of the motivation for
shifting from the traditional Cartesian approach to the embodied approach comes from
intuitions about the fruitfulness of further research, and misgivings about the traditional
approaches abilities to overcome these enduring faults.
1.3

Embodied or Extended?
In the mid 1990s, around the same time that the embodiment thesis began to take

hold in cognitive science, another non-traditional thesis about cognition began to surface.
This thesis—the extended mind thesis—grew out of two related research projects that
both enjoyed popularity in the 1970s and 1980s. The first was a thesis in philosophy of
language and mind called “semantic externalism,” developed variously by Hilary
Putnam, Tyler Burge, and Saul Kripke (to name just a few). The second was a
constellation of approaches born out of attempts to conceive artificial intelligence (AI)
independently of the then dominant computationalist / representationalist picture of
cognition. These approaches went by an assortment of names, such as connectionism,
parallel distributed processing, subsumption architecture, and cybernetics 42. For
simplicity I’ll refer to these approaches more generally under the umbrella term
“dispersed cognition” 43.

42

43

Cf. e.g. Rumelhart, D.E., J.L. McClelland and the PDP Research Group (1986). Parallel Distributed
Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition. Volumes 1 & 2. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press ; Churchland, P. M., 1989, A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the
Structure of Science, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. ; Pinker, S., and Mehler, J. (eds.), 1988,
Connections and Symbols, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.; Smolensky, P., 1988, “On the Proper
Treatment of Connectionism,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 11: 1–74.
I would like to be clear that for the purposes of this text the terms “dispersed cognition” and “distributed
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The semantic externalism thesis is the view that linguistic terms obtain meaning
by their succeeding at attaching to aspects of or objects in the world without relying on
the intension of the speaker who invokes them 44,45. Importantly this view is, as stated,
recognizably Cartesian in the sense that it relies upon the coherence of an internal /
external distinction. The embodiment thesis, to contrast, takes as one of its primary tenets
the problematization of such a distinction. If this is an accurate characterization of
semantic externalism, then we have already located one potential source of tension
between these two positions (and by extension between the two positions of embodiment
and extended cognition). The classic example used in expressing the meaning externalist
position is the well-trodden “Twin Earth” thought experiment. Because this is such a
well-known bit of contemporary philosophy I will here only briefly discuss its basic
contours.
Suppose there are two distant worlds that are identical in every way except one:

44

45

agency” (or what sometimes gets called “distributed cognition”) should not be thought of as
synonymous. Dispersed cognition is a thesis about how cognitive processes work and are spread out at
various levels of cognitive activity. Distributed agency is a thesis about actions as enacted or shared
across the activities of many agents. In both, the idea of 'distribution' suggests that the term being
qualified (cognition, agency) is 'spread out' over or amongst multiple objects (or, in the case of agency,
subjects). In a [fully integrated, feed-forward] connectionist network, for example, processing is
distributed over a network of nodes and weighted connections. One may endorse either, both, or neither
thesis and remain internally consistent.
The term 'intension' refers to the linguistic semantic element of an agent's intention. For an extended
discussion on the differences and relations between “intention” and “intension” see John Searle's
defining 1983 work Intentionality. Here (as with Putnam's original formulation) the term 'intension' is
used much in the same way that Frege understood the term “sense” (Sinn)—the psychologistic feeling
of what one means when one uses a word.
In the philosophy of language, “intension” is often defined by substitution failure in opaque contexts—
the inability to discern a clear reference merely from grammatical structure. Cf. Gamut, L.T.F. (1991).
Logic, language, and meaning, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Using this definition of intension, the semantic externalism thesis can be expressed as either (i) the
claim that the external, intersubjectively accessible situation always provides enough information to fix
context such that they cannot be opaque; (ii) reference is determined externally by context, so to the
extent that something refers, it does so non-opaquely—even if language-users are not privy to that
reference. Cf, Kripke, Saul. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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where one world, ‘Earth’, has H2O, the other world, which we may call ‘Twin Earth’ has
instead XYZ. In both universes, all agents refer to their own planet as ‘Earth’ and as the
most prevalent substance on the surface of their respective planets as “water”. For the
Earthling, says the meaning externalist, uttering ‘water’ picks out substances that are
predominantly composed of H2O—the substance on Earth. For the Twin-Earthling, then,
uttering “water” picks out substances that are predominantly composed of XYZ—the
substance on Twin Earth. Thus, Earthlings who say ‘water’ mean H2O, and TwinEarthlings who say ‘water’ mean XYZ. As would need to be the case in order to say that
Earth and Twin-Earth are identical in every way except the piecewise replacement of
each molecules of H2O for molecules of XYZ, the physical characteristics of H2O and
XYZ would also have to be identical—or else the two worlds could not propagate
identically, and would immediately begin diverging 46. According to meaning externalists,
since it would be absurd to think that Twin-Earthlings could mean H2O when uttering
‘water’, and since Twin-Earthlings are brain-state identical with Earthlings [and,
presumably, mental states supervene on brain states so Twin-Earthlings and Earthlings
would have identical intensions] the ability to refer cannot be intensional—leaving by
exhaustion only the possibility of extensional reference. This is what purportedly
motivates Putnam’s famous claim that “meanings just ain’t in the head” 47.

46

47

The claim here is that differences the micro-level qualitative characteristics of H2O and XYZ would
correlate to differences in macro-level qualitative characteristics. As with most thought experiments, the
“Twin Earth” thought experiment faces some challenging conceptual hurdles. Since what makes H2O
what it is are its qualitative physical characteristics, if there are no qualitative physical differences
between H2O and XYZ as stipulated by the thought experiment, then there are simply no grounds for
claiming differences between the physical substances H2O and XYZ, and there is, in principle, no
possible method by which one could individuate the substances (identity of indiscernibles)—which is
sufficient for claiming their identity, e.g. that H2O just is XYZ and vice versa.
Cf. e.g. Putnam, H. (1973). “Meaning and Reference,” Journal of Philosophy 70, 699-711.and Putnam,
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Proponents for both embodiment and extended cognition have reason to take issue
with many aspects of the twin-earth thought experiment; but the extended cognition
thesis owes much of its motivation to the results fostered by semantic externalism. One
major idea motivated in large part by the twin earth thought experiment is known as
‘multiple realizability’ 48. Multiple realizability is the thesis that one mental state, process,
or property can be variously instantiated by different supervenience bases in physical
states, processes, or properties. For instance, earthling Oscar and twin-earthling TwinOscar are composed of different matter (Oscar’s brain is composed mostly of H2O, while
Twin-Oscar’s brain is composed mostly of XYZ, for example)—yet [if defined
functionally] their mental states, processes, and properties are identical—thus
[functional] mental states are (at least in principle, according to the meaning externalist)
multiply realizable. This result was thought to have direct relevance to AI research. If
human mental states are multiply realizable, the argument went, then they (or their AI
equivalents) could be implemented in AI systems.
Thus, if mental states, processes, or properties are multiply realizable, then what
individuates them cannot be their particular or unique relations with particular physical
supervenience bases. Instead, mental states, processes, or properties are thought to consist
in functional relations between physical sense-impressions and physical behavioral
activity. This ‘functionalist’ approach understands mental states, processes, and

48

H. (1975) “The meaning of 'meaning'“. In Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2: Mind, Language and Reality.
Cambridge University Press.
While Putnam's thought experiment did a good deal to provide motivation for the functionalist approach
to the mind because it showed how semantics could be consistent with the notion of multiple
realizability, it was not the first instance of the idea of multiple realizability. Earlier incarnations appear
in Alan Turing's 1950 “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”; Marvin Minsky's 1968 Semantic
Information Processing, and 1974 “A Framework for Representing Knowledge”; and Herbert Simon's
1957 Models of Man.
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properties as causally efficacious relational states, processes, or properties relating some
physical input to some physical output. We can understand the relation between mental
and physical on this functionalist account as analogous to the relation between computer
hardware and software: the mind is like software which can be variously implemented on
different hardware architectures. What makes the software software is that it produces
certain kinds of output when presented with certain kinds of input—regardless of the
hardware platform on which it is implemented. As such, and in line with meaning
externalist and functionalist interpretations, calling something ‘cognitive’ or saying that it
‘has a mind’ is a matter of satisfying functional criteria.
From these assumptions Andy Clark and David Chalmers set forth their extended
mind thesis 49. They ask, in essence, “if minds, like software, can be multiply realized in
different physical hardware, then what motivates our tacit identifying of minds with
brains?” At least in principle, the functional software of the mind can extend past the
boundaries of the brain; and since the mind is defined functionally, there should be
(again, at least in principle) multiple physically instantiable ways of realizing the criteria
for mind—of taking sense-impressions as input as producing behavioral activity as
output. As such, the extended mind thesis posits that cognition occurs in such a way that
the brain-world boundary is often if not always irrelevant to the functioning of a
cognitive system. From the perspective of the extended mind theorist, the embodiment
thesis amounts to the assertion of partial extension, and in many ways less radical than
the extended mind thesis. The extended mind theorist thinks of the embodiment theorist

49

Clark, A., and D. Chalmers, 1998, “The Extended Mind,” Analysis, 58: 10–23.
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as taking the extended mind thesis and stopping the functional extension at, instead of the
boundary of the brain, the boundary of the body 50. There are many reasons why this
characterization of embodiment is inadequate, and we will discuss them shortly.
The second area of research from which the extended mind thesis draws is
dispersed cognition. In the early 1980s many researchers in AI began to wonder whether
computationalist models could adequately handle the task of modeling cognition of
human-like intelligence. The computationalist had approached modeling cognition in
terms of manipulation of discrete symbol tokens 51. Since computation works on
representational symbolic tokens internal to the cognitive system and not directly on what
is presented to the cognitive agent in its external environment, the computationalist
approach can be thought of as firmly entrenched within the Cartesian paradigm. It should
also be noted that some versions of extended cognition understand the extended mind
thesis as merely expanding upon the computationalist paradigm 52. Instead of drawing the
boundaries of a cognitive agent around the brain, the extended computationalist
understands the fundamental activities of cognition to involve discrete symbol

50

51

52

For example, Andy Clark—the paradigmatic “Extended Cognitivst” discusses the boundaries of body as
a matter of “interface” that can be altered, or augmented in various ways. So, he writes: “Sensing and
moving are the spots where the rubber of embodied agency meets the road of the wider world—the
world outside the agent’s organismic boundaries.” (Clark, 2008). And later says that agents that
“constantly to negotiate and renegotiate the agent-world boundary itself” are “profoundly embodied
agents”. Clearly, Clark’s vision of embodiment focuses more on this “cyborgic” aspect of re-forming or
re-assigning the boundaries of what gets counted as the body, while downplaying the character and
quality of the body’s sensitivities to specific affordances in the local environment.
The paradigmatic example of such a computationalist approach is the “physical symbol systems”
proposed in Newell, A., and H.A. Simon, (1972), Human problem solving, Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
In his 2010 The New Science Of Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology, Mark
Rowlands argues that Andy Clark's 1998 and 2008 formulations of the extended mind thesis are both
computationalist in this sense.
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manipulation—though this can occur external to the brain, as well as body 53.
In contrast, dispersed cognition divides general functional cognitive tasks into
smaller, modularized tasks that can be accomplished in parallel rather than serially. These
smaller tasks needn’t relate symbolically nor representationally to the external world—
rather, their significance (symbolic or not) comes irreducibly from their functional
relations with lower and higher level functional processes. In the connectionist approach
to modeling cognition, mental functions are thought of as extremely complex
interconnected networks of simple uniform units 54 (often meant to be, to some degree,
analogous to neurons) 55. The kinds and relations of the connections between units
determine the character of the overall function executed. One common and important
aspect of most connectionist models is that such interconnected complex neural networks
must be dynamic. Somewhat abstractly, at a given time a connection between units in the
network can be activated to varying degrees represented by a numerical value called a
‘weighting’. For example, a weighting of a connection might represent the probability
that the neuron will generate an action potential spike. But one weighting alone does not
53

54

55

Hilary Putnam's “division of linguistic labor” (Putnam, H., 1975, “The Meaning of Meaning”, in Mind,
Language and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 215–271.) should be understood in this
way. Semantic meaning of, for example, natural kind terms is determined through an extended and
external process of epistemic expertise shared socially though linguistic constructs that allow competent
(though non-expert) language users to refer correctly to, say, an Ash tree through some properlyconstructed causal history that allows particular loci of reference to become meaning-bearing. That is,
I—as a non-expert on kinds of trees—am able to correctly (or incorrectly) identify the tree outside my
window as an Ash because there is somebody (an expert) who could, if asked, individuate this kind of
tree from all other kinds of tree; as long as there is a causal social epistemic link between me and this
expert, as well as a causal history of reference linking the expert to the initial 'baptism' of Ash trees.
This is in line with the UNIX programming ethos prevalent in the 1980s popularized by the inventor of
the UNIX Pipeline, Doug McIlroy's slogan “Write programs that do one thing and do it well. Write
programs to work together.”
cf. e.g. David Rumelhart's 1989 “The Architecture of Mind: A Connectionist Approach”, Paul
Smolensky's 1989 “Connectionist Modeling: Neural Computation / Mental Connections”, and Paul
Churchland's 1989 “On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective”; all of which can
be found in Haugeland's Mind Design II . MIT Press, 1997.
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constitute the full significance of a function or action—it is only within the whole of a
particular complex neural network that the weighting of this one neuron could take on
such a significance; and only if activation of other related neuronal units allows for the
spread of the action potential signal in a way characteristic of the function or action for
which the activation is said to be significant.
The more general point is that the connectionist or dispersed model of cognition
can but does not need to fit with traditional computationalist and representationalist
pictures of cognition 56. If one’s goal is to avoid the problems associated with traditional
Cartesian and reductionist accounts of the mind, one could do so with a properly nuanced
dispersed model. Such a model would have to take care to avoid computationalist /
representationalist assumptions however. But this at least appears in principle to be
possible for the dispersed cognitive model to achieve.
We have already seen one interpretation of the embodied mind thesis that puts it
in agreement with the extended mind thesis in some ways, and in disagreement in others.
As seen from the extended mind perspective, embodiment is a partial extension from the
methodological solipsism of the mind-brain identity thesis. The extended cognitivist sees
embodied cognition as the rejection of mind-brain identity, and the embrace of mindbody identity. As such, an extended cognition enthusiast would likely be apt to equally
dismiss embodied cognition as a sort of warmed-over identity theory. This would be a
mistake. Unlike the methodological solipsism of a mind-brain identity theory, embodied
56

For instance, such networks can be thought of as either continuously dynamic (described by differential
functions), or discretely dynamic (described by iterative step functions). The connectionist approaches
that emerged in the 1980s were largely discretely dynamic networks—which are (at least in principle)
consistent with the discrete representationalism of classical computationalist approaches. Continuously
dynamic networks, on the other hand, are not.
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cognition constitutively requires and causally depends upon close and direct interaction
between body and environment. If we understand the methodological solipsism of
“intracranialist” theories (like Fodor’s representationalist computationalism) as holding in
abeyance or methodologically bracketing as irrelevant to the study of cognition the
character of both sensory input and behavioral output, then we should take the embodied
cognition thesis to firmly deny the coherence of such a methodology. It makes no sense,
according to the embodied cognitivist, to try to theorize about or understand the body as
isolated from its local environment, or apart from its social, cultural, and historical
situatedness. In fact, the embodied cognitive agent constitutively incorporates precisely
this multifaceted situatedness in its complex and dynamically integrated system of bodily
affordances and constraints. The very idea of ‘body’ (Leib) for the embodiment theorist
must of necessity incorporate all of these elements traditionally thought of as ‘external’
(in the methodologically solipsist sense). Such affordances and constraints not only
causally factor into changing and shaping the embodied system, but must be understood
as constitutive of embodied agency—making the embodied system what it is.
Seen from this ‘embodied’ perspective, the ‘extended’ criticism now appears offmark. In fact, the embodiment thesis is now the one that appears more radical. The
extended cognition thesis claims that cognition may possibly involve processes that occur
outside skin and skull. This thesis is comparably weaker than the embodiment thesis’s
claim that cognition both causally and constitutively is afforded and constrained by the
body’s complex interrelation with its social, cultural, historical, and physical
environment. The former’s position asserts merely the possibility of incorporation of
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entities external to the brain while the latter’s makes such incorporation necessary. Far
from warmed-over intracranialism, the embodied mind thesis radically departs from the
Cartesian and reductionist traditions; and in some ways is more strongly committed to
‘extending’ cognition than the extended mind thesis is.
One last word on the conceptual relations between semantic externalism,
functionalism, and the embodied mind thesis. We’ve already seen how the extended mind
thesis depends conceptually on a commitment to functionalism, and that functionalism
stems from the hard-won multiple-realizability of semantic externalism. Thus, to some
extent the extended mind thesis is married to semantic externalism 57. But what is the
sense of externalism once cognition is understood as extended? The initial distinction for
semantic externalism was between intension and extension. The meaning externalist’s
argument showed that linguistic intension cannot determine reference, so the only
remaining option for reference is linguistic extension. Extension is not fixed internally
(“intracranially”), so meaning must be external (“extracranial”). But with the extended
cognitivist’s denial of intracraniality, it is no longer the head that bounds inside from
outside. The head is no longer the locus of the distinction between intension and
extension. But this reveals a more fundamental problem. Where is the locus of the
distinction between intension and extension? In fact, “intension” and “extension” needn’t
be conceived of spatially at all. Only under the very specific historical and conceptual
circumstances of a received computationalist / representationalist view could such a
spatial metaphor for meaning make any sense.
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But the reverse relation doesn't necessarily hold. One can be a meaning externalist without affirming the
extended mind thesis—in fact most contemporary functionalists do.
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Fortunately (or, perhaps unfortunately) functionalism provides an escape from the
meaning externalist’s spatial incoherence problem. Functionalism redraws the relevant
boundaries around whatever operations or properties are to count as cognitive. According
to the functionalist cognition takes in inputs, operates on them in characteristically
cognitive ways (which allow for multiple-realizability), and produces outputs imbued
with the hallmarks of having been produced by functions of cognitive agency.
Importantly functionalism doesn’t dissolve the boundary problems caused by Cartesian
dualism and inherited by computationalist / representationalist accounts of cognition—
rather it maintains them by de-spatializing them. But it does so at the price of multiplying
conceptual boundary problems. Now instead of the problem of spatially locating the
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of cognition, the extended cognitivist is forced to take seriously the
need to give the functional boundary conditions of cognition. This is a problem with what
Adams and Aizawa have dubbed “the mark of the cognitive” 58. Because the extended
mind is married to semantic externalism, it must address the problem of the mark of the
cognitive. Instead of answering what counts as inside or outside the head, the extended
mind theorist must now explain what counts as functionally cognitive or non-cognitive.
Alternatively, the embodied mind thesis isn’t married to functionalism or
semantic externalism, and so does not necessarily inherit the problem of the mark of the
cognitive. Of course, an embodied theorist’s commitment to either of these doctrines
equally implicates their position in dealing with this problem, so mere adoption of the
embodied mind thesis is not enough to avoid dealing with the mark of the cognitive.
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Cf. Adams & Aizawa, (2001) “The Bounds of Cognition”. Philosophical Psychology. 14, pp. 43-64.
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Instead, one must develop an account of embodiment that does not essentially rely on
functionalism or semantic externalism. To my knowledge, few who affirm the embodied
mind thesis explicitly address this issue 59. I think that a coherent and strong account of
embodied cognition can be developed without relying on either functionalism or semantic
externalism as they have been outlined here 60, and further that if one can avoid the
problem of the mark of the cognitive, one should 61. So, to briefly recap: in order to avoid
the traditional pitfalls associated with dualism and reductionism as well as the more
contemporary problems relating to the mark of the cognitive one should adopt some
version of the embodied mind thesis that disavows commitment to functionalism and
semantic externalism. Further, by interpreting the embodied mind thesis properly, we can
understand it as a more radical break with traditional dualism and reductionism, as well
as a stronger departure from computationalist and representationalist accounts of
cognition than what is availed by the extended mind thesis.

1.4

Multiple Realizability& Type-Token Identity
Without semantic externalism and functionalism, we lose previous grounds for

asserting multiple realizability. Many find multiple realizability to be a desirable result,
so from their perspective, abandonment of semantic externalism and functionalism might
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One notable exception is Mark Rowlands (cf. e.g. Rowlands 2006 and 2010). He does a good job
navigating these difficult issues, but his account of cognition ultimately relies on yet one more spurious
assumption about agential ownership. More discussion on this matter in chapter 4.
Though what I have in mind does rely on a concept that bears a close resemblance to a notion from
philosophy of biology called “biological function”. This will also be discussed at greater length in
chapter 4.
That is, rather than take it seriously. Even if one takes seriously the problem of the mark of the
cognitive and is able to adequately defeat it, one's position is still seriously undermined.
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be seen as ‘throwing out the baby with the bathwater’. For without good grounds for
multiple realizability what reason is there to think that the projects of AI can be, at their
most basic levels, possibly successful? To put the issue in terms more closely related to
the issues pertaining to this project, the concern surfaces as an issue of communicative
expression: without good grounds for sharing semantic meanings (a la semantic
externalism) what reason is there to think that social practices, at their most basic levels,
can possibly be transmitted? If we understand the gains of adopting an embodied or
extended account of cognition as finally giving a new basis for overcoming the old
Cartesian problem of separate substances, our new worry is that we haven’t made any
progress on the front of Descartes’ second problem: the problem of other minds. On the
extended and embodied approaches, mind and world are placed in direct causal and
constitutive contact with each other—so much so that there is a new worry that they
eliminate the meaningfulness of the subject of inquiry (the mind) altogether. But this
alone isn’t enough to have settled the issue of boundary between one and another mind.
Here I would like to highlight some intuitions about multiple realizability, and suggest
that perhaps we shouldn’t value it as much as the semantic externalism that motivated it;
and further that without multiple realizability the hopes of AI researchers are not dashed;
rather they are made more realistic.
Multiple realizability, again, is the idea that the same function can be
implemented variously on different platforms. A function, it is often said, is the software
that takes inputs, operates on them, and produces outputs. Since software doesn’t depend
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on a particular computational architecture 62 then, so the analogy goes, cognitive functions
do not depend on for their successful implementation on particular cognitive
architectures. To play off some intuitions about multiple realizability, let’s look at how
the idea can be seen working in an interpretation of two agents who utter the same
phrase. If agents A and B are each told to utter the phrase “Kree Jaffa!”, and each then
does, there is some sense of the word ‘function’ in which we would like to say that they
underwent the same process or function. They each took the input of the instruction to
utter the phrase (at some level of abstraction), and by doing some cognitive work, were
able to produce output (at the relevant level of abstraction) judged to be—in the relevant
aspects—the same. Thus, on this interpretation the cognitive function required to produce
agent A’s utterance is functionally equivalent to the cognitive function required to
produce agent B’s utterance. That is, there is one function variously realized on the
variant physical architectures (or substrata) of agent A’s and B’s cognitive resources.
There are a couple ways of understanding this, however. Are A’s and B’s
cognitive resources really different? Or are they two instances (or tokens) of a common
type? Using the software/hardware analogy, we can imagine swapping the software (the
functional cognitive makeup) of one agent to the other—downloading either agent’s mind
to the other’s body. If such a scenario is possible, what makes it possible? A likeness in
bodies? A likeness in minds? Both? What would happen if we attempted to download
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In fact many programs are written for a specific computer architecture. For example many Apple
programs in the 1990s were designed to take advantage of the proprietary Power PC CPU architecture
designed exclusively for use in Apple products. Such programs could not be “ported” to other
architecture intentionally as a form of 'vendor lock-in'. However, even software that cannot be ported
can be run in “non-native”, or “emulated” environments. This possibility is assured by the ChurchTuring thesis.
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agent A’s mind to a lion’s body? What about the lion’s mind to agent A’s body? These
questions hone our intuitions about in what exactly multiple realizability consists.
Wittgenstein famously wrote “if a lion could talk, we could not understand
him” 63. Though Wittgenstein would not assent to the use of psychologistic language, for
the purposes of our current exposition we can understand this aphorism as Wittgenstein’s
taking a stand on the compatibility between a lion’s embodied existence (Leib) and that
of humans. There are two interesting elements in this aphorism: first, that Wittgenstein
apparently believes that a lion’s embodied experiencing is sufficiently different from that
of a human—enough to account for the impossibility of linguistic understanding 64. This
point is important because it designates a distinction in type. Humans and lions are
linguistically incompatible because their embodied biographies are divergently
dissimilar. The second important point is that it is not merely Wittgenstein or I that cannot
understand the lion, it is we who are unable to understand. This suggests that
understanding—a function of linguistic meaning—is not something attained (for us
anyway; whoever we are) privately, rather understanding or linguistic meaning is
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Philosophical Investigations, §223.
Another possible interpretation is that Wittgenstein believes that the lion is mentally incapable of
linguistic expression in general, or of human linguistic expression in particular. I do not think this is an
adequate interpretation however. In his Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (volume II)
Wittgenstein writes: “...In general I do not surmise fear in [another person]--I see it. I do not feel that I
am deducing the probable existence of something inside from something outside; rather it is as if the
human face were in a way translucent and that I were seeing it not in reflected light but rather in its
own.” (RPP II, § 170) and ““We see emotion.”--As opposed to what?--We do not see facial contortions
and make the inference that he is feeling joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad,
radiant, bored, even when we are unable to give any other description of the features.--Grief, one would
like to say, is personified in the face...” (RPP II, § 570). It seems clear from these passages that
Wittgenstein wishes to move past cognitive processing in his account of linguistic expressibility—rather
expression is perceived (at a pre-cognitive level). For an excellent discussion of this see Søren
Overgaard & Dan Zahavi “Understanding (Other) Minds: Wittgenstein’s Phenomenological
Contribution” In E. Zamuner and D. K. Levy (eds.), Wittgenstein's Enduring Arguments. London:
Routledge, 2009, pp. 60-86.
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distributed socially. For Wittgenstein meaning is necessarily relational, interpersonal. It
cannot be located or isolated privately ‘within’ one’s subjective experience. Action is
made meaningful precisely by its performance within a social context. Without social
context, there can be no meaning. So, because a lion is a different type of social entity—
because the lion does not share our “form[s] of life” (Lebensform[en])—this is precisely
why we couldn’t possibly understand it.
The question then arises as to how different social or linguistic types can be
differentiated—in accordance with what mechanisms or principles? Additionally, what
exactly makes, for example, a lion a different type of sociolinguistic entity but another
human merely another token of the same type? Wittgenstein’s position seems to limit the
possibility of communicative meaning to the socially significant activities of token agents
belonging to a social type—or “form of life” as it were. So, if one were able to prove that
the differences between one human and another human versus the differences between
one human and a lion were, instead of differences in kind, rather differences in degree,
Wittgenstein would appear to have a problem on his hands—namely either that we
should be capable of understanding lions, or that we should not be capable of
understanding other humans 65. The issue is of how to define the belonging relation for a
sociolinguistic type. Constrain the criteria too much and all agents become type-token
identical 66, which—if Wittgenstein is correct—rules out the possibility of meaningful
language use. Loosen the criteria too much and lions, ants, trees, and rocks become
65
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The conspicuous alternative is that Wittgenstein is wrong about the bivalent nature of understanding—
that we either [fully] understand, or we [fully] fail to understand. Perhaps understanding comes in
degrees (Cf. e.g. Susan Carey’s 2009 The Origin of Concepts)
That is, each individual agent is its own type—no two agents can be judged to be 'the same' in any
relevant sense.
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candidates for social and linguistic intelligibility67.
Another way of approaching the issue of multiple realizability is from the
functionalist perspective. For the functionalist, the issue of how to define function carries
with it the problem of fineness of grain. Another of Wittgenstein’s favored examples in
his worries with what has been called the “private language argument” is in how to make
sense of personal claims of pain. On the one hand pain is a phenomenal feeling—it is
something that is primitively felt by whoever is the recipient of the sensation of pain. In
this sense, nobody but I can feel my pain, say, of a toothache. That is, this pain is
fundamentally indexed to me, here and now in this instant of feeling it, and it is of a
character so singular as to be impossible to accurately express it. As such, this pain is
wholly singular. Wittgenstein argues directly against this sort of interpretation of
‘private’ sensations such as pain. ‘Pain’, after all is, at its most basic, a linguistic
expression; and linguistic expressions attain meaning only though the myriad of uses and
relations with other linguistic expressions and within a social, language-using
community. Thus, to claim that pain expressions are utterly singular can be nothing but
nonsense because pain in all cases is what is expressed or expressible—and the utterly
singular is, indeed, inexpressible. To Wittgenstein then to be in pain is to bear the right
kind of relation to how one behaves and expresses being in a state of pain—there can be
nothing more to it.
Here we can recognize two extremes: the too-fine-grained Scylla of pain as being
utterly singular (and thus ‘private’), and the too-coarse-grained Charybdis of pain being
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In fact, this notion bears a striking resemblance to Anaxagoras' conception of noesis (νόησης).
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something in which all can share (and thus eliminating the concrete possibility of
intersubjective misunderstanding). Wittgenstein clearly wishes to avoid both extremes. If
‘pain’ is to be meaningful at all as a linguistic expression it must be socially understood.
This rules out the possibility of the [private] fine-grained extreme. However, the
meaningfulness of ‘pain’ is only retained if it does not apply to any and everything. If
pain can apply to any and every experience of any and all things ever to have existed,
being in pain becomes completely vacuous. But now again we are faced with the
dilemma of how to go about deciding what is too-fine-grained and what is too-coarsegrained. To put this problem a little differently, we could ask whether pain is a concept
that is multiply realizable. If so, how multiply realizable? The Wittgensteinian is forced
to understand the notion of multiple realizability as an intensive relational property 68.
Once again, we find that the degree to which a function is multiply realizable depends on
what is meant (in context) by the function being discussed. Wittgenstein’s response is to
look to our actual usages of concepts: how do we use the word “pain”? To Wittgenstein,
how we respond to this question is precisely what it means to be in pain, and also reveals
the degree to which being in pain is multiply realizable by others 69.
In his discussing of these issues it becomes clear that Wittgenstein does not to
believe that giving the severally necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for
belonging—for all and only the proper usage of language—is possible. Instead, he
employs the metaphorical device of “family resemblances” to express a novel conception
of inclusion without reliance on rules giving the conditions of inclusion. Thus,
68
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That is, a relational property expressible as a difference of degree. A function is not merely multiply
realizable or not—rather functions must be understood as more-or-less multiply realizable.
Philosophical Investigations §244 – 253.
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Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblance’ approach attempts to give criterionless—yet still
meaningful—conditions of appropriateness to distinguish between types and tokens 70.
I think there is much in Wittgenstein’s approach that warrants thoughtful
consideration, but I will beg-off prolonged discussion of this until chapter 2. Until then it
will have to suffice for us to acknowledge that the problem of type-inclusion is not one
that is programmatically solvable, and that multiple realizability is intimately tied to its
solution. There is additionally the trouble with what to do about degrees of similarities
and differences in body plans, as well as how to approach degrees of similarity and
difference in the cultural, social, and biographical histories of individual agents. Recall
that the question with which we are here preoccupied is in addressing how social
practices are possible for embodied agents. If these difficulties prove insuperable the
question must be answered in the negative (i.e. social practices are not possible). If they
are not insuperable, I bear the burden of showing how this is [metaphysically and
epistemically] so.
1.5

Enactive and Ecological Agency
We have already briefly examined some of the relationships between

representational or computational approaches to cognition, the extended mind thesis, and
the embodied mind thesis. Both the extended mind and embodied mind theses attempt to
set themselves apart from the computational and methodologically solipsistic approaches
to studying the mind or cognition. Both claim to make radical departures from this
tradition while downplaying the radicality of the other’s departure. While the extended
70

Ibid. §66 – 71.
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mind thesis makes great strides in conceptually freeing itself from the dualistic strictures
that have provided the basis for centuries of traditional thinking, it is at the same time
incapable of completely overcoming them entirely. Part the problem for the extended
mind thesis is its negative formulation, which depends on and derives from taking the
Cartesian way of thinking to be coherent. To claim that the mind is extended is ultimately
to simply redraw the spatial bounds of the mind—not to dissolve or ‘unthink’ those
boundaries. This is evidenced by the need for extended cognition to take seriously the
problem of the mark of the cognitive 71. Alternatively, the embodied approach to mind
fundamentally relies upon precisely the indiscernibility of clear boundaries between body
and world. To this end, it is crucial to understand what kind of entity we are discussing
when we affirm cognition as embodied.
The claim that the mind is embodied is not simply the claim that the mind is
located inside a body. As a thesis that attempts to question the very foundations of
centuries of study of the mind this would not be very interesting. In fact, depending on
how it is understood, this formulation of an “embodiment thesis” is a rare instance of a
claim that may enjoy universal assent. On the contrary, the embodied mind thesis is not
just that the mind is covered by body, so to speak—that the mind has a body—but rather
that body is essential to or constitutive of the mind, or cognition; that without the body
there is no sense in which one could be discussing minds or cognition. All concepts
involved in discussions of the mind are precisely concepts about lived bodies (Leib); that
is, the mind is the body; the body’s actions are the actions of an agent. But also as
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This is precisely what Andy Clark does in a sustained way in parts II and III of his 2008 Supersizing the
Mind.
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discussed in contradistinction to the extended mind theorist’s characterization of
embodiment, the embodied mind thesis asserts that in order to understand and explain
cognition we may not stop at the putative borders between flesh and world—we may not
become methodological solipsists. According to the embodiment theorist, lived bodies
(Leib) are special kinds of entities that are sensitive and open to the various constraints
and affordances of their local environments. One condition for the possibility of being
open to the various constraints and affordances of their local environments is that bodies
move and can be moved. Bodies are in close, “high bandwidth” coupling or interaction
with that in the local environment to which they are differentially sensitive.
There are two distinct ways of understanding this close, “high bandwidth”
interaction. The first is the embeddedness thesis, the second is the ecological mind thesis.
Both of these theses depend on a more general claim about movement—what can be
called the enactive thesis. I’ll first discuss what it means for an embodied agent to be
enactive, then show the differences between embeddedness and ecological cognition
respectively.
The idea of enactivism emphasizes the motile aspects of cognitive agency. It is the
claim that in order for something to have or be a ‘mind’ it must have or be a mobile
‘body’. In this way cognition is fundamentally tied to movement 72. There are at least two
ways for this relation between cognition and movement to be ‘fundamental’. The first is
in that the two are causally related—that either cognition causes movement, or that
movement causes cognition. Neither of these is a particularly controversial claim.
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Because movement is trivially tied to bodies (e.g. nothing but spatially-related, extended bodies can
move—movement is a spatial relation).
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Without any stimulus, without being affected by anything, the character of cognition
would be radically affected—so much so that it would no longer be clear that we are even
discussing cognition at all 73. On the other hand, if cognition could not cause movement, it
is hard to imagine what cognition does or is for. To the extent that cognition involves
some temporal process or function, there must be some output or result of having
cognized—a cognitive product. So the idea that cognition is causally related to
movement or activity 74 should be in no way contentious 75.
The second way in which the relation between cognition and movement can be
thought to be fundamental is in that either, or both are constitutive of the other. To say
that A is constitutive of B is to claim that B cannot be understood to be what it is without
A’s being what it is, in relation to B. For example, when I say that “copying others’ work
is constitutive of plagiarism”, I am claiming that the concept of plagiarism includes in its
definition what it means to copy others’ work. Without the inclusion of copying others’
work in this definition, we simply would not be talking about plagiarism—we would be
discussing either something other than the concept of plagiarism, or perhaps nothing at
all. So there are three potential “constitutive” relations between cognition and movement.
Either
(i)

73

74

75

cognition constitutes movement,

That is, so long as cognition is fundamentally intentionally structured. Cognition must be about
something, and nothing can be about anything without causality. George Kampis argues this
persuasively in his 2002, “The Natural History of Agents”, in: Gulyás, L., Tatai, G., Váncza, J. (ed.):
Agents Everywhere, Springer, Budapest, pp. 24-48.
Cf. e.g. R. F. Port, & T. van Gelder (Eds.), (1996). Mind as motion: Explorations in the dynamics of
cognition (pp. 1-43). Cambridge, MA: MIT.
In a certain sense, it is precisely the intuitiveness of the relation between minds and causation that
grounds the problem of separate substances (occasionally called the problem of mental causation).
Without such a tight (at least intuitive) connection, there couldn't be a 'problem of mental causation'.
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(ii)

movement constitutes cognition, or

(iii)

cognition and movement are co-constitutive 76.

The easiest case to consider is (ii). If movement constitutes cognition then there
can be no cognition without movement—what it means to cognize involves movement.
While not entirely vacuous (viz. it is in fact a substantive claim 77) it seems fairly
innocuous to say that (ii) is true. Whatever we may mean by “cognition” it must implicate
some kind of movement; whether the motive result is functional or physical. Cognition
necessarily has a motile product. The first case, (i), must be considered with care. We
need to think carefully about what is meant by ‘movement’. For this we should return to
the distinction between lived (Leib) and merely extended (Körper) bodies. If one’s
intuition is to say that merely extended bodies can move (for example in the sense that
planets move) then it seems an abuse of language to claim that cognition constitutes
movement—to say that what it means for something to move implicates the exercise of
some kind of cognition 78. If instead we define movement as volitional—dependent upon
some agent’s will, decision, or intention to act in a certain way—then the claim that
cognition constitutes movement becomes the claim that an agent’s movement implies that
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Outside the claim that there is some constitutive relationship between cognition and movement, there is
a fourth option: (iv) that cognition and movement bear no constitutive relation to each other. Even when
no constitutive relation is borne, there may still be some causal relation between them—and likewise,
even if there is no discernible causal relation, it is still possible that cognition and movement bear some
constitutive relation to each other.
The dictum of methodological solipsism, for instance potentially denies the relevance of movement
external to the brain barrier. If this is so, then it is possible claim that such methodological solipsists
could deny (ii). Since methodological solipsism has already been disqualified, I shall not dwell further
on this issue.
Barring claims about the “mind of God”. If one insists that movement necessarily implicates the
existence of the mind of God (as Descartes seems to argue as the basis for our inference to the existence
of res extensa in MeditationVI), then we may ask such a person if they aren't equivocating on the term
“mind”. Of course, these discussions, while interesting, take us too far from our current inquiries.
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the agent utilizes cognition 79. If volitional action originates in cognition, then we can
comfortably affirm (i) as well 80. Finally, to say (iii) that cognition and movement are coconstitutive is to claim that the two are defined in ways that rely on the other—that
neither could be what it is without the other being what it is. Without cognition could
there be movement? Without movement could there be cognition? If the answer to both is
“no” then we affirm (iii). I am inclined to affirm (iii), which means I assent to both (i)
and (ii) as well. I assent to (ii) in particular because I am committed to the notion that
merely extended bodies (Körper) derivatively owe their conceptual existence to a more
“primordial” lived embodiment (Leib). This commitment will be defended in chapter 4 81.
To say that the mind is embodied and embedded is to say that the physical
interaction between a cognitive agent’s body and the rest of the world strongly causally
constrains the possible behaviors of that agent. This in turn causally influences whatever
cognitive processes can occur for the embodied and embedded agent 82. Defined in this
way, the embedded mind thesis is a comparably weak claim about the causal relations
between the embodied mind and the external world. Given the conceptual tools
79
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Of course, the definition of movement as volitional smuggles in a potential vicious circularity: if we
understand terms like “will”, “decision”, and “intention” in cognitive terms, then all the addition of
volition does is tautologously define cognition in terms of cognition. This is unacceptable. What is
needed is a non-cognitive basis for volition. In chapters 3 and 4 I discuss one way to express the notion
of [normative] decision making in a way that doesn’t question-beg cognition.
I have up until this point been discussing cognition as a particular aspect of mental life. Many
understand cognition—thinking—to consist exclusively in the manipulation of non-derived,
propositional content. Here I will need to deviate substantially from this “received” view. Instead I wish
to hold in abeyance the precise character and details of what comprises cognition. Because I am not wed
to this “traditional” view of cognition as trafficking solely in propositional content, it makes it easier to
avoid entanglements in 'mark of the cognitive' arguments.
But to anticipate the point, roughly: what makes “mere” objects (Körper) objects is that they are
fundamentally objects for some subject—and subjects are embodied (Leib). Without subjects, there can
be no objects.
For an early explication of the idea of embeddedness see John Haugeland's “The Mind: Embodied and
Embedded” in Having Thought. 1998. For criticism of embeddedness see Mark Rowlands' The New
Science of Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology, MIT Press. 2010.
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developed earlier in this chapter, it should now be easy to see that the claim of
embeddedness, while “high bandwidth” still fits squarely within the linear, Cartesian,
‘dual-stream’ view of cognition. It maintains and assumes an inside / outside distinction
(though here shifted to the boundaries of skin and world) that the extended and embodied
approaches have attempted to mitigate. As such it inherits all the same ‘old’ Cartesian
problems.
The enactive approach to cognition owes much of its conceptual underpinnings to
the groundbreaking work of J.J. Gibson in the 1960’s and 1970’s. As compared with the
embeddedness thesis, Gibson’s vision of perception emphasized the constitutive relations
between the embodied perceiver and the ‘ecology’ in which a perceiving agent is always
enmeshed. In the 1970’s Gibson developed his theories of direct visual perception and
ecological affordances 83. His interests focused on the visual modality of perception
instead of other ways in which agents participate with and within their ecological milieus,
but he did not intend to privilege vision over these modalities. Vision just happened to be
his psychological specialty, and the area in which he did his work.
Gibson’s ecological approach to perception marked what he took to be a drastic
departure from the way perception was being studied from the 1950s to the 1970s. This
“received view” from which Gibson set himself apart followed in the Cartesian, Lockean,
and Kantian traditions of treating perception as unidirectional. The agent, in her capacity
as a perceiver plays a passive role taking in, for example, visual stimuli as it
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Cf. (1972) A Theory of Direct Visual Perception, (1977) The Theory of Affordances, and most
significantly (1979) The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception.
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spontaneously bombards the retinal disk 84. Gibson’s approach put the perceiver in a more
active role, according to which perception and action are closely interwoven and
mutually constraining. It is not that visual stimuli cause perception, as the “received
view” had it, but that the perceiving agent in many ways causes the visual stimulus
though her active movement through her surroundings 85. This is striking in experiments
with the Ganzfeld (“whole field” [of vision]) in which subjects were deprived of visual
stimulus 86. Through saccadic eye movement, subjects reported visual perception where
they knew none was possible. Gibson’s explanation was that there is “invariant”
information embedded in what he called the “ambient optic array”. The “ambient optic
array” is the particular matrix of light as it is from each and every possible perspective
within a given environment. As an agent moves about her environment, the ambient optic
array is differentially affected by the agent’s movement. Through this movement some
aspects of the ambient optic array take on a second-order invariance—their differential
alterations occur in characteristic and predictable ways 87. Gibson argued that this secondorder invariance is what allows for us to perceive our surroundings in terms of objects
with surfaces and textures, and helps determine which objects in our environment are
moving and which aren’t. What is important, however is that the invariant information
embedded in the ambient optic array can only be obtained through agential movement.
For Gibson, in a very concrete sense, movement is both causally necessary for and
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To be clear, Kant’s theory of mind is active, but not environmentally or ecologically active – it doesn’t
act in the world, it acts on itself. The charge of unidirectionality still sticks.
Ibid, pp. 170-188. This, however is different from the Kantian view that an intellect completely
constitutes her world by exercising the spontaneous synthesizing powers of reason (schematism,
categorization, etc.).
Ibid. p. 151.
Ibid. pp. 73-88.
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constitutive of perception.
According to the received computationalist / representationalist view of
perception, perception is mediated by algorithmic inferences or manipulations of internal
symbols or representations. What is perceived depends equally on the input supplied by
sensory stimulation of light, as well as the representational symbolic manipulations and
computations employed in processing that information. Gibson’s view of perception is,
on the other hand, not mediated by computational algorithms, inferences, or
representations—rather he saw perception as occurring directly through the unmediated
differential experiencing of invariants in the ambient optic array as it is differentially
affected by agential movement. These invariants are what reveal to a perceiver all
objects, motions, and activities in the agent’s local environment. The result of perceiving
invariance in the ambient optic array is that no mental representations, processes, or
inferences are required for visual perception. The activity of perceiving is not a
unidirectional process resulting in an internal representation of the external environment;
it is rather the direct experiencing of environmental invariants.
One significant result of Gibson’s ecological theory of affordances is that many of
the cognitive activities that were previously thought to necessarily occur in the brain were
shown to possibly occur external to organismal boundaries. For the visual modality the
ambient optic array serves as a case in point. Additionally, Gibson believed that the
normative values and meanings or significances of situations, events, objects, and persons
are not internal to a perceiving agent. Thus, it would be accurate to say that Gibson too
thought that “meanings just ain’t in the head”. Instead, he thought that values and
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meanings acquire their valuation and meaningfulness through situations that directly
reveal environmental affordances and constraints, or potentials for action, to agents. For
example, imagine a friend choking on chicken bones. Without the knowledge of how to
properly perform abdominal thrusts or CPR, we find ourselves constrained—unable to
provide help—by this very lack of knowledge. This situational constraining (or
affordance in the case of one who can perform abdominal thrusts or CPR) is what,
according to Gibson, normatively imbues situations with value and meaning. That the
situation shows up as affording or constraining particular agentive actions is precisely in
what value and meaning consists.
The radicality of Gibson’s position cannot be understated. By locating cognitive
information in the ambient optic array itself, and not within some computational process
occurring within a brain, Gibson’s theory of visual perception already depended on the
truth of the extended mind thesis—predating its Clark & Chalmers formulation by more
than two decades. By recognizing that this information only becomes significant through
organismal movement Gibson realized that the activity of perception (and by extension,
cognition) fundamentally relies on the close, nonlinear, dynamic coupling between active
embodied agents and their environments 88. Further, he was sensitive to the fact that not
only is the agent differentially affected by the constraints and affordances provided by the
local environment, but that the agent herself differentially affects those same constraints
and affordances through her differential activity within those environs—that is, Gibson
recognized the ecological nature of agency. With this in place, Gibson was able to
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Ibid. pp. 133-143.
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explain how agents come to perceive themselves as the sources affordances and
constraints, as well as perceiving their environment as constitutive parts of themselves 89.

1.6

Cognitive bloat and other colors of herring.
The move to reconceptualize cognition in a way that is inclusive of factors and

elements external to the brain, or on many interpretations external to the body, opens up
the door to a worry first articulated by Robert Rupert and popularized by Mark
Rowlands’ reference to it as the “cognitive bloat” problem 90. The cognitive bloat problem
is the worry that when we are willing to accept as constitutive of cognition elements and
factors that occur external to the brain and/or body, then we had better be able to clearly
demarcate in all cases where the boundaries of cognition are located. Without being able
to give such a demarcation, cognition can, as it were, “spill out” into the world,
encompassing and including any and everything that exists. The entire universe, so the
cognitive bloat argument goes, could constitute the cognitive apparatus of a single
cognitive agent—and this is preposterous. A related problem also falling under the
heading of ‘cognitive bloat’ is in not being able to define the limits of the subject under
cognitive investigation. The worry here is that when we allow for the extended mind
thesis we begin failing to be able to articulate what exactly cognition is; so we begin to
fail to identify what exactly we are studying. Without being able to define the subject
area, so the worry goes, we cannot possibly make progress in solving its [exactly
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Ibid. pp. 182-208.
cf. Rupert, Robert.2004. “Some Problems for the Thesis of Extended Cognition.” Journal of Philosophy
101:389 – 428. and criticism, Mark Rowlands' The New Science of Mind: From Extended Mind to
Embodied Phenomenology, MIT Press. 2010.
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what’s?] problems; instead condemned to fruitless cognitive research programmes—and
this is preposterous and self-defeating. The problem of cognitive bloat can be put by way
of analogous example: consider the task of answering a friend’s query about tomorrow’s
weather forecast:

Beers, Bars, and Barometers [BBB] example:
You and your friend are seated in a pub in the center of town when your friend
asks you “what does the local weather authority forecast for tomorrow’s weather?” Not
wanting to disappoint, you assess your current situation with a mind toward adequately
and correctly responding to your friend’s query. After much consideration, you remember
that another friend both owns an iPad and is currently working at the café down the
street. You surmise that this friend is likely to both have his iPad and to allow you to
borrow it for these purposes. The café, if you recall properly, has wi-fi internet access,
and you trust that you know how to search for the local weather authority’s forecast using
your friend’s iPad.

The question is whether you are cognitively capable of adequately and correctly
responding to your pub friend’s query. Many would intuitively say “yes, you are capable
of this cognitive task”. But with worries of cognitive bloat in mind, perhaps we should
pause and consider wherein lies such an affirmative response. We should focus on what
is required to successfully complete the task at hand, as well as what aspects of the
completion of this task should be considered genuinely cognitive. The enactivist intuition
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is precisely that implementation is integral to (or constitutive of) cognition—nothing can
be considered cognitive if it cannot be enacted. 91 But first, let us recognize a bit of a
puzzle. The worry about cognitive bloat only arises when we suspect that there aren’t
any, or aren’t enough, necessary and sufficient conditions defining the boundaries of
what is to count as ‘cognitive’. So to address the issue of what aspects of this example
task should be considered genuinely cognitive is to presume that we already have
sufficiently established such boundary conditions (viz. the “mark of the cognitive”). And
if such boundary conditions are already established, then this example should prove
wholly uninteresting.
First, in order to be capable of completing the task of telling my friend the
weather, I must have some idea of what the task is that needs completing. I must interpret
my friend’s utterance in a way that sets up a problem or task for completion; and which
gives at least rough criteria for success or failure. That is, I must understand my current
situation as a problem, a task—I must recognize that something must be done. My actions
should constitute a sufficient basis for both me and my friend to judge whether I’ve met
those criteria or not 92. Interestingly, if I begin to act by hailing the waiter to settle my tab,
my pub friend may judge me not to have properly understood his query—even though
this might be the first action in a series of planned actions which are intended to result in
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This central tenet of enactivism is shared by a majority of its proponents (e.g. Alva Noë, Mark
Rowlands, Evan Thompson, De Jaeger & Di Paolo, Varela et. al., and perhaps Clark). For further
discussion see Clark 2008, De Jaeger & Di Paolo 2007, Varela 1997, Thompson 2007, Noe 2004,
Rowlands 2010.
Of course, my friend and I can disagree as to whether particular criteria are met, or about which criteria
are significant. We may have a conversation (or argument) about this very issue, or [perhaps
incorrectly] assume that the other operates with the same criteria as our own. Difficulties can and do
often arise in communicative and interpretive tasks such as these; and so a theory's ability to adequately
represent the character of these difference should be viewed as a merit rather than as a demerit.
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correctly responding to his query. Judgment of satisfaction of criteria such as these is
often executed in the impoverishment of sufficient evidence.
After interpreting my friend’s question, cognitively speaking, I engage in a sort of
playful heuristic search for viable ways in which an appropriate response might avail
itself. Included in this search might be considerations such as whether I want to take the
query seriously in the first place, or if I can quickly respond with a pun. I attempt to
remember if I had previously seen a forecast or not, and—regardless of the actual facts—
I am constrained by a self-imposed (though implicit and undefined) time limit in such
considerations—I decide that I must not have seen a forecast previously, at least not that I
can recall under such constraints. I move on to consider what actions I could take in order
to find out. Hail the waiter and ask him? Maybe, but the waiter’s response may be
unreliable. Scan the room for a television. None to be found. Give up entirely? Perhaps—
but wait! Aha! I’ve recalled I have a friend who works nearby; and even better, this
friend is likely to have an iPad with internet connectivity. I’ll settle my tab, head over to
the cafe, and ask to borrow my friend’s iPad. The plan is now set.
Was this plan hatched in my head alone? Did the delicious beer have any effect on
it? Perhaps. If it did, does this effect count as constitutive of cognition? Well,
counterfactually speaking, we can ask whether the cognitive task would have been
executed differently were it not for the effect of the beer. If the qualitative character of
the task is made sufficiently different by the consumption of beer 93 then the beer is
minimally a causal influence in the decision. But what would it take for the beer to be
93

Though here we encounter the problem of how to cash out the notion of “sufficiently different”. How
could one possibly compare what actually occurs with what didn't? How could one possibly make sense
of such a comparison? Such problems are inherent to counterfactual thinking.

47

constitutive of cognition? Of this particular instance of cognition 94? Intuitively we might
want to say that this particular beer may be constitutive of this particular instance of
cognition, but that beer (in general) is not constitutive of cognition (in general). But
cognition is never actualized in general. It is always actualized in specific circumstances,
and if particular instances of drinking beer each constitutively factor into particular
cognitive activities, it seems reasonable to say that (at least in each of those
circumstances) beer factors constitutively in cognition.
Here I have stumbled into what Fred Adams and Kenneth Aizawa have called the
“coupling-constitution fallacy” 95—the idea that proponents of the extended mind thesis
fallaciously conflate the notions of causal coupling and constitution. It may be argued
that what I have said in the previous passage amounts to such a conflation. The upshot of
the previous paragraph is to show that (C) there can be no severally necessary and jointly
sufficient general criteria for counting as cognitive (viz. bearing the so-called ‘mark of
the cognitive’) because (P1) all cognition occurs in particular instances, and (P2) all
particular instances bear purely causal relations (therefore, all criteria are necessarily
particular, and not general). Another way of expressing this is to say that—as a
committed physicalist—I claim that in a concrete sense, everything bears purely causal
relationships—that everything is constituted through its causal relations. This supposition
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The difference between these two questions is interesting. Is it possible that something be constitutive
of cognition in one particular circumstance, but not be allowed to count as constitutive of cognition
generally? I tend toward giving an affirmative response here—but only because I think a general
concept of cognition is either incoherent or empty. On the contrary, I suspect that many would say that
to “count as cognitive” is to exhibit the appropriate general characteristics—so nothing could count as
cognitive in particular circumstances and not generally—because to “count as cognitive” is just to
possess the necessary and sufficient [general] conditions. This is precisely the position against which I
here argue.
cf. e.g. Adams F, Aizawa K (2008) The bounds of cognition. Blackwell, Malden, MA
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does conflate cause and constitution in the sense that it conflates the more general notion
of identity with the causal structure of the world. But does it conflate the causal
“coupling” of cognitive and non-cognitive systems with the notion that causally coupled
systems constitute a greater system bearing the so-called ‘mark of cognition’? To this I
wish to respond that it does not because I do not purport to give any such general criteria
for counting as cognitive; which are what is asked-for by the requirement of the “mark of
the cognitive”. Another way of seeing my position is to understand all cognitive systems
as unique, and provisional—defined by their concrete, particular, and dynamic causal
relations. Because of this uniqueness, to ask for general inclusion criteria for what gets to
“count as cognitive” [bear the “mark of cognition”] is to ask for an explanation that must
necessarily distort any and all actual moments of cognition. Whatever it could mean to
“count as cognitive” [generally] is precisely the extent to which its application to a
particular system is distortive rather than explanatory.
The question as to whether I would be able to have cognized the task of figuring
out the weather in this way is different than the question as to whether I would have been
able to cognize the task [at all]. The former question understands instances of cognition
as type-token identical. Each act of cognition is essentially unique. The second question
understands instances of cognition as tokens of a type—the type in this circumstances
being viable cognitive solutions to the particular query. So regarding the BBB example,
we may ask whether the beer I consumed is constitutive of the general cognitive task
“one” might employ in order to adequately respond to my pub friend’s query. That is, is
the beer necessary for any adequate solution? And to this our intuitions likely suggest a
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response of “no”, the beer happens to be constitutive of this particular instance of
cognition, but is not constitutive of cognition pertaining to any solution to the query. But
again, we may ask, why should we be concerned with “any” [generic] solution rather than
the specific solution availed in these particular circumstances—especially when all
cognitive situations are instances of the latter, and not the former? To put the issue here
more abstractly, and to make the point more pertinent toward our discussion, it is not at
all obvious that we should be attempting to describe how cognition is generally, because
doing so appears to cover over and ignore salient cognitive aspects that are inextricably
tied to functioning of actual and particular cognitive situations. 96 The worry here is that
by focusing on general criteria for “counting as cognitive”, we run the risk of ruling out
specific, particular—but genuinely cognitively constitutive—factors indexed exclusively
to the particularities of a situation.
What about the physical and sensorimotor activities involved in my particular
solution to my pub friend’s query? My solution requires that I relocate myself to the café
down the street. In different circumstances where I was immobilized for example—
perhaps by another pub-goer attempting to tranquilize a monkey with a blowgun who for
some reason accidentally missed and instead hit me—I would not be able to rely on, or
assume I could readily rely on the relative ease at which I am able to move myself down
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In conversation, Megan Altman drew my attention to the similarity between seeking general “mark of
the cognitive” criteria and the misapplicability of Kant's Categorical Imperative. For Kant, one's duty is
determined solely by the purely general formal laws of reason—which in their generality cannot
account for the particularity of any situational context. It is precisely because the categorical imperative
is general, and abstract, that it applies; but it is equally precisely because it is general and abstract that is
necessarily excluded from the particular context of any situation. The categorical always applies, but
can never be applied. Likewise, generalized definitions of cognitions may apply (for example in
attempting to pick out all and only those things capable of cognition) but can never adequately
characterize the particular processes [of cognition in action].
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the street to the café. That is, my solution depends on the effective use and availability of
sensorimotor affordances. Without such affordances obtaining, my solution is not just a
bad solution—it ceases to be a solution at all. If I cannot get myself down the street to the
café, I cannot complete the task, or answer my friend’s query. I would have to either
reassess my situation, or give up. Thus, since my solution necessarily relies upon the
sensorimotor affordance of successfully walking down the street, part of the cognitive
task involves walking—the activity of walking too is constitutive of cognition 97.
Further, let us consider the role(s) of social practices as they may factor into this
issue of cognitive bloat. As with the effects of beer and the sensorimotor affordance
profile of walking down the street, I here claim that social practices are also constitutive
of cognition. In myriad ways our personal understandings of what it means to act within
social settings function to constrain and afford various particular and possible actions. In
the example above, my first action was to hail the waiter and ask for my check. My claim
here is that this action is also constitutive of the cognitive task of telling my pub friend
tomorrow’s weather—that without engaging in the act of hailing and the subsequent
social practices associated with bill-paying etiquette, I would not be engaged in the same
sorts of activity as I would were I not to have hailed him. Leaving the bar having not paid
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Again, I will be charged with falling prey to the “coupling-constitution fallacy”. To be clear, the
conflation of causality and constitution is a blurring of a distinction with which I am comfortable. I do
not believe that there is any “fallacy” in it. One only sees a fallacy when one [unjustly] assumes a
commitment to the applicability of general “mark of the cognitive” criteria to particular instances of
cognition. When we question the very meaningfulness of “cognition” as a general term, it is no longer
obvious that there is any fallacy at all. Others (especially Menary, Clark, and Sutton in Menary, 2010)
have taken issue with Adams &Aizawa's “coupling-constitution fallacy”, generally emphasizing the
idea of integration in defining cognitive systems. Defining cognitive systems as constituted by relations
of integrations rather than of coupling effectively works to skirt such criticisms. Others such as
Thompson & Stapleton (2009) have made similar arguments. I am sympathetic to these approaches, as
well as the idea that integration is significant in defining cognitive systems—but my approach needn't
avoid the charge—rather it faces it head-on.
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the tab gives an entirely different social (and I argue, cognitive) character to my actions.
It is the difference between adequately responding to my pub friend’s query in a socially
acceptable way, and doing so in a socially unacceptable way—and in many cases the
social constraints are so stringent as to make this difference in acceptability be effectively
prohibitive. Under such circumstances, the socially unacceptable “options” often fail to
arise as options at all. I may not even imaginatively entertain them because of their social
unacceptability, or the fact of their unacceptability could be enough for immediate
dismissal as viable options. As such, social considerations and activities can and do factor
constitutively into cognition.
For current purposes we can conclude that the problem of cognitive bloat only
arises as a problem for someone who wishes to nail-down what cognition is in general. I
have shown that any such general definition of cognition necessarily ignores or represses
an aspect of all actual cognitive activities—namely that they, in each and every case,
occur within some situation under some particular set of cognitively relevant
circumstances. Each situation uniquely and differentially exhibits its own particular
constraints and affordances. These constraints and affordances include salient aspects of
the local environment, as well as salient aspects of the agent for whom they are
constraining or affording—after all, if what I say is true, then there is no steadfast
ontological boundary between the two. If one would like to ask the question of what
cognition is—one must look to particular occurrences thereof. One should not generalize
or abstract away from them. The demand for a “mark of the cognitive” is thus not only
unmotivated, but detrimental to cognitive research.
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1.7

Dynamic Embodied Agency
So far I have given critical arguments against viewing cognition and agency in

certain ways. I have suggested problems with Cartesian, reductionist, [purely]
computational / representational, embedded, and even some versions of extended,
embodied, and enactive theories of cognition. In this section I would like to sketch a
positive construction of a position that I think is capable of navigating the rough seas of
agency scholarship and its criticisms. This picture will depend for its full effect on a
vocabulary to be explicated further in chapters 3 and 4. As such, this should serve as a
warning that my comments here should be understood as merely preliminary and
provisional. More serious explication will appear shortly, once all the conceptual tools
have been put in place.
As may have been evident in previous sections of this chapter, I posses a great
respect and affinity for J.J. Gibson’s approach to visual perception and the ‘enactive’
approach to cognition that followed. However, my purpose here is not to give an account
of vision or perception. Instead, one should understand this as a work in the metaphysics
(and related epistemology) of agency—addressing the question “what are agents such
that our phenomenal experiences can arise and be meaningful as they apparently do?” In
order to ask this question, we must already take seriously that our phenomenal
experiences are in some ways primitive—we take as our starting point the veracity of
experiencing. This has the effect of tying together metaphysical and epistemological
claims. Whenever we attempt to make claims about what there is and how, we
necessarily imply that the answers we give can and should be meaningful to us. Thus, any
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metaphysics implicitly carries with it the epistemological baggage of bearing meaning. A
metaphysics that is not, or has no possibility of meaningfulness (to us) is one that is
ignored 98 (blind). It is literally and effectively insignificant. Similarly any epistemology
that has no bearing on how things are (in the world), or on what there actually is, is one
that is toothless (empty). Therefore, we must take seriously the phenomenality of
experiences because the alternative (metaphysics which does not account for
phenomenality) is incoherent. If anything, this is what licenses our taking of phenomenal
experiences as primitive.
There are a great many varieties of phenomenal characters of experience and ways
of seeing the world or one’s situation. Again, depending on fineness of grain, one might
even say that there are as many varieties of phenomenal characters of experience as there
are moments of experiencing. This is, in some sense, another way of saying that every
moment of one’s life is unique (diachronic uniqueness), or that each of us experiences
our lives in a way that is qualitatively and phenomenally different from everyone else
(synchronic uniqueness). Of course at coarser grains of analysis we encounter
similarities 99. To assert something like the embodiment thesis is to make a somewhat
coarse grain level assertion about what is or can be significant for many of us—but it
isn’t to say that there is something special about this level of analysis, nor is it to say
there is something special about who is included in the class of entities for which the
embodiment thesis can be significant. In this way, much of what I have to say, and
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Just as an ethics that has no practical bearing on particular situations is useless (cf. Footnote 96).
Finding similarities, detecting patterns—these are the benefits of abstraction; and the follies. As
discussed earlier, it is precisely the extent to which similarities and patterns can be detected that they
distort what is actual.
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believe to be compelling is simply a matter of my being impressed with a certain
treatment of a subject matter at a certain level of analysis. My being impressed, and my
opting to write about it betrays the functioning of an additional normative element—I
think that you too, if you are reading this, should be impressed by similar arguments. The
point here is merely to acknowledge the contexts and degrees of commitment to which I
feel obliged. Overall, this argument can be read as one big conditional: IF you think that
this is a compelling level of analysis, and IF you think that we are licensed to take as
primitive phenomenal experience then you should be willing to accept the kind of
account proffered here.
As I mentioned, I have a particular affinity for J.J. Gibson’s theories of visual
perception and affordances. This affinity is based in an intuitive agreement between how
I feel my phenomenal encounter with the world is, and how I understand Gibson’s
theories to fit with my understanding of my phenomenal experiences. Argumentatively
there is an important point to be made here: I do not wish to claim that my phenomenal
experience and my understanding of Gibson’s theories of visual perception and
affordances should extend or apply to anybody else. Thus, there is a crucial skeptical
thread I wish to weave into my argumentative structure. I wish to grant that others’
phenomenal experiences and understandings are—at least possibly—radically different
than my own. I grant this possibility while recognizing that it comes with both
metaphysical and epistemological strings attached.
My skeptical claim interpreted metaphysically amounts to granting the possibility
that what another is, may be a fundamentally different kind of thing than what is made
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significant by my phenomenal experiencing 100. In a certain sense what I am saying is that
my phenomenal experiencing is [potentially] different in kind than anything else in the
universe. Epistemologically however, I am not in a position that allows me to make a
claim one way or another. I could not possibly know how others’ phenomenal
experiences are [if there are any]. This is not equivalent to the doubt that other
phenomenal experiencing occurs, rather it is holding in abeyance all and only what
cannot in principle be or become meaningful from here. The facts about how others’
phenomenally experience could not possibly be meaningful to me because they are in
principle out of the bounds of my experiencability. As such, my claims may strike one as
wildly inaccurate, and phenomenally false. To this all I can say is that perhaps our
experiences are wildly different than each others; since neither of us could know, it
cannot matter.
This is what makes communication possible—that one is always in a position of
being incapable of knowing for certain whether the other understands or not—or what of
an expression is understood, and how. Instead if we are to arrive at such a judgment it
must necessarily come from underdetermined and inadequate evidence. The result is
often that when we take others to understand, we do so provisionally—their
understanding is “good enough for government work”; it is pragmatically, and
epistemically adequate (for now, until proven otherwise). Many times this is how one’s
sense of understanding another arises phenomenally; but this is not always how it is. Just
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That is, I allow for radical otherness—even to the extent that others' agency may not be recognizable as
agency at all from my perspective. Of course, this is a merely academic problem—because the
epistemic nature of otherness is such that precisely these kinds of problems cannot possibly arise; from
my perspective it would be impossible to experience an others' agency. This will be elaborated in
chapter 4.
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as often there appears to be no judgment at all—phenomenally speaking our
understanding of the other shows up as directly accessed. For instance, when I look at the
face of my perplexed pub friend when my response to his query is to hail the waiter, I
don’t interpret or judge him to be perplexed; rather I see it directly in his expression 101.
For all that it could possibly matter to me—that is, for all that I could know, or could be
or become meaningful to me here and now—my pub friend simply is perplexed. The
general point that I am making is that for my friend to be perplexed is necessarily a fact
from here—it is indexed to and only as broadly scoping as the system for which it is
significant or meaningful. This is what it means to be perplexed—to arise as being in or
expressing a state of perplexity for some affection-recognizing system. There is no
objective fact of the matter as to what it could mean to ‘be perplexed’ beyond this. To
expect more is to require or reach beyond epistemic possibility; which means reaching
beyond meaningfulness 102.
Given that the basic issue addressed here is one of the metaphysics of agency, the
possibility of communication is of fundamental significance. Are agents the kinds of
things that are capable of communicating? To this, it is of course crucial to understand
what is meant by ‘communication’, and from the above sketch, it may be clear to some
that what I have in mind is strikingly different than a theory that understands
communication as the transmission of information from one subjective locus in objective
101
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Recognize the influence of Wittgenstein here (cf. Footnote 64). Following the work of Eleanor Rosch,
and subsequent research in mirror neurons (e.g. Rizzolatti, Iacoboni, Gallese, et. al.) there is good
reason to take the hypothesis of direct access to others' affective states seriously. This can be noted in
the recent surge of philosophical and psychological work on what is being called “empathy” or
“empathy studies”. Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi have even begun a sort of cottage industry in
synthesizing all of these threads, as well as historical studies in phenomenology (especially in Husserl,
Scheler, and Merleau-Ponty) into a coherent theory of embodiment sensitive to sociality.
Which is precisely what many flavors of metaphysical realism do.
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space to another. I believe that within such an understanding of communication then
agents are not the kinds of things that are capable of communication. However, on a
‘weaker’ version of what it means to communicate, agents are capable of
communication. I will construct a notion of communication on which nothing needs to be
shared between or amongst agents said to be in communication with each other. This is
fortuitous, because metaphysically speaking, I claim that sharing meaning between or
amongst agents is impossible. Most basically, agents cannot share or elude their
particular cultural, social, physical, and biographical histories—they are inextricably tied
to their own perspectives. But as historical entities, agents are dynamically co-constituted
by, and integrated with and within their dynamic (social, cultural, physical, etc.)
environments. Agents do not share but they are not isolated—they are open, dynamically
interact with, and are sensitive to the world around them. Further, as embodied and
extended entities, agency may span parts of bodies, one body, many bodies, tools,
cultures, and social practices. I call my theory of agency “Dynamic Embodied Agency”
or DEA.
DEA can be variously understood as a theory of metaphysics, epistemology, or
meaning. Taking phenomenal experience as primitive means that aspects appearing in
any one of each of these three areas always fundamentally impacts the other two 103. As a
metaphysical theory DEA addresses what kinds of entities agents are. According to DEA,
In order to understand what an agent is, means understanding what agents do. Agents
understand and act in their local environments in accordance with the constraints and
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This is true of any theory of metaphysics, epistemology, or meaning. Any and all commitments made in
one area constrain the possibilities in either of the other two.
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affordances which function to disclose or occlude available possibilities for
understanding and action. A situation is the disclosure or occlusion of available
possibilities as they arises or “show up” meaningfully for an agent. Situations are
essentially dynamic in that agents and their local environments are in close causal and
constitutive coupling—they each differentially and continuously affect each other, and in
so doing make each other what they are.
Taken as an epistemological theory, DEA addresses the ways in which agentenvironment couplings come to constitute a dynamic situation for a cognitive agent.
Epistemologically significant are then issues pertaining to how information is
communicated to and for an agent, given the kinds of interactions that make the agent and
local environment what they are. Specifically we will be interested in how agents
communicate interpersonally, and the relations between interpersonal communication, an
agent’s understanding of her situation, and the development and effects of social
practices as they become significant for a socially situated dynamically embodied agent.
As a theory of meaning, DEA focuses on the relations between bodies and
meaning-bearing situations. According to DEA the body is the sine qua non through
which environmental and agential affordances and constraints come to signify a
meaningful situation for an agent. A dynamic agent’s degree of bodily ‘likenesses’ and
“attunement” to salient aspects of her situation are what disclose a sense of belonging and
agreement with others, and feeling of being “at-home” or comfortable in her situation.
When an agent’s bodily encounter with her cultural, social, physical, or biographical
environment arises as more disjointed, the agent comes to see her place in the world as
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alienated and ill-at-ease. Of course, because situations are dynamic there are different
degrees and qualitative characters of experience that can change (with varying degrees of
robustness or plasticity depending on how “stable” the agent’s understanding of her
situation is) depending most fundamentally on particular characteristics of the bodyenvironment interaction.
In the next chapter I will continue in more depth discussing issues of
communication, and social practices—specifically addressing concerns and criticism
relating to issues of transmission and inheritance of social practices, sharing social
practices, and the ontological status and significance of social practices for socially
embedded agents. Once this groundwork is laid, we will be in a position to construct
more fully a theory of agency that allows us to adequately navigate both these issues as
well as those encountered in the discussion about cognition in this chapter.
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Chapter 2: Social Practices and Agency
2.1

Metaphysical and Epistemological Background
With the basic structure of the account of agency I’ve just formulated in place, it

is now important to address the pressing concern of the problem of other minds. My
intention here is to give an explanation of the possibility of dynamic embodied agents
communicating with each other. I do not propose to solve the problem of global
skepticism about other minds (the solipsistic doubt that there are other minds out there).
Instead, I take it as granted that there exist a plurality of agents acting in the world.
Whether this is metaphysically the case or not, I will argue, is phenomenally and
epistemically irrelevant—and taking phenomenality as our only metaphysical primitive
(as I’ve attempted to justify in the previous chapter) any metaphysical claims that make
no difference phenomenally cannot matter to the kinds of dynamic embodied agents I
have outlined 104. So as long as the world shows up to an agent through her experiencing
as populated with other agents, this itself is enough to warrant the metaphysical
hypothesis of other agents; as no stronger criterion for warrant is possible.
There are many and variegated senses in which one might call him or herself a
104

In some ways, my thesis here is Quinean in the sense of preferring ontological “desert landscapes”—I
use epistemic significance as a constraint for metaphysical significance; and use metaphysical
significance to constrain metaphysical possibility. I am aware that these constraints underdetermine a
final metaphysical resolution, and in fact this basic metaphysical indeterminacy is a natural result of the
fundamental differences in perspectives explicit in my account of dynamical embodied agency. The
sense in which this is “Quinean” is that epistemic meaningfulness can be used as a mode of paring back
the metaphysical landscape. Tersely, my account privileges epistemic difference over metaphysical
(realist) similarity.
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metaphysical realist. Here is not the proper place to rehearse such metaphysical
taxonomies, however some brief remarks describing and locating my position are
warranted, because metaphysical commitments have epistemic consequences and vice
versa—such commitments are mutually constraining. Thus, the picture of dynamic
embodied agency outlined in the previous chapter is only coherent on or possible for a
definite set of metaphysical commitments. For example, the requirement that agents are
necessarily embodied excludes the possibility of a purely idealist metaphysics (or
conversely for an idealist, dynamical embodied agency should appear as incoherent on
the grounds of the materiality of the body—lived (Leibt) as it may be). The requirement
that agents can act excludes the possibility of a purely static universe 105 (e.g. Platonism,
Four-Dimensionalism, Russell’s so-called “at-at” theory of time, etc.); instead it relies on
a nonlinear, intensive notion of temporality106.
None of this is to say that—while non-standard—there is anything inconsistent
between dynamic embodied agency and a fairly flat-footed metaphysical realism – the
belief that reality, or aspects of reality, is ontologically independent of our conceptual
schemes, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc.. Certainly the tone of my position, indexing
metaphysical possibility to epistemic possibility, is quite anti-realist. But nothing about
the metaphysics of agency given in DEA precludes a thoroughgoing scientific realism 107.

105
106
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This is because action depends on the passage of time and the possibility of change.
For excellent discussion of the qualitative differences in temporality see Henri Bergson’s Time and Free
Will, Division II of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, and Theodore Schatzki’s The Timespace of
Human Activity. While there are interesting differences in each of these accounts, all of them share an
affinity for what Bergson calls aionic duration—an intensively felt and overlapping vectoral time that
problematizes the sequential past-present-future structure assumed by many theories of metaphysics.
More thorough treatment of the concept of nonlinear temporality is given in chapter 4.
At its most basic, scientific realism is the position that the unobservable entities posited by current best
scientific theories are metaphysically real. One popular scientific realist position is the “Structural
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Prior to taking a stand as a realist we may ask what is to qualify as “real”. DEA is a
position that takes a metaphysical stand by first taking an epistemological stance.
But the problem of other minds goes further than mere metaphysical
commitments to realism. It ties together the metaphysical and epistemic issues of the
possibility knowing certain kinds of entities—namely other minds. In order to know
anything about other minds, there must be something about which it is knowledge—there
must be other minds. But what is the character of these minds? What are these minds
like? And what is the character of the epistemic activity required to know them? Both of
these concerns depend directly on the quality of epistemic encounter brought to bear by
agents. In a sense, the perspectivalism implicit in dynamic embodied agency invites a sort
of relativism: different agents are going to understand the very character of agency—of
what it means to be an agent—differently. That is—from either of our perspectives, we
may be taking each other as agents, but what either of us means by “agent” may be very
different. Of course, this possibility of difference is simultaneously both an epistemic and
metaphysical possibility. Epistemically, as perspectival agents—agents who perceive
from somewhere—dynamic embodied agents lack the requisite access to be able to learn
of such a difference. Thus, if there is a difference between my and your understanding of
what an agent is, it would be in principle impossible for me as a perspectived agent to

Realism” pioneered by John Worrall, which suggests that while the content of scientific theories may
not strictly be true, our best scientific theories tend to get better and better at capturing the structure of
reality—science accurately describes the real structure of the world, and gets progressively more
accurate (without major crises or revolutions in the way that Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend describe).
Dynamical embodied agency is consistent with structural realism, and scientific realism more generally
because there is nothing in it that directly or indirectly disputes an adequate interpretation of our current
best scientific theories.
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know it 108. To know the difference requires that one dynamic embodied agent has direct
access to another dynamic embodied agency qua agency; the agency with that particular
dynamic embodied perspective. Essentially such an agent would have to be the other—
but under such circumstances, there would simply be no difference anymore, and no
‘other’ to speak of 109.
The consequences of this picture for an adequate theory of communication are
quite significant. As long as an agent can have direct or immediate epistemic access to
another, the other is no longer other. In recent literature on the topic of empathy, some
commentators 110 have focused on the question of what constitutes ‘directness’ as it
pertains to epistemic access. I find that it is most useful to see directness and indirectness
as differences in degree of accessibility. The easier it is for an agent to incorporate
something into her dynamic embodied agency the more direct it is 111. This approach has
fairly clear consequences: On the one hand, the directness of access is directly
proportional to the degree of otherness. On the other hand, this means that the greater
degree of otherness, the less epistemic access a dynamic embodied agent has. These
results point to the significant ways in which dynamic embodied agents are constrained in

108

Because of the impossibility of knowing the content of another’s mind from inside, I will not make
much of the point that emphasizes difference here. We have reason to suspect different perspectives
produce differences in experience and vice versa because experiences define and shape our perspectives
(and vice versa). It seems a safe (though inductive) inference to conclude that from a difference in
agents’ perspectives there should be a corresponding difference in agents’ understandings and
meanings. This sets the stage for discussion of the problem of sharing social practices later in this
chapter.
109
Cf. e.g. Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the problem of other minds in the preface to Phenomenology of
Perception.
110
For example, in his address at the 2012 Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP)
titled Levels of Empathy, Dan Zahavi argues that “one should acknowledge that there simply isn’t any
established view on what “direct” means.”
111
The specifics of the ontology and mechanisms involved in “incorporating” something into one’s
dynamic embodied agency will be discussed more exhaustively in chapters 3 and 4.
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their abilities to relate to each other—which, in turn, directly impacts the possibility for
success in interpersonal communication between them.
The complexity of this issue is compounded by increasing the number of ‘moving
parts’ (in our case, increasing the number of dynamic embodied agents, as well as
number and varieties of parameters and variables to which DEAs are sensitive) involved
in the epistemic task. Phenomenally speaking, there is a qualitative difference between
how one encounters one concrete other (a second-personal “you”) and how one
encounters aggregate, or indistinct others (first and third personal plural “we”, “they” 112).
From whence does this qualitative difference arise? Is it a result of the quantitative
difference (viz. is it an emergent phenomenon?), or is it a difference in phenomenal kind?
This chapter attempts to sort through these issues.
More centrally, however, this chapter focuses on the character of social
encounters, experiences, and communication—what it means to be social, or to engage in
social practices. Many theorists have, at various times, in various places, and in various
ways, invoked or alluded to social practices as explanations for other apparent
phenomena 113. From the perspective of this investigation of agency, it is of interest to try
to understand exactly how the kinds of agents described in the previous chapter can be
thought of as social agents. What could it mean to be a social agent, or to engage in a
social practice as a dynamic embodied agent? In order to ask or answer these questions
we must first navigate the different senses of sociality; as well as develop an
112
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This difference was played out vocally in arguments between Heidegger and Sartre in the 1930s and
‘40s. See later discussion on this point.
Stephen P. Turner emphasizes three areas where he sees this as especially true: attempts to explain the
conduct scientific communities, attempts to reductively explain political theories, and attempts to
naturalistically explain morality (c.f. Brains/Practices/Relativism, 2002).
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understanding of what exactly social practices and institutions are, or are meant to
explain.
2.2

Issues of Selfhood and Otherness
The problem of other minds has traditionally been discussed in terms of, on the

one hand, Cognitivist accounts of mind that can be roughly traced through a tradition
following the representationalist picture of cognition first expressed by Descartes and
later elaborated by Kant in the First Critique; and on the other hand, predominantly
Empiricist accounts of learning that find their beginnings in Locke’s and Hume’s
Inquiries. Despite its seeming initial lack of an account of cognition, the empirical
approach enjoyed a renaissance following the eclipse of Kantianism. The idea behind the
empiricist approach was that through the tools afforded by the highly empirical scientific
method, inquiry could be conducted in such a manner that the advancement of
understanding was inevitable. Compared with the rather speculative transcendental
reasoning championed by Kant and the neo-Kantians, 19th century empiricism garnered
much wider appeal. It is somewhat ironic then that empiricists were motivated more than
anything else by faith in this inevitability in epistemic advancement. If the problem of
other minds was to be solved, it would be solved by as-yet undiscovered empirical
investigation—not speculative transcendental inferences to conditions for the possibility
of knowledge.
The Cognitivist approach re-emerged in the early decades of the 20th century,
when advancements in Boolean logic and computing began to make headway in classical
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problem solving 114. Thus the “classical” computational or cognitivist approach to
modeling the mind was born. This picture took the mind to function like a Turing
machine—processing the input delivered from the raw sense-data acquired from the
world through bodily sense-perception. This data filtered through the ‘programs’ of
cognition as physical symbols, or tokens that could be operated on by the inferential
system of the human mind 115.
The computationalist approach to modeling the human mind could rely on the
representationalist assumption of different kinds of information being transmitted through
the media of external environment, sensory apparatus, and as symbolic tokens within the
brain. What needed to be discovered was the ways in which that information was
manipulated, translated, and converted through these media in such a way as to produce
veridical internal representations of the outside world. The more-or-less unquestioned
epistemic assumption of computationalist representationalism was that the contents of
thought, symbolic representations, veridically corresponded to the way at least some of
the world actually is 116. This is significant to the problem of other minds because it made
it easy to see how communication was possible, and suggests a fairly straightforward
explanation of how communication works. If human minds are organized such that they
operate on and produce representations that bear direct correspondence with the objective
world, then that world can function as a common medium through which representations
114
115
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Cf. e.g. Alan Turing’s 1950 “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, Mind LIX (236): 433–460
Cf. Newell, Allen; Simon, H. A. (1976), “Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and
Search”, Communications of the ACM, 19
Here I qualify the statement with ‘at least some of’ because nobody claimed that human sensory
apparatus was capable of picking up on, or receiving all of the information embedded in the world. The
processes involved with sensation are, for the representationalist, most fundamentally filtering
processes; separating out the ‘wheat’, the relevant symbolically manipulable content of the world, from
the non-conceptual ‘chaffe’.
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can be expressed, transmitted, and received between subjects.
In essence, the process can be understood as a simple encoding and decoding.
Imagine that I wish to express a certain idea I have to my friend Fred sitting across from
me. Perhaps I wish to say “Kree Jaffa!”. The computationalist says that my thinking of
this idea, and what I would like to say to Fred are just the operation of an interpretive
processor on representative or symbolic tokens. When it comes time to produce some
output, the appropriate symbolic token is sent to a sensorimotor-translator which takes
the representative token and translates it into a signal that is instructionally significant for
the appropriate lower-level sensorimotor systems (larynx, diaphragm, tongue, lips,
mouth). In executing the received instructions, these lower-level systems encode the
representational content I wish to express in a new medium, sound waves traveling from
my mouth and radiating through the air, presumably in the direction (among others) of
Fred’s ears. Fred’s ears pick up the audio signal and send it, still encoded, rather
circuitously to the inner ear where air vibrations are translated to aqueous vibrations in
the Organ of Corti, which in turn stimulate the spiral ganglion, and finally transmits an
electrochemical signal down the Vestibulocochlear nerve. Each translational step does
some decoding 117 of the information—but not until it reaches the Pons, is the sensory
information fully decoded into a symbolic representation for Fred. At this point, as long
as the various processes of translation did not result in loss of the relevant
representational information 118, Fred has mentally available the symbolic representation

117

And re-encoding; essentially translating (or schematizing) information from one format into another.
Certainly not every aspect of the previous signal can be translated; something is always lost in
translation (e.g. the mechanical character of vibrating air is not retained in the electrochemical signal).
118
Again, the claim is not that every aspect of the external stimulus is represented veridically; just that at
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“Kree Jaffa!”.
So for the computationalist, communication is the largely straightforward, linear
process of transmitting readily encodable and decodable information through
intermediate media. Since the symbols necessary for computationalist accounts of
cognition must be discrete it means that communication between two cognitive agents is
a digital, all-or-none, affair; either the signal is transmitted (and thus a thought is
communicated from one subject to another, or it is distorted, and what is received is not
the same as what was expressed. Sufficient noise or loss of information means entire loss
of signal, or complete communication breakdown. But, since this is clearly not the way
our usual, mundane interpersonal interactions work, there must be something wrong with
this picture. Fodor, for one, has suggested that problems crop-up whenever one supposes
that an agent’s mental processes or states depend in any way on states external to the
agent. In order to understand an agent’s mental processes or states, all one needs to do is
investigate the internal workings of the [functional] parts that make up that agent. Fodor
grants that external information is causally efficacious, but cannot give semantic content
to the agent’s mental workings 119. Presumably for Fodor, communication in the sense of
transmitting information from one agent to another is an epistemic impossibility. This has
the effect of explaining away the problem of communication, and of other minds; rather
than addressing it. What is needed instead is an account of communication that explains
how it can possibly work without encountering the pitfalls of the mediated and discrete
transfer of symbolic information that we saw earlier.

119

least some of what is processed bears some veridical relation to the external stimulus.
Cf. Fodor, Jerry (1980), “Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive
Science,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 63-73.
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By the late 1980s, basic questions about the representational computationalist
approach had not yet been answered (especially regarding how such a system could have
evolved by natural selection 120), and some researchers returned to a more empiricist
approach. Instead of attempting to simulate the functional aspects of a Turing machine
with a serial von Neumann architecture, the new “connectionist” approach treated the
neuronal structure of the human brain as the model’s basis. While this approach initially
showed great promise, it quickly ran into some severe setbacks. One problem arose in
methods of simulating the brain—what level of abstraction is appropriate when
simulating a complex biological system such as the human brain comprised of over 100
billion neurons? How should or could physical constraints be simulated? Another
problem was in simulating the mind—is the non-representational Hebbian learning in a
connectionist network at all analogous to the seemingly representational appearance of
conscious thought 121?
Further, while the connectionist approach to cognition made strides in conceiving
the mind as more akin to a massively parallel processor, it still seemed as though the
picture for communication looked much like the computationalist one just described. As
much as the connectionist paradigm increased the bandwidth or channels of information
flow for associative connections inside the head, it was still constrained for
communication to the comparatively low bandwidth sensorimotor channels. Moreover,
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E.g. Cosmides, L. &Tooby, J. (1987). From evolution to behavior: Evolutionary psychology as the
missing link. In J. Dupre (Ed.), The latest on the best: Essays on evolution and optimality. Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press.
Cf. e.g. Haugeland, John, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea (1985). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press;
and Fodor and Pylyshyn. “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis” in S. Pinker
and J. Mehler, eds., Connections and Symbols (1988) Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press
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connectionism still trafficked in discrete tokens which bore little resemblance to the
actual continuous differential processes with which a realistic cognitive system interacts.
In short, connectionism changed little if anything about the problematic picture of
communication.
While advancements were being made in neurochemistry, neurobiology, and
cognitive psychology; philosophical accounts seemed incapable of producing results—we
still lacked a plausible initial approximation of how the mind works so as to produce
something as rich and complex as consciousness. We still couldn’t explain how humans
communicate. Then, in 1991, the first 122 Embodied accounts of cognition began to
precipitate into cognitive science discourses 123. As discussed in the previous chapter, this
approach to cognition treated the living human body—not only the brain—as the locus of
perception and understanding. While both Computational and Connectionist theories
subscribed (minimally) to a methodological individualism and thereby limited their
investigations to the brain, the embodiment approach broadened the focus to include not
only the flesh and bone encapsulating the brain, but also the various physical, social,
cultural, and historical environments encountered by the living body as the appropriate
loci for investigating the human mind. Since some of these forces are external to the
internal workings of the brain, the methodological individualism of Computationalist and
Connectionist theories could no longer be maintained so comfortably. While this may
have posed epistemic boundary problems for computationalists and connectionists, when
122
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The outcropping of Embodied accounts in the nineties was by no means the first instance of such
ideas—these thoughts date back to the very beginning of philosophy of mind, and can be seen in
Aristotle, Descartes, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and Sartre just to cite a few.
E.g Varela, Thompson, Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and the Human Experience.
MIT Press. 1991
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we look at the significance of this change for the study of interpersonal communication
we can see that new avenues of possibility have opened up.
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch set the agenda for the Embodiment program in
1991 with their now-renowned The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and the Human
Experience. They wrote that embodied cognition “depends upon the kinds of experience
that come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities, [that] are themselves
embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural context” 124 and
cite as inspiration for this thesis the work of Hubert Dreyfus, George Lakoff, and Mark
Johnson. They closely tie the notions of the embodiment and embeddedness of cognitive
agents with the bodily activities that are brought about, calling this tight connection
between body and world ‘enaction’. Enaction, according to Varela, Thompson, and
Rosch consists of two primary aspects: “(1) perception consists in perceptually guided
action, and (2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that
enable action to be perceptually guided” 125. Notice here that there is here no mention of
the constitutive parts of enactive systems of agency. All that is discussed is the act of
perception (not the equipment through which perception occurs), actions and the
relationship between perception and action for such agents, and emergent patterns of
perceptually guided action. As discussed earlier, in order to act one must have or be a
body—but nowhere in this account do Varela, Thompson, and Rosch say how that body
needs to be put together 126. The enactive agent is one who dynamically reciprocally co-
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Varela, Thompson, Rosch. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and the Human Experience. MIT.
1991. p. 173
Ibid.
This may be somewhat misleading. It is clear that the authors believe that the particulars about bodies
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constitutes her world—her activities shape the world around her, and the world around
her shapes the activities she embodies.
When we add to enactivism the “extended mind” thesis, objects from the
environment may then be taken up by an enactive agent into her cognitive schema as a
part of its—and her—cognitive constitution. Shaun Gallagher’s distinction between bodyschema and body-image proves useful in discussing these matters 127. It is important to
recognize early on that Gallagher’s argument employs a formal distinction between the
concepts of a “body-schema” and that of a “body-image”, and uses this distinction to
clarify the problem of intersubjectivity. It will be important to track and maintain this
distinction as formal or conceptual, rather than one that is intended as a metaphysical or
ontological commitment. He writes:
Distinctions that can be made clear conceptually may not remain so at the
level of practical behavior...I will argue that if the clear a proper distinction is
made, these concepts carve up the conceptual space in such a way that leads to
a productive understanding...rather than trying to locate or construct an
intermediary entity to bridge the [self-other] gap, the task, as I understand it, is
to create a coherent and contextually rich background theory. 128
This means that while Gallagher’s distinction is meant to help clarify the ways we talk
about intersubjectivity—borrowing from Plato, to “carve nature at its joints” 129—it is not

and their environments are constitutively significant in the perceptual activities that such agents are
capable of performing. What is important here is the recognition that they’re not talking specifically
about human bodies or minds.
127
It is worth noting that Gallagher’s use of this distinction between “body image” and “body schema”
derives from Merleau-Ponty’s usage of the terms (l'image de notre corps, and schéma corporel
respectively) in Phenomenology of Perception. To complicate matters, the canonical Colin Smith
translation of Phenomenology of Perception does not distinguish between these two; referring to both as
“body image”. This mistake has been corrected in the recent Donald Landes translation. For his part,
Merleau-Ponty saw himself as employing a then-common terminological distinction from contemporary
French research in clinical psychology.
128
Shaun Gallagher (2005) How the Body Shapes the Mind (pp. 5-6).
129
Plato’s Phaedrus 265e.
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meant to endorse specific theories of mind or social cognition as metaphysically correct.
Nevertheless, throughout his 2005 book How the Body Shapes the Mind, Gallagher
explains why he thinks the most consistent, and fruitful theory of mind is an “embodied”
and “enactive” one, and why theories of social cognition must adequately and coconstitutively align with embodied selves. For this reason, it can be easy to misinterpret
this distinction as the basis for an argument for a theory of embodied cognition.
On Shaun Gallagher’s construal, the difference between the enactive agent’s body
and the world is a matter of inclusion in her body-schema. If objects arise in one’s bodyschema they are pre-cognitively 130 (and literally) incorporated into her enactive body.
What this means is that the difference between the enactive agent and her world is not
founded on any principled physical distinction but rather is a matter of the ways in which
her situation arises phenomenally. The enactive agent phenomenally encounters her body
differently than other items in the world—and when that encounter includes (in the
instance of a blind agent) her cane, then this too ‘is’ her body and a part of who she is 131.
This raises another issue—this time with the distinction between subject and object. If
this account is correct, then there is a blurring of this distinction—an “object” taken up
and incorporated into an embodied subject’s body schema; which becomes part of that
130
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There are many phrases in the phenomenological literature that, for our purposes, can be thought of
synonymous. Among them are, on the one hand, “pre-thematic”, “pre-reflective”, “pre-cognitive”,
“non-representational”, “pre-noetic”, “lower level thought”, “perception” (excluding cognition), and a
host of others, and on the other hand “thematic”, “reflective”, “cognitive”, “representational”, “noetic”,
and “higher order thought” among others.
Implicit in this conception of enactive embodiment is a certain kind of individualist notion of ownership
of one’s body. Phenomenally speaking, the blind person’s cane is encountered as part of her agency
because it factors in making her who she is—in a sense, it is a part of her, and this is the sense in which
she ‘owns’ it. This phenomenal sense of ownership is hugely significant in whether or not some element
in the environment is, or is not, to count as a proper constitutive part of the agent. Mark Rowlands even
goes so far as to identify this kind of ‘ownership’ as the fundamental criterion for what Adams and
Aizawa have called “the mark of the cognitive”.
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subject, is in some important senses no longer merely an object but has become subjective
in the sense that it incorporated into the constitution of the subject—it is included in
embodied agent’s subjectivity and it participates in constraining and affording the kinds
of relations in which that agent can engage.
This sets the stage for one of the more difficult and puzzling aspects of the
embodied and enactive account of cognition as conceived by Gallagher: the problem of
other minds. The enactive agent perceives her body not merely as a physically extended
bit of matter (Körper, le corps objectif), but as lived (Leib, le corps vécu) 132. This
reverses the traditional Cartesian distinction between mind and body. While Descartes
distinguished between two substances (res cogitans, res extensa) the phenomenologically
experienced, lived body of Husserl and Mearleau-Ponty, for example, is one that is
perceived and experienced already as lived. Only later, through meditation or reflective
thought can such a distinction between two kinds of substances be made. Thus the
Cartesian division of mind and body is secondary to or derivative of a more fundamental
division between a “lived body” and that which is “other”; though as we have already
seen, even this differentiation must be thought of as not rigidly defined, but rather fluid
and contingent upon the concrete dynamic interactions between an agent and her
environment.
Because this distinction is not rigid, what “counts as” other in each situated
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The Leib/Körper distinction is Husserl’s, le corps vécu/le corps objectif, Merleau-Ponty’s. In
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty employs the phrase “le corps propre” (one’s own body)
rather than le corps vécu, though in the context of his work it is fairly clear that Merleau-Ponty intends
for the two phrases to mean the same thing: in order for a body to be “one’s own” it must be an agent’s
living body. Once again Colin Smith takes some liberties in translating “le corps proper” as “lived
body”, but in this case the consequences are less pernicious.
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experience of the embodied agent needn’t be uniform in its otherness—what is other is
experienced intensively 133 as other. For this reason, other agents can arise for the
embodied subject as true others; that is, others qua subjective agents rather than as mere
objects of experience 134. An often ignored consequence of this maneuver is that agency
too must be thought of intensively. As we will see, the degree of likeness in subjectivity
is directly related to the phenomenal degree of perceived likeness in bodies 135. The ability
to pre-reflectively compare bodies is a condition for the possibility of intersubjectivity
and empathy.
Embodied agents do not merely have bodies, but in a very literal sense they are
their bodies. The skills, habits, and practices acquired through one’s lived-out
experiences are skills, habits, and practices that find their proper intelligibility in the
situated context of one’s embodied and embedded life. They are first and foremost skills,
habits, and practices of a body engaged in the processes of living. This is not to deny that
they, in some sense, originate from the “external” environment. While such skills, habits,
and practices are learned and normatively honed by the embodied agent herself;
embodied agents are always situated in physical, social, cultural, and historical contexts.
Precisely what such skills, habits, and practices are is dynamically developed through the
particular concrete “living out” of a dynamic embodied agent’s life. At a certain point in
an agent’s life, such skills, habits, and practices may mean something quite different than
133
134
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That is, it is experienced differentially—as a qualitative difference of degree.
Further, aspects or elements previously incorporated into an agent’s embodied subjectivity can also
become other; one can become alienated from what one takes to be one’s self, one can misrecognize
one’s self. More on this in chapter 4.
This perceived likeness needn’t occur at the “noetic” level, or the level of conscious awareness. Using
Gallagher’s term of art, we should understand perceived likenesses at the “pre-noetic” or “bodyschematic” level (in addition to the “noetic” or the level of “body-image”).
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at another point for the same agent 136. Additionally, we should keep in mind that on the
enactive account there can be no principled, static, or rigid differentiation between self
and other—such differences are a matter of degree in modes of access and bodily
similarity. Thus lived bodies, like merely physical bodies, are able to be encountered as
situated or embedded in the world—they are able to be experienced by others as subjects.
In this way, to exist as a dynamic embodied agent means to exist as perceptibly
accessible by another, and to be able to perceptually access others 137. Moreover, this
means that others can be directly perceived in their sensory, emotional, and even
cognitive expressive subjectivity. We will presently investigate how this is a radical
departure from the traditional view.
The first noteworthy aspect of the picture of embodiment outlined above is that
‘self’, ‘other’, and ‘world’ co-constitute each other. There can be no account of self
without making essential reference to and including others and the world. Likewise, any
account of the world must include the fact of its inhabitation by subjects—a world is a
world for someone. Further, to be a self means to be recognizable as a self by another
self; and to recognize that recognition. Without this double association between self and
other, there can be no sense of self. To think of others as somehow secondary to an
understanding of one’s self, is to uphold and maintain the Cartesian distinction between
136

Some may think that because of this difference the ‘sameness’ of the agent is thrown into question.
Without continuity in the skills, habits, and practices of an agent, identity cannot be maintained.
Perhaps not. But I am not claiming that there is no continuity—in fact I do claim there is continuity; but
it is an intensive, temporally nonlinear, dynamic continuity—changes unfolding on variant, variable,
overlapping timescales. The difficulty for those concerned with the seeming discontinuity presented by
the differences in an agent’s phenomenal perception of his or her skills, habits, and practices at one or
another time in his or her life is caused by failing to understand properly the temporality of a life lived.
Only when one mistakenly takes a Platonist, Four-Dimensionalist, or Russell’s “at-at” theoretical stance
on time, can such a problem arise.
137
Cf. e.g. the preface of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception.
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mind and body—it is to take the first-personally experienced realm of “mind” to be more
intimately known, and more ontologically primordial than bodies, both of one’s own, and
of others. The troubles for the Cartesian dualist are, then, double: (1) first they must
account for, or bridge, the substantial gap between res cogitans and res extensa; (2)
second, they must bridge the gap from their own first-personally experienced bodies to
the bodies of others such that there remains an analogy which allows for the inference
from the other’s body to the other’s mind.
The foregoing point can be traced back (at least) to John Stewart Mill and has
been traditionally called the “argument from analogy”. It can be characterized as follows:
The only mind I have direct access to is my own, My access to the mind of
another is always mediated by his bodily behavior. But how can the
perception of another person’s body provide me with information about his
mind? Starting from my own mind and linking it to the way in which my body
is given to me, I then pass to the other’s body and by noticing the analogy that
exists between this body and my own body, I infer that the foreign body is
probably also linked in a similar manner to a foreign mind. 138
As with any argument by analogy, it should be taken as a defeasable argument by
inference to the best explanation. The presumption is that in recognizing a fundamental
substantial difference between our own mind and body, we must give an explanation for
the existence of others’ inaccessible minds 139. This explanation runs by the analogy we
can construct on the likenesses assumed between my body and the body of the other.
Since my agency has a mind-body structure, and the other has a body like mine, she too
should have a mind-body structure just like mine. Alternatively, phenomenologist Max
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Zahavi, Dan. “Beyond Empathy” Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity”, Journal of
Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pg 151.
Wittgenstein problematizes this way of thinking in his classic discussions in questioning the pain of
others (Philosophical Investigations §300-304).
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Scheler has formulated arguments to condemn the argument from analogy:
1. To assume that our belief in the existence of other minds is inferential in
nature is to opt for a far too complex cognitive account. After all, both
animals and infants seem to share this belief, but in their case it is hardly
the result of a process of inference.
2. In order for the argument to work, there has to be a similarity between the
way in which my own body is given to me and the way in which the body
of the other is given to me. But my own body as it is felt proprioceptively
for me does not at all resemble the other’s body as it is perceived visually
by me.
3. How can the argument from analogy explain that we can empathize with
creatures whose bodies in no way resemble our own, say a suffering bird
or fish?
4. Even if all of these problems could be overcome, the argument from
analogy would still be formally invalid. Noticing the connection between
my own mind and my bodily behavior, and the analogy between my own
bodily behavior and the behavior of a foreign body, all that I am entitled to
infer is that the foreign body is probably also linked with my own mind. 140
We have already seen some responses, or solutions to some of the problems raised by
Scheler. Since the argument from analogy relies on Cartesian mind-body dualism, a
sufficient alternative to this Cartesian picture will likely relate differently to these
concerns. Since, on the dynamic embodied account of agency I am my lived body, the
fourth consideration does not even arise. In our acknowledgements that similarity among
bodies is in all cases a matter of degree 141, and that lived bodies are alike in kind, the
third consideration is also circumvented—or at least pushed back into a dependence on
whatever cognitive account of pattern recognition we can give. Further, as we will see,
there is evidence to suggest that the second consideration is hasty in its formulation.
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This is Scheler’s argument as reformulated by Dan Zahavi in “Beyond Empathy” Phenomenological
Approaches to Intersubjectivity”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pg 152.
141
I hasten to add here that such bodily similarities are properties of actual, concrete, relations encountered
in real time. Lived bodies and the contexts in which they express themselves are dynamic and unfold on
multiple overlapping timescales. As a result, the similarities and differences in bodies are contingent
upon the particular conditions of specific intersubjective situations.
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Research in mirror neurons, and shared representations indicates that the actions of others
are instantiated in one’s cognitive processes in the same way as one’s own actions.
Further, there is reason to think that—though proprioception and vision are distinct
modes of perception—there is cross- or inter-communication between modalities 142,
allowing for the possibility that my body as it is felt proprioceptively for me does
resemble the other’s body as it is perceived visually by me. Similarly, there have been
extensive advances in experimental psychology (spurred in large part by Meltzoff’s and
Moore’s groundbreaking 1977 study on imitation in neonates) to suggest that we should
give a more direct and innate perceptual account than one that requires the cognitionintensive process of inference.
But we must also be careful not to step beyond the empirical evidence when it
comes to direct perception of others’ (emotional, sensual, intellectual, etc.) bodily
expressiveness. One should not claim that what agents have access to are the processes
occurring inside another agent’s brain. Nor should one claim that direct perceptual access
entails that misrecognizing one’s own or others’ (emotional, sensual, intellectual, etc.)
expressions is impossible. After all, one simple counterexample—the familiar
phenomenon of a “successful poker face”—precludes the defensibility of such a claim 143.
So what then could be meant by this notion of an agent “directly perceiving” another?
Here there is no clear agreement between embodiment theorists. On one interpretation
(shared by Dan Zahavi and Theodore Schatzki) the emphasis of the claim is on the
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Cf. especially Hurley & Chater (2005), Goldstein (2001), and Iacoboni (2009)
A “poker face” expresses one emotional, sensual, intellectual, etc. state, without expressing what that
agent actually feels, believes, thinks, etc. What is important to track here is that expressively lying is a
genuine set of phenomena that should be acknowledged and accounted-for.
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directness of the perception. Both Zahavi and Schatzki believe that the contiguity
between self and other stems from a shared commonly lived-in world in which both
intersubjective parties interactively participate. Approvingly citing Heidegger, Zahavi
writes:
Dasein does not initially exist alone, and does not first acquire its being-with
[Mitsein] the moment another turns up. On the contrary, qua its engaged
being-in-the-world, Dasein is essentially social from the very start...Dasein’s
being-with, its fundamental social nature, is the formal condition of possibility
for any concrete experience of and encounter with others...Dasein cannot be
understood except as inhabiting a world which it necessarily shares with
others...Under normal circumstances we understand each other well enough
through our shared engagement in the common world, and it is only if this
understanding for some reason breaks down that something like empathy
becomes relevant. (BE 154-155, emphasis added)
What is important to Zahavi is that individuality is a later development derived from a
more primordial social being-with, which occurs through Dasein’s essential ‘thrownness’
in a ready-made world not of her own but rather a social making.
Following a remark Wittgenstein makes in Zettel §225, Schatzki similarly writes
that
The ability to perceive (primarily see and hear) that someone is in such and
such condition...pertains mostly to mental conditions manifested in behavior.
Wittgenstein states emphatically that one does not infer from, say, fear or pain
behavior that another person is fearful or in pain; one sees it:
‘we see emotion.’ - As opposed to what? - We do not see facial contortions
and make inference from them (like a doctor framing a diagnosis) to joy,
grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad radiant, bored, even
when we are unable to give any other description of the features. - Grief, one
would like to say, is personified in the face. (Z, 225) 144
Elsewhere Schatzki asserts that “a ‘realist’ viewpoint maintains that reality is directly
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Schatzki, Theodore. Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social. p.
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(‘bodily’ as Husserl put it) encountered in perception” 145 and that “individuality is a
socially constructed and achieved status. Personhood is an effect of social practices, in
that expressive bodies, life conditions, and ascriptions/comprehension of these conditions
exist only within practices” 146. He also follows Heidegger in distinguishing between
“having” and “being” a body: “to be a body, is to be able both to perform bodily doings
and sayings and to experience bodily sensations and feelings... having a body is made
evident in situations of breakdown, malfunction, discomfort, and incompetence, where
the fact that one is a body manifests itself explicitly.” 147 From all this we can glean that
Zahavi and Schatzki share the position that embodied agency is a result, or effect of the
socially-constituted practices that define the world; and from which direct perception of
others is made possible. A more fundamental social existence is the transcendental
condition for and the distal cause of the possibility of the phenomenal feeling of
individuality. Transcendentally, our social embeddedness is the sine qua non for any selfconception, and thus a necessary requirement for the phenomenal sense of individual
selfhood. Causally, it is through the myriad overlapping social practices, institutes and
mechanisms of our experiences that causes or produces the effect of one’s selfconception.
On the other hand Shaun Gallagher, in recognizing the non-inferential directness
of perception of others emotional, sensual, and cognitive conditions, emphasizes the
perceptual aspect. That is, if the hallmark of the similarities between Zahavi’s and
Schatzki’s theories of embodied situatednesss is of sharing a common social, cultural,
145
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and historical world; then what differentiates Gallagher from this position is that
Gallagher never emphasizes the element of sharing. In his How the Body Shapes the
Mind, he only ever uses the words “share”, “shared”, or “sharing” in three contexts, none
of which suggest the idea of two or more subjects grasping or comprehending or even
perceiving one and the same object or situation. The first circumstance is in dismissing an
incorrect viewpoint held by Kita. As they are not relevant to our present concerns, we
will leave aside these instances of “sharing”. The second situation in which Gallagher
makes use of the concept of sharing is in referencing a term of art coined by BaronCohen called “shared attention”, or what Gallagher himself calls “joint attention”. In
situations of shared attention [infant] subjects are said to “enter into contexts or shared
situations in which they learn what things mean and what they are for” 148. Following
Trevarthen’s distinction between primary and secondary intentions, Gallagher utilizes the
phenomena of “joint attention” to exemplify secondary intentions—whose “defining
feature is that an object or event can become a focus between people” 149. Here it may
seem that this is exactly the kind of situation where two or more subjects are grasping,
comprehending, or perceiving one and the same object or situation—that is, this seems
precisely to be an instance of social sharing. However, this is not the way that Gallagher
intends it. Instead, his discussion is on how the infant perceives her own situation or
object of attention as shared. Perceiving something as shared, and actually sharing are
two entirely different concepts. The former is a claim about the phenomenal character of
an agent’s encounter, while the latter is a metaphysical claim about the world. Elsewhere
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Gallagher writes that infants “9-11 mos. Are able to see bodily movement as expressive
of emotion, and as goal-directed intentional movement ... [they are] however, not taking
an observational stance, they are interacting with others ... [under] a sense of shared
experience or intersubjectivity.” 150 What I would like to emphasize here (whether he is
aware of it or not) is that Gallagher is careful not to say that the infants actually share the
experience. What he says amounts to the claim that infants are able to perceive,
recognize, or understand situations as shared. This is more of a fact of embodied
perception than it is of embodied and communal being-in-the-world.
Still, others take the claim of having direct perceptual access to the bodily
expressiveness of others as demonstrating naïve metaphysical realism. There are ways in
which we can understand this interpretation to fit in with either of the positions
articulated above, or neither, depending on how one defines naïve realism. Some
characterizations hinge their definitions on awareness of the external world. Aside from
assuming a problematic internal/external division (which may be the influence of a
lingering Cartesian dualism) the notion of awareness would need to be elaborated so as to
include pre-noetic aspects of experience. At any rate, prolonged discussion of this matter
would take us too far afield of our present concerns. While I think Gallagher’s position is
more defensible than Zahavi’s or Schatzki’s, their differences are slight compared with
the more pressing conceptual matter of an agent’s phenomenal comportment or
“attunement” of embodied agents toward others.
Zahavi puts the point rather astutely. “Husserl and Merleau-Ponty [contra
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Heidegger] argue for a place for intersubjectivity in the very intentional relation to the
world...As they put it, the subject is intentionally directed toward objects whose
horizontal givenness bears witness to their openness for other subjects” 151. Counting as a
subject requires the double recognition of other (explained above), as well as an attitude
of “openness” which recognizes and allows one’s self to be taken as a self by others, and
which allows one also to recognize others as other selves 152. To be clear, however, we
should keep in mind that the “recognition” discussed here need not be a conscious or
“noetic” recognition. The whole process of recognizing another as another subject occurs
pre-noetically, or below the threshold of conscious awareness; and one’s conscious or
noetic recognition is an effect of this more primary pre-noetic recognition. In addition,
this attitude of openness provides the resources allowing agents to change, and to account
for change in themselves and their perceptions of others. Evan Thompson writes
“Consciousness is not solipsistically closed in upon itself; rather it is structurally open to
the other in advance of any actual encounter between self and other” 153. For Thompson,
the open comportment of intersubjective agents is a structural aspect of embodied
cognition, and thus in no way depends on the contingent experiencing of an actual other.
Instead the open-structure is an a priori condition for the possibility of such an
encounter 154. For example, what allows us to perceive a tomato in its wholeness (e.g. as
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Zahavi, Dan. “Beyond Empathy” Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity”, Journal of
Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5-7, 2001, pg 155.
While the content of this claim seems both accurate and correct, as a criticism I do not think it meets its
mark in Heidegger. In his notion of a clearing (Lichtung) Heidegger seems to be pointing at exactly this
kind of open comportment.
Thompson, Evan. Mind in Life. Harvard University Press. 2007. p. 383.
While I support Thompson’s approach here I suspect the details are rather more complex than
Thompson suggests. I think that one should understand this open comportment not as a transcendental
condition for social encounters, but rather more as a dialectical or reciprocal process of unfolding: my
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having a 3-dimensional shape even though we only visually perceive one 2-dimensional
facet) is that we perceive it already as having the potential to be seen by others 155. Thus
even our comportment toward non-subjective, mundane, objects in the world carries with
it this other-intentional structural-openness 156. This should not be understood as in
opposition to what Heidegger expresses in Mitsein, but rather as complimentary to it.
Sartre famously critiqued Heidegger on exactly these grounds. For Sartre, the
most primordial experience of others is the concrete interaction between agents. This
interaction is face-to-face, or “confrontational”, and bears the phenomenal character of
conflict 157. He argues that human-made artifacts, or “equipment” (das Zeug) only appear
to the experiencing agent as equipment on the presupposed background of actual,
concrete experience with others in this confrontational sense. We learn to use tools or
equipment in concrete situations with particular others (face-to-face). Thus according to
Sartre, being-with (Mitsein) is a comparatively derived sense of other-oriented
interaction. It emphasizes the similarities or lack of difference between the agent as she
encounters equipment, and any arbitrary other as he (‘one’) would encounter it. Sartre,
following Husserl, acknowledges that if similarity is the basis for other-oriented
interaction, then the self-other relation is no longer expressed. Instead, as Husserl notes,
“Had I the same access to the consciousness of the other as I have my own, the other
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social encounter determines the character of my openness, and my open comportment determines the
character of my social encounter.
One way to think of this might be to understand such perceptual openness as an agent’s perception
being conditioned by social counterfactuals; “if there were a person nearby, the tomato would be
experienceable to that person like so”.
Compare this account of the perceptibility of the tomato to, for instance, Alva Noë’s sensorimotor
contingencies approach—which sees the tomato ‘as affording’ various potential interactions through the
enactive agent’s movement. (cf. Action in Perception pp. 62-67)
This Sartrean position bears a striking resemblance to the relations of recognition that occur between
the lord and bondsman of Hegel’s ‘Master/Slave Dialectic’ in Phenomenology of Spirit.
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would cease being an other and instead become a part of myself” 158. Thus, the
phenomenological picture of the self that both Husserl and Sartre (as well as MerleauPonty, and debatably Heidegger) entails a movement from an acknowledgement of an
other, or alter ego, immediately to the recognition of the self as recognized by the alter
ego, and finally to the realization that the self, qua alter ego, is one among many, and in
no way privileged. All that makes the self unique is its position as bearing the
phenomenal character of being given to the self, as well as the recognition that others
cannot, in principle, experience this particular relation 159.
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty take self-otherness, or ‘alterity in ipseity’ as a
transcendental condition for the possibility of experience of the alter ego (an other self),
and an important basis for the ability to ‘empathize’ with an other (viz. to recognize
‘ipseity in alterity’). The experience of self-otherness occurs when one experiences
herself as another would, or could. This arises in Merleau-Ponty’s exposition of “double
sensations” or what he later calls the chiasm:
When I press my two hands together, it is not a matter of two sensations felt
together as one perceives two objects placed side-by-side, but an ambiguous
setup in which both hands can alternate the roles of ‘touching’ and being
‘touched’...I can identify the hand touched in the same one which will in a
moment be touching. In other words, in this bundle of bones and muscles
which my right hand presents to my left, I can anticipate for an instant the
incarnation of that other right hand, alive and mobile, which I thrust towards
things in order to explore them. The body catches itself from the outside
engaged in a cognitive process; it tries to touch itself while being touched and
158
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This is Dan Zahavi’s translation of Husserl. E. Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge,
Husserliana I (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff). (1973) p. 139. Zahavi also likes to point out that Heidegger
agrees, at least partially, with Sartre’s assessment, citing a personal correspondence from Heidegger to
Sartre from October 28th, 1945: “I am in agreement with your critique of ‘being-with’ and with your
insistence on being-for-others, as well as in partial agreement with your critique of my explication of
death” (Towarnicki, 1993, p. 84). Both can be found in Zahavi’s Subjectivity & Selfhood: Integrating
the First-Person Perspective, MIT Press, 2005. pp. 154, 237n9.
cf. Zahavi, “Beyond Empathy”p. 160. This is precisely the phenomenal experience of first-personality.
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initiates a kind of reflection. 160
Thus for Merleau-Ponty and Husserl, contra Sartre, the experience of self as a self
amongst others can be encountered in absence of a concrete interaction with an actual
other. This experience is of the self as an other through the body “catching itself from the
outside;” which in turn relates the self in its otherness (alterity) to the self in its ‘my-ness’
(ipseity). It is only through this more basic experience that self-consciousness can arise,
and also through this mode of self-consciousness that one is equipped with the skills
required to empathize, or experience the other as one does herself.
Evan Thompson gives a loose sense of what embodiment theorists mean when
they discuss empathy:
Empathy is a unique form of intentionality in which we are directed toward
the other’s experience. Any intentional act that discloses or presents ‘foreign
experience’ counts as empathy. Although empathy, thus understood, is based
on perception (of the other’s bodily presence) and can involve inference in
difficult or problematic situations (when one has to work out how another
person feels about something), it is not reducible to some additive
combination of perception and inference...Rather in empathy we experience
another human being directly as a person—that is, as an intentional being
whose bodily gestures and actions are expressive of his or her experiences or
states of mind. 161
As previously mentioned, the other’s bodily expressiveness is given directly, but not firstpersonally. If the bodily expressiveness of the other’s pain, for example, were to be
perceived first-personally, it would not be the pain of the other, but rather would be
phenomenally perceived as one’s own pain. This is not how the pain of the other is
perceived, however. As Edith Stein (one of Husserl’s students) explains, one can “never
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get an ‘orientation’ where the pain itself is primordially given” 162.
This problem of ‘non-primordiality’—or how to account for a mechanism that
allows for the direct, perceptive, empathic feeling of another—is addressed more recently
in experimental psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind. One suggestion
is variously called the ‘common-coding theory’ (e.g. by Prinz, Thompson, Carruthers,
etc.) 163, or the ‘ideomotor framework of imitation’ (e.g. by Iacoboni, Rizzolatti, Gallese,
Di Pellegrino et. al.) 164. On this theory planned actions, action execution, and perceived
active events are all commonly expressed in a single neural format, or “mentalese”.
Evidence given in support of this theory comes from ‘mirror neurons’ which “are
activated either by the subject’s own motor behavior or by the subject’s visual
observation of someone else’s motor behavior” 165. More recently, Iacoboni et. al. have
shown that “goals have higher priority than movements in imitation”166. Thus, not only
do agents perceive what another is physically doing using their own sensorimotor
systems; emotionally feeling by using their own affective framework; or meaningfully
gesturing at the proprioceptive level of body-schemata; but rather they perceive and
privilege the goal-directed intention of those actions. In this way, embodied agents can be
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said to empathize with “how the other is, and what she is doing” in a maximally rich
sense. Hence, the historical phenomenological claim that we directly perceive others’
actions and intentions seems generally correct. In empathetic emulation, our brain
activities, bodily comportments, and sympathetic sensorimotor responses are triggered
not by our own bodily situations, but through our perceptions of the situations of others.
As Gallese writes “when we observe actions performed by other individuals, our motor
system ‘resonates’ along with that of the observed agent” 167. This “resonance” is of the
same phenomenal kind as any other worldly encounter. When we observe the world
around us, our sensorimotor system responds directly to what is bodily available. So too
with our empathic, intersubjective encounters. Thus, the evidence provided by “mirror
neurons” supports a theory of direct perception in line with Gallagher’s rather than
Zahavi’s or Schatzki’s.
Of course, what counts as evidence is often a matter of interpretation and subject
to observer biases, so we should probably take the results of these “mirror neuron”
studies with a grain of salt until more substantial empirical evidence becomes available.
What the studies are good for, however, is in showing that there are some cases in which,
in a very concrete and literal sense, we perceive the other’s experiences and lived mental
conditions; in her intentionality, actions, and bodily gestures; directly as belonging to a
person like ourselves. This does not mean that we perceive them first-personally, but
rather the perception itself contains the experiences as the experiences of an other.
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2.3

Social Practices & Institutions
Recently there has been renewed discussion about the tensions between social

theoretical accounts of ‘social practices’, and individualistic accounts of experience 168. If
anything about the debate is clear, it is that both kinds of phenomena (social practice,
individual experience) deserve to be taken seriously, and require a thoroughgoing and
consistent account by which they can together be understood. The purpose of this section
is to clarify how the concept of a social practice must align with the ways in which social
agents understand their own actions as well as the actions of others. In particular I will be
explicating by way of representative example the conflicting notions of practice put forth
by Theodore Schatzki and Stephen P. Turner (and using our previous discussion of Shaun
Gallagher’s theory as a touchstone) in order to reveal differences in intuitions about
social practices.
In his Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the
Social, Theodore Schatzki develops an intersubjective social theory of practice largely
consonant with Shaun Gallagher’s. While they share a large set of commitments (for
instance, regarding the importance of expressiveness of the body, the direct perception of
others in their bodily expressions, and de-privileging 1st and 3rd personal accounts of
social learning in favor of 2nd personal interactive and co-constitutive accounts, just to
name a few 169), perhaps the most striking difference is in the direction of causality and
explanation. On the one hand, Gallagher is mainly interested in giving an account of

168

169

For example the Communitarian critique of individualism and the subsequent boon in virtue and care
ethics literature spawning from Alisdair McIntyre’s and Charles Taylor’s respective 1989 volumes
After Virtue and Sources of the Self.
Schatzki, 1996.

91

perception that explains the ways in which agents can be understood to interact
intersubjectively. On the other hand, Schatzki’s intent is to give an account of social
practices that explains how concepts such as subjectivity and individuality arise and
become meaningful through common, shared, social practice. Initially then, one might
see these two approaches as incommensurable—after all, even though they appear to be
giving largely similar accounts of the actual details pertaining to intersubjectivity, they
swap the respective roles of explanans and explanandum—Gallagher’s is a
phenomenological-perceptual explanation of what amounts to social practices, while
Schatzki’s is a social practice explanation of perception and phenomenology. However,
both authors take care to emphasize the importance in recognizing a co-constitutive
relationship between (individualistic) embodied perception and (social) practice:
individual agents contribute to, and are shaped by, the content of their social milieus. We
will return to these themes shortly. First, let us put Turner’s position on the table for
examination.
Stephen P. Turner’s approaches the idea of social practice both more skeptically
and more obliquely. In his The Social Theory of Practices, rather than engage in the
relatively positive project of theory construction, Turner expresses grave concerns about
the explanatory power any notion of “social practice” could possibly provide. Turner is
skeptical that the notion of a “social practice” is capable of explaining anything—instead
he claims that the idea functions merely as a “stop-gap” for incomplete explanations.
What is particularly helpful for my purposes is his discussion of “theory theorists” and
“simulation theorists” in Brains/Practices/Relativism which provides precisely the basis
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or vocabulary needed to compare the relevant aspects of Gallagher’s “bodyschema”/“body-image” distinction with the explanatory requirements for an account of
social practices consistent with dynamical embodied agency. To complicate matters a bit,
Gallagher (and to a lesser extent, Schatzki) gives an argument for the direct perception of
others’ minds that might be thought to diffuse Turner’s criticisms. However, in as far as
Gallagher’s argument succeeds, it only does so partially and at the expense of the
impoverishment of resources to combat another of Turner’s worries.
Gallagher begins his work in How the Body Shapes the Mind by giving a history
of the use of various concepts akin to “body-schema” and “body-image”. He shows that
historically, there has been little care in distinguishing them, and that one result of this
lack of care was previous theorists failing to recognize the strengths and merits of an
embodied account of cognition. Here “embodied” means that the lived, spaceencountering, corporeal bodies of persons factor constitutively in the functioning of
cognition. It is not equivalent with the identity theorist’s claim that “mind is brain”, but
rather includes the doings of bodily activities in the functioning of the cognitive system
(Leib). In considering this body (as opposed to the generically extended “body” of “mindbody dualism”, (Körper)) we must first recognize that it is distinct in that it is
experienced subjectively. However, when we acknowledge that some cognitive functions
are carried out “unconsciously” or “pre-reflectively” (or, using Gallagher’s term, “prenoetically”) there are really two ways of considering how the body is experienced—either
consciously (reflectively), or unconsciously (pre-reflectively). Thus, Gallagher initially
characterizes the distinction between “body-image” and “body-schema” as follows:
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A body-image consists of a system of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs
pertaining to one’s own body. In contrast, a body-schema is a system of
sensory-motor capacities that function without awareness, or the necessity of
perceptual monitoring. 170
Stated colloquially, your body-image is “how you see yourself”, while your body-schema
is “how your body ‘sees’ its place in the world”. Thus, the notion of “body-image” is
concerned with reflective and discursive cognitive modes of perceiving, believing,
understanding, representing, emotionally feeling, etc., while “body-schema” pertains to
the pre-reflective, non-discursive body’s ability or capacity to move or constrain
movement, act or maintain posture, etc. 171.
Gallagher emphasizes the concept of proprioception as the generalized mode of
body-schematic encounter with the world. Proprioception is “the bodily sense that allows
us to know how our body and limbs are positioned. If a person with normal
proprioception is asked to sit, close his eyes, and point to his knee, it is proprioception
that allows him to successfully guide his hand and find his knee”. 172 From this definition
we find that proprioception relates not only to the body-schema but to body-image as
well. In as far as we consider the “know how” of proprioception in its representational or
discursive content (e.g. my knowledge that I am able to successfully run this blind knee
experiment), this knowledge pertains to my body-image, and not my body-schema. On
the other hand, the motor, spatial, and relational ability of my body to succeed at the task
occurs “before” consciousness, perception, thought, or beliefs come or into
consideration—this is the “pre-reflective” character of body-schema. Thus proprioceptive
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Gallgher, Shaun. (2005) How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford. p. 24.
Ibid. p. 24.
Ibid. p. 45.
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bodily awareness refers to the lived body’s sense of itself and its surroundings (as
considered in contradistinction to my inner sense of myself and my surroundings). This
characterization of proprioception would be a bit loose according to Gallagher because
the sense of “ownership” associated with body-image need not take the 3rd personal,
observational stance—one needn’t understand their body as an object to recognize it as
“owned” 173, and likewise, the “inner” sense of self expressed here would strike Gallagher
as overly 1st personal.
Importantly, Gallagher sees body-schema not in terms of a transcendental
condition for the possibility of perception, representation, belief, emotion, etc.; but,
following J. J. Gibson, as an open system of affordance and constraint. The body in its
schematic role pre-noetically “organizes” an agent’s immediate environment into an
environment for interaction with the body in ways coherent with the body’s capabilities.
The environment, before conceptual or reflective organization, is manifested
proprioceptively or body-schematically as allowing (affording) or disallowing
(constraining) certain modes of bodily encounter. A good example to elucidate this point
is standing in a cramped, unlit mop closet. It doesn’t take discursive reasoning for one’s
body to “know” that this situation does not afford the possibilities of sprinting or seeing,
though it may afford grasping the doorknob in a certain way and applying an amount of
torque to free itself. It may be argued that it is not the body that “knows” these things—
instead, this knowledge solely and exclusively resides in the representational, discursive,
processes of the brain. But consider the door-opening action. Over the course of one’s
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Ibid. p. 29.
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life, one becomes habituated in door opening. It is a common activity, variously enacted
upon many different styles and mechanisms of door latches 174. Discursively representing
the “high bandwidth” interactive activity of turning a door knob and applying pressure to
the door cannot be done on the timescales required to represent that action—there are
simply too many relevant aspects for a serial representational processor to process 175.
To be clear, I am not claiming that there is no representing going on in
cognition—rather it is possible that there are some cognitive situations in which
representation doesn’t or cannot occur. In fact, I don’t think there must necessarily be
such a situation in actuality. In principle, I am comfortable with representation always
accompanying (or even playing a necessary and integral role) in any or every cognitive
activity. My argument is simply that representation is not sufficient for cognition. We
should not think of representation as the entire explanatory basis for all cognitive goingson. It is a significant infelicity that such a position is often called “antirepresentationalism” 176. Justifying this position is rhetorically difficult given the inherited
hegemony of the received view. In order to argue that cognition isn’t all and only
representation all of the time, the standard of evidence requires finding an example in
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Opening doors is also a paradigmatic example of a social practice. What makes someone’s activity an
example of opening doors fundamentally involves a social background involving certain kinds of
enclosures (rooms, buildings), hinges, and various etiquettes.
The problem raised here is akin to the philosophical version of “The Frame Problem”—the problem of
effectively symbolically representing the relevant aspects of an artificially intelligent robot’s
environment so as to successfully formulate and solve practical problems in real time. The problem of
determining what is relevant from scratch turns out to be computationally “hard” (complexity theory
classifies the philosophical version of the Frame Problem as NP-Hard and likely NP-incomplete). Even
if the serial symbol processing of classical computational models were exchanged for massively parallel
symbol processors, the consequences entailed by complexity theory suggests that adequate solutions to
the frame problem are not likely forthcoming.
Calling someone who claims that cognition is not all and only representational processing an “antirepresentationalist” is akin to calling someone who is “pro-choice” “anti-life”—it gives the impression
that the theorist makes a much stronger than she actual does.
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which no representation occurs—but there may not be such a thing even if it isn’t all and
only representation all of the time. The thesis I wish to put forward seems to be
underdetermined in principle by any possible evidence—which is unfortunate. However,
suppose the counterfactual hegemonic circumstance where my weaker claim happens to
be the received view. The stronger claim of representationalism would also depend on a
standard of evidence that requires finding an example in which only representation
occurs—but there may not be such an example even if it is all and only representation all
of the time. The issue of theory decision is here rhetorical, not genuinely philosophical (or
empirical). It is more so a function of which theory occupies the privileged position
afforded to a received view than it is a function of which theory has the superior
empirical support—neither does (from the other’s perspective).
Now that we have sorted out the distinction between “body-image” and “bodyschema” and their relations to proprioception, we are in a position to see how they factor
into considerations about intersubjectivity and social practices. There are, of course, two
maneuvers necessary to clarify the relevance of body-schema and body-image to social
practices. First one must give an account that shows how body-schema and body-image
differentially participate in social interaction. Then one must give reciprocally
constitutive accounts of social interaction and the functioning of practices, customs, and
other social institutions that shape body-image and schema. The general argument is that
only dynamic, embodied, extended agents of the kind I have described are capable of
enacting the kinds of social practices, customs and institutions that we actually do. A
failed attempt at adequately motivating this reciprocal relation results in one of the
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following outcomes:
(1) An account with dynamic embodied agency as explanans to the explanandum
of social practices,
(2) An account with social practices as explanans to the explanandum of dynamic
embodied agency, or
(3) An account that is unable to ‘bridge the gap’ between dynamic embodied
agency and social practices.
If the outcome we arrive at (3), there are three further possible explanations:
(A) We must abandon a dynamic embodied account of agency in order to salvage
a workable theory of social practice (deny the gap – no embodiment),
(B) We must abandon the coherence of the notion of social practice in order to
salvage a workable theory of embodied cognition (deny the gap – no social
practices), or
(C) Adopt a dualistic or pluralistic account which recognizes an unbridgeable
explanatory gap between the type of account of agency we can give, and the
type of account we can give about social practices (embrace the gap).
I will argue that both Gallagher and Schatzki fail to maintain the reciprocity to which
they both pay lip-service, and that instead, Gallagher’s argument leaves him with an
account resembling (1), Schatzki’s argument leaves him with an account resembling (2),
and Turner’s argument affirms something like (3-B). An argument resulting in (3-C) is
unsatisfactory as an explanation 177, though if it turns out that it is the only defensible
position, we may accurately call this the “Wittgensteinian Approach”, as Wittgenstein
never sought to explain, but rather to merely clarify by describing what is the case in a
way that coheres with our concrete and ordinary phenomenological and social encounters
in the world. Interestingly, contrary to what Schatzki claims, I do not think the approach
he gives is “Wittgensteinian” enough to merit the title of his book (though our interests
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That is, it is unsatisfactory as an explanation of the relation between social practices and an account of
agency because it denies there is such a relation. It amounts to explaining away the problem rather than
addressing it.
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here do not turn on this point) 178. Again, the purpose of this chapter is to avoid all of (1) (3) (and thus 3A-C), by giving accounts of agency and social practices that adequately
shows how they dynamically co-constitute each other (viz. dynamic embodied agency
constitutes social practice(s), and social practice(s) constitutes dynamic embodied
agency). We may call this the “co-constitution criterion” (hereafter “CCC”).
2.4

Turner’s Criticism of Social Practices
In order to show how Gallagher’s and Schatzki’s accounts fail the CCC, I will use

Turner’s criticism of social practices. In The Social Theory of Practices, Turner outlines
an argument that shows how any attempt to make good on the “promissory note” left by
those who invoke the concept of “social practice” must inevitably fail. In terms of
explanatory fecundity, if this negative argument succeeds the concept of practice, along
with a constellation of similar concepts (traditions, customs, institutions, habits, etc.),
must be cast to the junk-heap of philosophically useless concepts. Turner’s argument
amounts to the claim that to explain an action as instantiating a practice is precisely to fail
to adequately satisfy the reasonable minimal criteria for explanation. He differentiates
the problems faced by notions of practice along three axes:
(I) [Transmission]: How practices can be transmitted between and among
individuals within a society, culture, or tradition,
178

Wittgenstein was the paradigmatic case of what would later be called an ‘ordinary language’
philosopher. His intention, at least by the time he worked on Philosophical Investigations, was to tidy
up the way we think about language by analyzing how we actually use it in concrete situations. For
Wittgenstein then, there is no problem of explaining how metaphysics of agency and social practices
relate—namely because Wittgenstein simply was uninterested in metaphysics. If it turns out that an
analysis of our use of language reveals inconsistencies between how we talk about agency and how we
talk about social practices—this just points to a philosophical confusion—a bungle that only
philosophers could have gotten themselves into—rather than some deeper underlying problem.
Wittgenstein doesn’t attempt to clear up such ‘philosophical confusions’ but seems to think that
revealing them as such is sufficient.
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(II) [Diachronicity]: How practices can be said to both persist and change
over time in a coherent way, and
(III) [Synchronicity]: How individuals that differ in their situational
experiences can participate in a practice if nothing is
shared between them.
His argumentative strategy is to show that any adequate theory of social practices must
simultaneously solve all three problems, and that attempting to solve the problems on any
one axis results in exacerbating problems along another or both of the others.
If someone takes transmission (I) seriously as a problem, it betrays the
supposition that there are objective contents to be transmitted, essentially sedimenting
and reifying the contents practices 179. This in turn makes the persistence in (II) a bigger
problem. On the other hand, if one takes the issue of diachronic change in (II) seriously,
it becomes difficult to articulate exactly what could be shared by social practitioners, and
what kind of cognitive mechanism could enact the transmission of such continually
dynamic practices 180. Finally, when we take the issue of synchronic differentiability (III)
seriously, we seem to be left with nothing to transmit in (I), and no way to track
persistence or change in (II). Ultimately, Turner concludes that:
[T]he idea of the special persistence of mores or traditions was thought to
necessitate the hypothesis of the existence and transmission of some sort of
collective object. But there is no need for any such collective object. The same
kinds of persistence can occur entirely through individual (and possibly
literally different) habits that arise in the individual as a consequence of the
emulative performance of particular activities, observances and the like. (STP
98-99)
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In chapter 3 I argue for a process-based ontology of systems that is incompatible with the presumed
substance—or reified object—based approach that underwrites the problem of transmission. By instead
taking a process approach, the problem of transmission is averted, though a different account of
communicability must be provided. The interactive dynamic systems approach I describe in chapter 3
does precisely this.
Again, this is an ontological issue – and one that is sufficiently addressed via Dynamic Systems Theory.
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The solution is to do away with reference to social practices altogether, and in their
explanatory stead talk of “individual habits”. These habits, as we will now see, are
nothing more than learned bodily skills—alterations to one’s body-schema and bodyimage 181.
All parties involved (Gallagher, Schatzki, Turner, and even Wittgenstein) value
the explanatory relevance of dynamic embodiment in agency. In Turner’s The Social
Theory of Practices these commitments are displayed in the following passages. For
instance, In his discussion of “the Mauss Problem”, he writes:
Marcel Mauss, the nephew and student of Durkheim, provides the classic case
of the discovery of a practice in his essay on techniques of the body. In this
essay he recalls lying ill in a hospital in New York:
I wondered where previously I had seen girls walking as my nurses walked. I
had time to think about it. At last I realized that it was at the cinema.
Returning to France, I noticed how common the gait was, especially in Paris.
The girls were French and they too were walking in this way. In fact,
American walking fashions had begun to arrive here, thanks to the cinema.
...Mauss could distinguish the walk as habit because he could say that the
difference in walks he had noticed was not a natural difference, and he could
say that it was not a natural difference because he could give a historical
account of it. He started, so to speak, within a culture with its
expectations...An exterior performance, such as a manner of walking, is the
result of the compositions of many causes – body properties, shoes, training,
and setting. The ‘same’ external walk can be produced by various
combinations of causes. 182
Here, Turner shows how Mauss’ assumptions about the different ways in which
embodied activities are learned (either through individual lived experiences or through

181

182

To anticipate the account I give in chapters 3 and 4, we may describe habits as behavioral “attractors”
established through various interactive feedback mechanisms between an individual agent and her local
environment. The patterns that underlie such behaviors are determined both by the agent’s self-guiding
norms (developed through the agent’s embodied sensitivities to the various affordances in her local
environment) as well as the negative and positive social-normative feedback provided by others. I take
the issue of pattern-detection – and therefore the issue of identifying habits and norms – to be a
primarily epistemic issue (for more on this, see my discussion of “systems” in chapter 3).
Turner, Stephen P. (1994) The Social Theory of Practices. Chicago Press. 1994. pp. 21-22.
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manifold forms of social conditioning), factor fundamentally in social practices or
‘habits’. Along the same lines Turner later writes:
Two people may learn to ride a bicycle equally well, in the sense that they are
able to perform the same tricks on the bicycle, or guide the bicycle through
the same manoeuvres. But each person, in acquiring this skill, has done so
with a different instrument, their own body, which they have trained in a
different way. The ‘differences’ may be seen from the history of their teaching
themselves the skill, or learning it...Not only may they not be identical, there
is every reason to suppose they are not identical. 183
Quite similar to Gallagher’s point about body-schema constraining and affording
different possibilities, Turner here emphasizes the malleability of the body as a skillbearing locus, and that the status of one’s possession of a skill depends solely upon the
status of the body—which changes in ways that inform that skill. Additionally, this
passage also shows that Turner doesn’t distinguish as Gallagher does between pre-noetic,
and perceptual learning. For Gallagher one can either consciously or unconsciously train
himself to ride the bicycle—bicycle riding is either a body-schematic skill or
intentionally manipulated through one’s body-image. The distinction is appears
extremely important here because it signifies the difference between success and failure
for Turner’s general argumentative scheme. If the possibility of intersubjective
communication depends crucially on conscious discursive expression and skilled bodily
learning occurs only at the pre-noetic or body-schematic level, then Turner’s argument
for the impossibility of sharing the skilled practice of bicycle riding via discursive
communication succeeds. However, if the possibility of intersubjective communication
depends on conscious, attentive, discursive communication, and skilled bodily learning
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Ibid. p. 58.
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can be expressed consciously and discursively, then there is absolutely no problem with
sharing practices. While this purported solution may seem enticing, it would be prudent
to consider that social practices are themselves complex and dynamic, and it no trivial
task to explain the changes that practices can undergo, and how such changes in practices
relate to the concrete interactions that a multiplicity of agents enact.
Alternatively (and I think rightly), it seems Gallagher would argue that
intersubjective communication must occur pre-noetically between two or more subjects’
body-schemata 184. Turner’s language here seems to suggest that many of the aspects of
learning the skills of bicycle riding can only occur consciously (at the level of bodyimage). If this is the case, Turner’s argument once again succeeds: some of what is
necessary for skill/practice transmission (specifically one’s idiosyncratic body-image)
cannot be transmitted. Later in The Social Theory of Practices, Turner seems to
problematize learning by transmission in exactly this way:
[consider] for example a robot replacing a lathe-operator’s body together with
a traditional mechanical lathe. The lathe-operator obviously does not possess
the ‘knowledge’ to run the robot’s body. The lathe-operator’s embodied
achievements and powers (to perform a specific range of tasks) are what is
being emulated...In this case something – a computer-driven robot – is
emulating an activity, but obviously not literally following the same rules. But
if something – a machine driven by a computer – that is not following the
same rules can emulate, why can’t this same kind of relationship, of
emulation, occur between persons? 185
Here, what may at first blush appear to be an argument for a multiple-realizability thesis
184
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The picture here can very quickly become quite complex. There is regular traffic between bodyschemata and body-image for any given agent. We could ask whether the issue of communication
between two or more agents is a matter of body-schema or body-image (or both). Phenomenally it may
appear to agents that expressiveness in ones body-image is what is being transmitted and received.
However this may simply be the result of agents identifying their body-image with their body-schema
in a certain closely-coupled way.
Turner, Stephen P. (1994) The Social Theory of Practices. Chicago Press. 1994. p. 98.
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consistent with the functionalist theses of Putnam and Fodor amongst others, actually
suggests a deeper point: that there can be no hope for multiple realizability. Rather, each
differently-shaped, differently-trained body cannot help but run its own unique, nonportable “program”—because each body is necessarily different from others. One cannot
“possess the ‘knowledge’ to run [another] body”. Turner’s argument undermines the
expectation that intersubjective communication can be achieved through emulation,
regardless of whether it occurs pre-noetically or consciously. The negative result
produced by Turner’s argument is strong enough to eclipse the importance of Gallagher’s
body-schema/body-image distinction because—if Turner is correct—it doesn’t matter
whether communication is supposed to occur between agents’ body-schemata or their
body-images; since the differences in both abrogate any possible transmission of
expressiveness from one agent to another.
2.5

Gallagher’s “Interactionism” and Turner’s “Emulationism”
Interestingly, while discussing theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST) in

his Brains/Practices/Relativism, Turner supports what he calls an “emulationist” theory.
Theory theory is the idea that one’s communally-shared, culturally-inherited
understanding of folk psychology constitutes a theory of mind, while simulation theory is
the idea that agents ‘simulate’ the mental activities of others via their own mental
activities. The issue at stake here is different than those discussed above however. By the
time we get to discussing theories of “mind reading” (coming to understand the thoughts,
desires, emotions, etc. of others) such as TT and ST, we’ve moved beyond theories of
social communication. Indeed, both TT and ST share some key assumptions that
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Gallagher later goes on to question in his “Two Problems of Intersubjectivity”. There,
Gallagher treats concerns with three assumptions implicit in both Theory Theory and
Simulation Theory. The first of these assumptions is that minds are essentially individual
and autonomous—there is a gap in accessibility between one subject and others. This is
taken to imply that to solve the “problem of other minds” one needs to infer the mind
states of others. Second, the inference of others’ minds occurs essentially 3rd personally
as an observer from the outside looking in. And third, that the above mentioned modes of
inferring how others think explains a vast majority of the instances of inferences about
what others think. Gallagher instead refutes at least the third claim—that if one does
anything like the above, it is only in somewhat rare circumstances. Alternatively,
Gallagher proposes a third theory of mind option, his “Interaction Theory” 186, which
states that we directly perceive others’ intentions in their dispositions or embodied
behavior, trading the 3rd person observational assumption, for an unmediated 2nd personal
stance.
Gallagher (again, I think rightly) refuses to make the argumentative move 187 that
places individual, embodied agents out of direct perceptual contact with each other. This
is important regarding the critical arguments presented in Turner’s The Social Theory of
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It should be noted that the theory of Dynamic Embodied Agency that I develop here bears a close
kinship with approaches that have been called “Interactivist”. My approach shares much in common
with both “Interactionist” and “Interactivist” theories; but these two are quite different. As described on
the Institute for Interactivist Studies official website: “Interactivism is a metaphysical and theoretical
approach to understanding phenomena of biology, mind, persons, and social reality. At the
metaphysical level, it emphasizes a strict naturalism and a process metaphysics as essential to the
understanding of emergence…The term “interactivism” derives from the model of representation as
emergent in interactive systems.” (http://www.lehigh.edu/~interact/ retrieved 2/2/2013)
That is, the argumentative move assumed by Theory Theoretical and Simulation Theoretical models of
the mind that agents are more-or-less isolated from each other and autonomous.
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Practice because it appears to sidestep his problem-schematic 188 (a possibility ruled out
by Turner). However, we shall see that Gallagher’s argument for “direct interaction” does
not evade Turner’s critical arguments. Initially, Turner seems to agree with the basic
aspects of Gallagher’s interaction theory, writing that “It helps [Turner’s “emulationist”
approach] if the basic material with which “understanding” develops includes some
common starting points [..or..] basic emotions, and there is important evidence that there
are some universal feelings with universal facial expressions” 189; also “all that
understanding another person means is to be able to interact, and this means to play the
relevant roles,” 190 though he continues the sentence in a way that betrays a major
difference from Gallagher: “and to take the attitude of the other in the relevant
stereotyped ways, and to employ the significant symbols in this activity of attitude
taking” 191. He continues to elucidate a more or less simulationist position that should now
sound familiar:
What we ‘acquire’ is no more than the results of our own attempts to interact
on the basis of our hypotheses about the attitudes of others and the feedback
that enables us to improve our attempts to take the attitudes of others is the
success and failure of our interactions. There is no more than this to
understanding and specifically nothing in the way of a ‘system of
conceptions’ that must be ‘inherited’ in order for us to understand. 192
Because Turner doesn’t make use of a distinction between body-image and body-schema,
188
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Turner’s problem-schematic is that all explanations invoking notions of ‘social practice’ must
necessarily face the problems of transmission, change, and sharing—and that facing one means
exacerbating another. Gallagher “sidesteps” this scheme by eliminating the mediation that underlies the
problems of transmission, change, and sharing. These are only problems when agents’ interactions are
mediated—when there are boundaries preventing direct access to others. By hypothesizing direct access
to others’ bodily states, Gallagher successfully circumvents these concerns—perhaps trading them for
others.
Turner, Stephen P. (2002) Brains/Practices/Relativism. Chicago Press. 2002. p. 67.
Ibid. p. 68, emphasis added.
Ibid. p. 68.
Ibid. p. 68.
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his picture of communicative interaction involves one agent discursively making
inferences about another. On the other hand, Gallagher need not hypothesize that
communicative expressibility trades in, or depends upon body-image at all; and if bodyimage is not implicated in communication, then there is need for neither discursivity nor
inference. The problem that disallows Gallagher’s interaction theory exemption from
Turner’s criticism of social practices is that there is no principled way of distinguishing it
from Turner’s indirect, inferential account of making sense of others. If the direct access
agents have of others bodies occurs at the pre-noetic, schematic level of bodily
expressiveness (and much of the work in Gallagher’s book is at pains to motivate and
support precisely this claim) and does not transgress the threshold of conscious inference,
then there can be no way to guarantee the directness of that access. Put perhaps more
pointedly, the kind of expressiveness to which agents have direct access in others’ bodies
is exactly the kind of expressiveness available in non-agential objects, animals, plants,
rocks, and T.V. screens. Interaction theory collapses into mundane simulation or
emulation theory in that it neither requires nor can help itself to a theory of mind. The
direct interaction is not between two or more agents (or minds) but is between two or
more body-schemata; and there is no obvious sense in which body-schemata are, in
themselves, minds (or agents). What is needed is some argument that shows how bodyschema is sufficient (not merely necessary) for agential (or “minded”) action. If all I
am—as a mind—is pre-noetic body-schema, what are we supposed to make of the noetic,
the discursive, and the representational? Are these not also properly constitutive of the
mind? It seems here we have again run up against Adams’ and Aizawa’s problem of the
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“mark of the cognitive” 193. At any rate, they are precisely what Gallagher proscribes in
his Interactionist account. In effect, he closes both the epistemic and metaphysical gaps
between different agents’ bodies (and body-schemata), but in so doing widens a gap
between body-schema and body-image. Perhaps lived bodies interact with each other
directly as Gallagher says, but this provides no reason for eliminating the inference an
agent must make in relating his body-schema to his body-image. Effectively, all
Gallagher has done is shift the indirect inference from between isolated agents’ bodies to
between isolated body-schema and body-image within an agent. Indirect and inferential
access occurs not between agents, but within agents. Gallagher believes his direct
Interactionist account evades the issues caused by mediation but it instead merely
internalizes them.
2.6

Schatzki’s Social Practice Theory of Agency
In league with Gallagher, Schatzki argues for a social theory of practices in which

agents directly perceive each others “conditions of life” (Schatzki’s term of art for the
expression of “how things stand or are going for someone”—basically one’s general life
situation 194). Schatzki echoes both Gallagher’s and Turner’s de-privileging of the 3rd
personal observer stance in favor of a 2nd personal interactive one. He writes “a
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That is, the question “what is to count as cognitive?” or “in virtue of what is something a mind?”.
Adams and Aizawa ask for the necessary and sufficient conditions for counting as a mind; and while all
of Turner, Schatzki, and Gallagher resist taking the bait, it seems none succeeds in evading this
problem.
I am tempted here to compare Schatzki’s “conditions of life” with Gallagher’s “body-image”, but I
think an identity is too strong. They are in some weaker sense analogues—both are a matter of how one
sees one’s self. However, Schatzki’s “conditions of life” may be broader, and contain the concrete, prenoetic bodily and physical conditions of one’s situation as well. Since he doesn’t discuss the phrase in
these terms it is difficult to say. Nonetheless, when he uses it, it tends to refer to the way in which one
sees their life (in a diachronic sense). It is an assessment of how one’s life is going, here and now.
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functional adult’s extensive bodily repertoire of doings and saying is social in the sense
of being acquired through learning and training in the context of others’ activities...An
expressive body that manifests, signifies, and constitutes conditions of life is thus a social
product” 195. He continues by fleshing out four different ways that individual agents are
“characterized by virtue of their participation in social practices” 196.
The first feature Schatzki outlines is that of “being in” a particular, contextualized
“condition of life”. He says that “to be in a condition of life is for things to stand or to be
going some way that is expressed in doings, sayings, sensations, and images.” First to
note with the idea of being in a condition of life, then, is that it does not distinguish as
Gallagher does between body-schema and body-image. For Gallagher, in order for
something to be ‘expressible in doings’ is for it to be proprioceptively capable—it
implies having available a pre-noetic body-schema through which doings are
meaningfully expressed (again, pre-noetically) amongst embodied agents engaged in an
act of participatory sense-making 197. Even sayings and sensations can be thought to be
expressible though body-schemata. Since Gallagher takes expression to occur at the prenoetic level, it should not be possible for conditions of life to be expressible via (body)
images. Indeed, in listing “sayings” and “images” what Schatzki suggests is that
conscious conceptions of body-image are also directly expressible—a possibility ruled
out by Gallagher (body-image is, if anything, transmissible, not directly perceived
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Schatzki, Theodore. (1996) Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the
Social. Cambridge. p. 70.
Ibid. p. 70.
The phrase ‘participatory sense-making’ is a term of art introduced by Hanne De Jaeger and Eziquel Di
Paolo. Cf. e.g. De Jaegher H, Di Paolo EA (2007) Participatory sense-making: an enactive approach to
social cognition. Phenomenology and Cognitive Science 6(4): 485–507
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amongst embodied agents) 198. At any rate, Schatzki’s point in highlighting the feature of
being in a condition of life is to emphasize the word in. He writes that “understanding
particular conditions, as much as understanding types thereof, is part of the background
against which behavior and inner episodes express particular conditions” 199. For Schatzki
and others (notably Searle), a “background” is the pre-representational, meaning-bearing
substratum from and according to which individual agents situate their particular
understandings of their own, and others conditions of life 200. Individuals are always
already immersed in and structured by the social conditions given by—and constitutive
of—their environments.
Schatzki however attempts to sidestep some of Turner’s concerns by
incorporating considerations of complexity and ambiguity in conditions of life. He puts
the problem thusly:
Strictly speaking, understanding determinately institutes specific conditions
only in conjunction with the entirety of the context of behaviors and inner
episodes occur. These contexts, furthermore, are invariably complicated,
embracing events in the immediate settings of action, wider social situations
and practices, past and future behaviors and inner episodes, other conditions
of life, and physical states of bodies. What is more, even given specific
expressions and the totality of contexts in which they occur, conceptual
understanding might not unambiguously determine that a person is in some
specific condition. Common locutions for mentality and activity are extremely
flexible, and different words can often equally well capture how things stand
or are going for someone at some point. 201
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That is, when Schatzki says that being in a condition of life is “for things to stand or to be going some
way that is expressed in doings, sayings, sensations, and images” what he has in mind is that doings,
sayings, sensations, and images are shared amongst those who share the same life condition (and for
Schatzki, this is not an empty set. Turner would disagree).
Schatzki, Theodore. (1996) Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the
Social. Cambridge. p. 70 (emphasis added)
cf. e.g. Turner, Stephen P. (1994) The Social Theory of Practices. Chicago Press. 1994. pp. 35-41.
Schatzki, Theodore. (1996) Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the
Social. Cambridge. p. 73
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Schatzki is here concerned with the problem of underdetermination 202. Any explanations
that must make essential reference both to direct perceptions of others mental conditions
as well as a background of social intelligibility will need to address the issue of how
particular expressions can be honed-in upon. This concern is similar to Wittgenstein’s
preoccupations in the celebrated private language argument sections of Philosophical
Investigations, where we [philosophers] are faced with the problem of verifying or
explaining which rule is being followed when one would like to “the” rule. Of course, on
some readings of these sections, Wittgenstein’s purpose is to show that, in normal
everyday doings and uses of seemingly rule-governed behavior, this problem precisely
doesn’t arise—it is only a problem when we set to explaining what we do. Schatzki
makes the same rhetorical move. He notices that “in the rough and tumble of real life we
are of course rarely appraised of all contexts of behavior” 203 and instead we must simply
rely on whichever background criteria arise in the particular considerations of the
context—we recognize whichever “behavioral phenomena by virtue of which it makes
sense to say that someone is in a given condition” 204. This, of course, does not give us
transmission of expression across the intersubjective void between isolated agents; nor
does it allude to “intending to”, or “triangulating amongst” (a) one’s understanding, (b)
the expressivity of the other’s body, and (c) a Platonic “background” (as Searle or
202
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This problem of “underdetermination” is precisely what Kripke (1982) and Brandom (1994) – in
dealing with Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following – describe as the “gerrymandering problem” –
the problem of being able to, post-hoc, re-draw the boundaries of the terms of discussion so as to make
them fit with whatever inference is being made. This problem more generally applies to
“transcendental” inferences to the “conditions for the possibility” of factual states of affairs.
Transcendental inferences, because they’re always undetermined, can always be “gerrymandered”. For
a similar characterization see Turner’s Brains/Practices/Relativism, pp. 122-4.
Schatzki, Theodore. (1996) Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the
Social. Cambridge. p. 74.
Ibid. p. 74.
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Davidson might have it); and importantly it doesn’t necessitate direct perceptual
apprehension of one another (as with Gallagher). Rather, Schatzki’s more modest
understanding of intersubjective communication bears a striking resemblance to Turner’s
position in Brains/Practices/Relativism—namely that “What we ‘acquire’ is no more than
the results of our own attempts to interact on the basis of our hypotheses about the
attitudes of others and the feedback that enables us to improve our attempts to take the
attitudes of others is the success and failure of our interactions” 205. Compare this to
Schatzki’s claim that:
People’s evaluations of the bearing of specific context also often deviate. So
our judgments of others’ conditions diverge, and we occasionally challenge a
person’s self descriptions...[one] is of course familiar with life conditions and
her situation, but this familiarity need not be explicitly drawn upon. She just
acts. And what conditions are thereby expressed depends on what she does
and says, the contexts in which she acts, understandings of life conditions, and
possibly whatever inner episodes (if any) occurred. 206
If this was all Schatzki thought was necessary for the constitution of persons by
way of social practices, his views would be in line with both Turner’s and Wittgenstein’s.
However, he includes three additional features which he thinks fundamentally bases
explanations of persons and intersubjective interaction in social practices.
He tells us that the second feature of social practice constitutive of individual
agency is our “abilities to describe, explain, and report one’s conditions to others” 207.
This equates fairly straightforwardly with the pre-noetic, body-schematic expressibility
that underwrites Gallagher’s notion of direct perception of others. On the other hand,
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Turner, Stephen P. (2002) Brains/Practices/Relativism. Chicago Press. 2002. p. 68.
Schatzki, Theodore. (1996) Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the
Social. Cambridge. pp. 74-75.
Ibid. p. 75.
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Schatzki says that when it comes to describing, explaining, and reporting one’s
conditions to himself “he usually ascribes them on the basis of nothing at all...there is
nothing articulable or designatable in the experience of a person whose understanding is
formed within social practices that informs him what his conditions are” 208. Gallagher
however certainly allows for the possibility that body-schematic knowledge can cross
over into and become body-image knowledge, claiming that “there are reciprocal
interactions between pre-noetic body-schemas and cognitive experiences, including
normal and abnormal consciousness of the body” 209. Unfortunately Gallagher does not do
much to flesh out precisely how body-schema and body-image do interact 210. Even more
puzzlingly, this seemingly magical ability to unproblematically transmit one’s life
conditions to others seems to directly oppose the non-totalizing, complex, ambiguities of
the first feature Schatzki describes.
The third feature is the compliment to the second—“the ability to identify others’
conditions” 211. Here Schatzki distinguishes as others (including Gallagher) do between
perceiving and inferring. Following Wittgenstein, he says for instance that we simply do
not infer other’s pain states:
“We see emotion.” - As opposed to what? - We do not see facial contortions
and make inference from them (like a doctor framing a diagnosis) to joy,
208
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Ibid. p. 76. One way of understanding this is that, for example, when I feel morose, I do no give myself
reasons for the feeling—I do not feel morose on the basis of anything at all—I simply feel that way
(directly).
Gallgher, Shaun. (2005) How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford. p. 35.
One may see parallels between this difficulty in Gallagher, and the difficulty Kant had in expressing
how precisely schematism is supposed to succeed at taking non-representational intuitions to produce
representational understanding in the intellect. If they’re distinct and separate kinds, exactly how do
body-schema and body-image interact? This problem is exacerbated the problems of inferences just
discussed.
Schatzki, Theodore. (1996) Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the
Social. Cambridge. p. 76.
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grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even
when we are unable to give any other description of the features. - Grief, one
would like to say, is personified in the face.” 212
Schatzki continues by explaining how the ability to perceive others’ life conditions
depends on a background (pre-noetic or schematic) “understanding” of the social
practices in which such expressions can arise meaningfully. This understanding is
acquired through the (often tacit) recognition of patterns of behavior. This pattern
recognition is not some kind of inferential calculus; working out a complex regression
analysis of previous or stereotypical life situations to compare degrees of similarity of
features 213; but rather such previous experiences factor in precisely as a concrete
historical conditioning of the agent’s body through habituation and learning. In particular
contextual situations, experience is always novel and can only be made intelligible by
drawing from the historically, and socially established background patterns of
behavior 214,215. Recall that all this is supposed to occur in the moment of direct perception
of another’s bodily expressiveness. The problem here is that more of an account for the
mechanics of learning needs to be given (even at the pre-noetic level of body-schema)—
how does one first come to recognize the patterns beset by the background of social
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Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1967) Zettel. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe., G.H. von Wright, G.E.M. Anscombe
ed.’s. University of California Press. p. 225.
213
Presumably contra Brandom’s “inferentialism”.
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But this background is itself dynamic. Compare here to Derrida’s notion of iterability. When one uses a
word in a particular context, the use of this word both derives its meaning from past uses and contexts,
but also from its novel application here and now. Thus, every time a word is used, it cannot mean the
same thing as previous uses for two reasons: (1) since its last use, it has accumulated one more usecontext, which alters its meaning, and (2) since this situation is novel, its meaning is indexed to this
very situational novelty. Thus, through repetition (using a word, time and again) its meaning is
“iterated”. Schatzki’s “background” must work the same way.
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practice 216—e.g. how does the background become the background? Like Turner,
Schatzki’s explication of inferential identification of others’ conditions largely follows a
simulationist tack 217.
The last feature of individual experience that exhibits how it is constituted by
social practices is “possession of ‘convictions’ that, in Wittgenstein’s words ‘hold fast’ in
a human life” 218. Citing passages from On Certainty (mainly 88-105) Schatzki explains
how one’s convictions maintain their normative force without ever being explicitly taught
or discursively formulated; “rather, people’s understandings of the concepts of belief and
doubt, in conjunction with their wider ability to grasp particular languages, is simply such
that when certain statements are made, perhaps for the first time ever, people are not in
the position to doubt them” 219. Presumably these convictions function as the persistent,
normative, structure-giving elements of the pre-noetic social background of practices. In
this case, the reason explanations ‘bottom out’ at practices and we must cease attempting
explanation, is because there simply is nothing more to articulate about our current
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Especially when this “recognition” is often tacit. In a sense, the problem here is akin to the poverty of
stimulus problem Chomsky addresses with his theory of generative grammar. Infants seemingly lack
sufficient exposure to well-formed grammatical utterances—yet they’re capable of linguistic expression
far beyond what their exposure affords. What could explain this? Chomsky has made a career of finetuning his theory, but his general response is a transcendental inference that there must be some kind of
innate “language acquisition device” or “generative grammar”-supporting structure in the brains of
competent language-users. Cf. Chomsky, Noam. (1980). Rules and Representations. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
217
Schatzki’s formulation of “background” is (compared to Searle’s) quite nuanced and helpful. The
Dynamic Systems Theory (DST) approach I outline in chapter 3 agrees in large part with Schatzki’s.
What is needed is an explanation of the processes or mechanisms whereby a “background” can be
established or “bootstrapped”. The model Richard Campbell describes (considered at length in chapter
3) can be used to do precisely this—it gives a basis for a naturalistic model of dynamic embodied
learning that provides sufficient conditions for the kinds of social resources required for establishing
such a “tacit” background.
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actions or practices—as Wittgenstein writes “If I have exhausted the justifications I have
reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply what
I do’” 220. To explain convictions grounded in a non-discursive background is to reach
beyond what is epistemically available. In this way we can see how the conviction of
acting in a certain particular way—in acting and expressing oneself according to social
conventions or practices—is understood as ‘reaching bedrock’ or being unable to give
further explanation or justification. However, what adds to confusion here, at least in
considering pre-noetic constraints or criteria for action (including speech action), is in
trying to differentiate between consciously-held convictions on the one hand, and
mundane non-discursive, bodily-learned skills (like riding a bicycle) on the other. Both
are presumably normative in the relevant ways. There can be no hard line in
understanding “this is simply what I do” as a matter of conviction or of individually
learned, historically habituated, skilled bodily activity221. However, I suspect that nothing
in Schatzki’s account hinges on this issue.
It should now be quite clear that Schatzki’s claim to co-constitution between
individual embodied agents and the background of social practices is merely lip-service.
His project is straightforwardly one in which social practices unidirectionally constitute
the embodied individual, and not the other way around. Earlier I said that if it turns out
that the only defensible position was (3-C) (embracing the unbridgeable gap between
220
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Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1953/2001) Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. 3rd
Edition. Blackwell. §217
Rather, if there is a difference, it must be a difference of degree. In How the Body Shapes the Mind,
Gallagher argues for a difference of degree between body-schema and body-image, though he does not
spell out exactly how this is supposed to work out. I suspect he realizes it body-schema and body-image
must lie on a continuum, but cannot give good grounds for this and maintain the significance of the
distinction simultaneously. Further, we have already seen that there appears to be an important sense in
which body-image and body-schema are epistemically distinct.
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embodied cognition & social practices), we could accurately call it the “Wittgensteinian
Approach”. While such an approach, under such conditions would be Wittgensteinian, I
do not think it is the only defensible position.
All three of Gallagher, Schatzki, and Turner recognize this as well. The only
defensible position is the one embraced by both Gallagher and Schatzki—which includes
both bottom-up and top-down constitution of embodied agents and social practices 222. It
is a phenomenological fact that for each individual agent, we enter a ready-made world
socially imbued with significance. As Wittgenstein recognized, however, socially imbued
significance does not in-itself constitute meaning. For this, we need actual agents
engaged in concrete experiences of bodily encounter in and with the world. Gallagher’s
distinction between body-schema and body-image does some work in helping to untangle
some of the details of this encountering, but it does not go far enough in bridging the
explanatory gap between phenomenal experience and the significance of social practices.
Specifically, the body-image/schema distinction fails to adequately address the top-down
(social practice) constitution of embodied subjects. Schatzki’s “Wittgensteinian” theory
of social practice puts the perceiving agent in a role like that of a patron in the Cartesian
theater—significance is bestowed from without, from the inherited background of
intelligibility always already given. Agents may come to participate in meaning-making,
but only derivatively as a result of their absorption of the social-practice background.
Thus Schatzki’s theory fails to adequately address the bottom-up (phenomenal)
constitution of embodied subjects.
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I take it that Schatzki does much work in motivating the importance of giving a
social-theoretical account of practices, and that Turner succeeds in elucidating the kinds
of problems that have traditionally plagued such explanations. But I think Gallagher; with
his more recent work on Interaction Theory and Mental Institutions 223 is beginning to
give the appropriate attention to a properly phenomenological account of social
institutions and practices.
2.7

Attunement [or recursive self-maintenance]

In the balance of this chapter, I will examine the conditions for the possibility of
individual agents intersubjectively sharing what Schatzki calls “conditions of life”. If
Turner’s skeptical arguments prove correct, we should not be able to succeed at securing
the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions required for sharing.
Schatzki’s notion of “conditions of life” maps closely to Wittgenstein’s much discussed
use of the term Lebensformen or “forms of life”. There is an entire cottage industry in
discussing what “forms of life” could mean to Wittgenstein; but for the purposes of this
exegesis, we can generally understand the notion of a “form of life” as the socially and
culturally established practices or “ways of living” that comprise the “background” upon
which the intelligibility of an agent’s actions gains purchase.
Wittgenstein addresses the problem of intersubjectivity somewhat circuitously
through his investigations into rule-following. He hinges the possibility of following rules
on pre-reflective “agreement” (Übereinstimmung) which works to constrain the
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hermeneutic space of understanding amongst language-users 224. Wittgenstein recognizes
the difficulty of this task in showing how describing one human’s behavior must
presuppose an entire comples social background or Lebensform(en):
How could human behavior be described? Surely only by showing the actions
of a variety of humans, as they are all mixed up together. Not what one man is
doing now, but the whole hurly burly, is the background against which we see
an action, and it determines our judgment, our concepts and our reactions. 225
At first blush then, it seems as though one must give an account of how one man is
capable of ‘accessing’ this background in order to show how agents can come to agree in
their judgments, concepts, and reactions to (amongst other aspects of Lebensform)
following rules. Given that Anglophone Wittgenstein scholarship is fraught with
interpretive and translational issues, it would be wise to inspect whether the term
‘agreement’ is a good translation for Übereinstimmung. The root stimmung translates to
“mood”, “disposition”, “tuning”, or “morale”. From the contexts in which Wittgenstein
makes use of übereinstimmen or Übereinstimmung 226, it is clear that “agreement” is more
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Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1953/2001) Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. 3rd
Edition. Blackwell. §224.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1980) Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 2, G.H. von Wright and
H. Nyman (eds.), C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell. p. 629.
cf. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1953/2001) Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. 3rd
Edition. Blackwell. §224, 241-2, 429, PPF 346-7, 351-2. I’ve highlighted in boldface the English
analogues of “übereinstimmen” and “Übereinstimmung”:
§224(e). The word “accord” and the word “rule” are related to one another; they are cousins. If I teach
anyone the use of the one word, he learns the use of the other with it.
§241(e). “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” - What is
true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is
agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life.
§242(e). It is not only agreement in definitions, but also (odd as it may sound) agreement in judgments
that is required for communication by means of language. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do
so. - It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of
measurement. But what we call “measuring” is in part determined by a certain constancy in results of
measurement.
§429(e). The agreement, the harmony, between thought and reality consists in this: that if I say falsely
that something is red, then all the same, it is red that it isn’t. And in this: that if I want to explain the
word “red” to someone, in the sentence “That is not red”, I do so by pointing to something that is red.
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appropriate than “moodiness”, “disposition”, or “morality”.
Interestingly, when it comes to the option of “tuning”, the rendering “attunement”
is less straightforwardly incorrect. “Attunement” and “agreement” certainly do not mean
exactly the same thing (i.e. they do not participate in the same language-games in the
same ways), though they are similar in important ways. For example, we can say that one
is “attuned to nature”; and this would be quite different than what we mean if we said that
one “agreed with nature”. However in the case of the latter, there is a similarity between
a colloquial meaning of ‘agreement’ and the notion of attunement. When we say that
someone “agrees with nature” we do not usually mean that there are two psyches (the
person and Nature) and that they’ve come to some sort of discursive accord. Rather, the
agreement is in fitting or attuning one’s mood to that which jibes harmoniously with the
natural environment around her.
Charles Taylor identifies an important, and I think accurate, aspect of the ways in
which individuals come to “agree” (or perhaps “attune themselves”) with communal
practices:
The background understanding we share, interwoven with our practices and
ways of relating, isn’t necessarily something we partake in as individuals.

§346(e). Does it make sense to say that people generally agree in their judgements of colour? a What
would it be like if it were different? - One man would say that a flower was red, which another called
blue; and so on. - But with what right could one then call these people’s words “red” and “blue” our
‘colour-words’? - How would they learn to use these words? And is the language-game which they
learn still the one we call the use of ‘colour names’? There are evidently differences of degree here.
§347(e). But this consideration must apply to mathematics too. If there weren’t complete agreement,
then human beings wouldn’t be learning the technique which we learn either. It would be more or less
different from ours, perhaps even up to the point of unrecognizability.
§351(e). There is such a thing as colour-blindness, and there are ways of ascertaining it. There is, in
general, complete agreement in the colour statements of those who have been diagnosed normal. This
characterizes the concept of a colour statement.
§352(e). There is in general no such agreement over the question of whether an expression of feeling is
genuine or not.
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That is, it can be part of the background understanding of a certain practice or
meaning that is not mine but ours; and it can indeed be ‘ours’ in a number of
ways: as something intensely shared, which binds a community; or as
something quite impersonal, where we act just as ‘anyone’ does. Bringing in
the background allows us to articulate the ways in which our form of agency
is nonmonological, in which the seat of certain practices and understandings is
precisely not the individual but one of the common spaces between. 227
Whereas “agreement” suggests an active, conscious, discursive, and thematic normative
judgment, “attunement” can engage in normative practices pre-reflectively through the
shared background of “common spaces” 228. The notion of attunement has a particularly
beneficial feature when we consider the metaphor of an orchestra tuning itself for a
recital. Each instrument enters the cacophony already having been tuned—perhaps for a
previous recital. No instrument is too far out of alignment, and if it was the room full of
trained musicians could easily identify that fact, and use their developed skills as
musicians to resolve the problem. Myriad practices are involved in the activity of
bringing an orchestra into tune (the learned, proprioceptive, skilled bodily practices of the
musician acquainted with her instrument, the ingrained music-theoretical skill of the
musician, ways of arranging and sitting as an orchestral group, the recognition of the
conductor as having authority, etc.). The activity of tuning, which is itself a social
practice, depends on an open and unbounded structure or “framework” 229, or
“background” “web of practices”—all of which are continually and dynamically engaged
in normative adjustment 230.
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Nevertheless one must be careful, as the language of a “shared” or “common”
space “between” or amongst intersubjective interlocutors potentially suggests a
consensus-driven process through which all involved parties come into normative
alignment or “attunement”. William Lynch (following David Bloor and Henry Collins)
writes that the concept of Lebensform “introduces a sociological element only at the cost
of assuming that social life is consensual at its core and that the limits of consensus
define the limits of community” 231 while Norman Malcolm avers that “[Wittgenstein
held] that in the absence of a consensus of action, there would be no concept of a rule” 232.
E. F. Thompkins similarly claims that “the meaning of the words on which for example
our judgment of colors depends is a matter of communal consensus; of the way people
live their lives, not of transcendental truths enshrined in language” 233. These three
accounts are representative of the general tenor of humanist arguments for a socially
constructed, Wittgensteinian account of normative force meant to be robust enough to
adequately characterize rule-following. But as philosophers of science—such as Sandra
Harding, Donna Harraway, as well as David Bloor—have argued, consensus accounts of
belonging, while seemingly egalitarian on paper do not a community make.
In this vein, Schatzki does a good job in giving a Wittgensteinian account of
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maintenance explicated in chapter 3. A recursively self-maintenant system is one that is “densely”
coupled to its local environment in feedback processes that allow the system to interact with the
environment in such a way as to maintain itself by differentially adjusting both its own homeostatic
processes as well as the conditions of the local environment. The local environment is comprised of all
the factors to which the system is sensitive (e.g. the set of all affordances and constraints). For Dynamic
Embodied Agents (DEAs) this includes physical, biological, psychological, and social (amongst others)
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“being one of ‘us.’” He writes:
Being one of us means, broadly, that a person speaks and behaves intelligibly
to us...this means that what a person says and writes when confronted with
novel and unusual situations is immediately understandable to the rest of us.
When someone departs from familiar usage, he can make himself understood
relatively easy with a succinct explanation of the departure...being one of us
implies...that her actions make sense to us in the contexts in which they occur
and that we grasp which life conditions they express...when these things are
not understood, a person still counts as one of us so long as her behavior
becomes intelligible once we learn of reasons for her action or about the
contexts in which she acts. 234
However, Schatzki also recognizes the trouble with this type of account. He
acknowledges that even with those nearest and dearest to one another, each individual
agent “never fully understands” and is never fully understood by anyone. Crucially, he
notes,
Just where someone begins to become unintelligible and thus no longer one of
us, is a contingent and shifting matter...A ‘we’s internal boundaries are
similarly flexible and porous, since the border between sanity and insanity,
between those who behave intelligibly and those who, despite [similar
upbringings & experiences] do not act and speak like us, is subtle and shifting.
Foreignness, sanity, and we-ness are all matters of degree. 235
Unfortunately he goes on to shrug these concerns off as mundane troubles already prereflectively surmounted, and hence they are issues of little importance. Contrarily, I do
not think we can be so sanguine. These considerations of radical alterity need to be
addressed head-on if humanists such as Schatzki and Taylor are to succeed at maintaining
their position. The differences of degree amongst peers within a community may be
minute, but this does not erase the substance of those differences—especially as they
factor significantly into concrete communicative relationships. The practices constituting
234
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Schatzki, Theodore. (1996) Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the
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the background of intelligibility for a “form of life” are abundant, as are the manifold
ways in which those practices can relate and mutate within supposedly shared communal
spaces, but the differences in degree which comprise the varying bodily encounters of
individual agents with their worlds, compounded by the myriad and chaotic continual
shifts in ‘attunement’ vastly outnumber them, taken jointly.
Without a satisfactory answer to the problems raised here, it is difficult to
motivate an affirmative response to the question of whether the possibility of meaning is
predicated on individual agents sharing in a communally-determined form of life whose
normative force naturally applies to all and only humans. One may grant that individual
agents normatively “correct” 236 their actions by employing any number of practices,
habits, rules, or behaviors, etc. to bring themselves into “attunement” with the uses (or
rules) in which they encounter (either pre-reflectively, or consciously) others acting. In
§242 of PI Wittgenstein writes, “If language is to be a means of communication there
must be agreement [attunement] not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound)
in judgments.” 237 I think that there is probably agreement (or attunement) in judgments
even without the kind of interactive, transmissive communication critiqued by Turner.
Judgment needn’t be shared collectively; rather it can merely show up phenomenally to
dynamic embodied agents as collectively attuned. This is all it means for agents to agree,
whether it is in their pre-reflective embodied (body-schematic) practices or in conscious,
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On the DEA account, this process of “correction” is the recursive self-maintenance of a social system
qua social.
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Cf. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1953/2001) Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. 3rd
Edition. Blackwell. §242.
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discursive, linguistic utterances 238.
While no particular judgments must be understood as collective, other pressing
questions remain: is collective sharing of judgments, expressions, emotions, or social
practices possible? How are we to understand the extended, dynamic, and embodied
aspects of dynamic embodied agents in relation to sharing social practices? What model
of communication is entailed or required by this picture of agency, and what are the
epistemic bases or consequences of this model? These questions will be addressed in the
two remaining chapters.
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It should be clear by now that I do not distinguish sharply between pre-reflective embodied skills, and
reflective embodied skills (like using language). There are many ways in which pre-reflective skills can
become reflective, and in which reflective skills become pre-reflective. An analogy to Hubert Dreyfus’
discussion of the Heideggerian concepts of “readiness-to-hand” and “presence-at-hand” may be helpful
here. The proper use of equipment must be learned. The process by which equipment goes from
showing up to Dasein opaquely (not as equipment for Dasein, but as obstinate, or in Dasein’s way,
keeping Dasein from transparently coping) is precisely a process of embodying a skill—of transforming
a reflective engagement into a pre-reflective engagement with that equipment. Likewise, when that
equipment fails, or the pre-reflective engagement between Dasein and the equipment breaks down, the
relation shifts from transparent, embodied, pre-reflective tool-use to opaque, obstinate, reflective
frustration of Dasein’s worldly coping.
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Chapter 3 – Dynamic Systems Theory

It will behoove us at this point to more fully flesh-out what exactly Dynamic
Systems Theory (DST) is, and is not, and how it has developed into its current
manifestation. DST is born from many interrelated fields of research (such as sociology,
anthropology, communication theory, social philosophy among others) and coalesces as a
mode or method or approach in researching in these various fields. Its approach has
changed somewhat over its relatively short history but the basic idea that motivates DST
is an effort to understand higher order patterns as a function of lower order patterns; to
see more general systems in terms of the interworkings of their dynamic component
parts. I hasten to add that even this extremely general characterization does not pass
without opposition from under the umbrella of DST approaches. To generalize DST in
the way I just did, argue these critics 239, already implies that there is some hierarchy of
system and component; that micro-systemic processes are nested within increasingly
higher-order macro-systemic processes, and that there are clear, perhaps systemfunctional divisions defining each component function within the greater system. Indeed
one of the disciplinary origins of DST follows a trajectory beginning with the early
structuralists in social theory such as Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, and Talcott
Parsons. These structuralists advanced theories that relied on the relative modularity and
decomposability of hierarchically structured systems.
239

E.g. Bickhard, 2009.
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3.1

The Etiology of DST: Structuralism

A system is modular if it is composed of multiple parts; each of which has a
function that, counterfactually, it could achieve on its own without being connected to the
greater systemic whole. A module contributes its functionality to the system not as a
result of its interconnections with other modules but because of its intrinsic functionality.
A system is decomposable if it can be taken apart or broken down into its various
components without erasing the system-independent functionality of those components.
The overall system may lose its more general functionality by being decomposed,
because the more general system depends upon a particular configuration of relations
between its components in order to accomplish the functions of the greater system. Thus,
built-in to the ideas of modularity and decomposability is a particular sense of emergent
properties; the undecomposed system exhibits or possesses some functional property
beyond those exhibited or possessed by each of its modular components. Emergent
properties are those properties that are exhibited in a system at a macro-level, but that are
not exhibited by or explanatorily reducible to any of the properties of micro-level
components that comprise that system. A modular and decomposable system is one that
performs some emergent function or exhibits an emergent property in virtue only of the
configuration of and relations between its components 240. The analysis or reduction of
systems in terms of just modules (or even of their relations) in isolation of their
240

It is important to recognize that such a system in order to be considered a system at all must possess
some system-identifying property or properties that identify the organized collection of modules as
belonging and excludes that which is not part of the system. Without such an identification, the
purported ‘collection of modules’ cannot be thought of as a system. Thus, all systems – in order to be
systems at all – must have some emergent system-identifying property. All systems qua system are
emergent.
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incorporation into the functional whole of the system then works to obscure the wider
system-level emergent properties, and gives an inaccurate view of the system. Finally, a
system that is hierarchically structured is one whose component modules are nested
within each other based upon some organizational principle; often based on degree of
functional generality. Thus more specific functional modules are subsumed under more
general functional modules, which are in turn subsumed under even more general
functional modules until the overall system is sufficiently composed 241,242,243.
This early structuralist picture provided a framework upon which sociological,
anthropological, economic, philosophical, and communicative theories could be
expressed and provided fruitful research programs for these disciplines. Of course, such a
framework carries with it commitments to conceptual dependencies like modularity,
decomposition, and hierarchy, which even in these early stages were questioned 244. The
stringency of such constraints as modularity, decomposition, and hierarchy to the
framework could be loosened, but not without significant costs. For example, a property
like decomposability could be loosened by treating it as matter of degree of
decomposability rather than in kind; modules could be understood as more or less
241

For a full expression of the structuralist conception of systems see Parsons, T., & Shils, A., (eds) (1976)
Toward a General Theory of Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge
242
For an account of the analysis of the concept of functions in scientific explanations see Cummins,
Robert C. (1975). “Functional analysis”. Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64
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M. H. Bickhard (in J. Seibt (ed.), 2003) distinguishes between parts (or modules) of a system having
versus serving a function. He argues that etiological models of function construe the order of
dependence such that the function that some module “serves” for a system is derivative of that module
“having” that function. By contrast, Bickhard’s “interactivist” model reverses the order of dependency
so that a module’s having a particular function is the result of the overall systemic functionality
achieved through a module’s serving the function it does. Bickhard argues (convincingly) that the
etiological approach that underwrites most functionalist / representationalist accounts of the mind (what
he calls “encodingism”) suffers from an incoherence in the very idea of a function; caused in part by
misunderstanding this order of dependency in having and serving functions.
244
Cf. e.g. the idea of “interpenetration” in Parsons, T., & Shils, A., (eds) (1976) Toward a General Theory
of Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, p. 109
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decomposable. They could be fully, or nearly decomposable, or non- or nearly-nondecomposable. However, the introduction of intensity brings with it the drawback that the
utility of the decomposability distinction is either weakened or completely compromised.
With modularity, the problem is exacerbated because a module is defined by functionally
localizable boundaries; but if modularity is a matter of degree, then so are the
corresponding boundaries. And if boundaries are not demarcated by clear and distinct
differences in kind, we now must face the difficulty of potentially being unable to define
modules at all 245.
Parsons’ structuralist social theory saw individual persons as modular components
comprising social entities like institutions, social norms, and practices. However
individuals may be somewhat more versatile than dedicated functional modules in that
they are capable of taking up or occupying various functions; what Parsons called social
roles 246. Often what role (or “function” as it may be) a person plays within the greater
system of, say, a social institution like the university system is dictated by other social
roles in which a person finds herself. Thus, according to Parsons what social roles a
person occupies, or takes up, is determined by a recursive operation involving the other
social roles she already plays 247. This process is dictated in part by cultural norms, and
also in part by the particular circumstances (within that culture) in which the person finds
herself. When a person is playing a social role she is modularly fulfilling a social
function. There are more general social functions (like being a modern woman, or being
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This is one rather functionalist characterization of modularity. See later discussion on C. Hooker for
additional detail.
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Parsons, Talcott (1951) The Social System. Routledge, London
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Parsons, Talcott (1964) Social Roles and Personailty. The Free Press, New York.
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an American) and more specific social functions (like being a second-string wide receiver
for the Green Bay Packers for the 2012-13 NFL season). What makes persons and their
social roles somewhat more interesting is that they are versatile; someone else could play
the role of second-string wide receiver for the Green Bay Packers in the 2012-13 NFL
season. In a sense, persons are more or less general modules in Parsons’ conception of
social roles. They are relatively interchangeable across a wide variety of possible social
roles. More important to Parsons was explaining how social norms, and thus social roles
are transmitted among individuals within a society; and more generally how these
interactions work to shape the character of the wider social system. He called the process
of norm transmission “socialization”, but never gave a full explanation of the
mechanism(s) through which socialization was meant to occur 248. This amounts to
recognizing the types of relations between modular components in a system, while failing
to explain through what media those relations take place.
3.2

Dynamics, Chaos, and Complexity
Structuralisms like Parsons’ had their heyday during the first half of the 20th

century, and laid a considerable part of the conceptual basis for later developments in
DST. Concurrent with Parsons’ sociological structuralism, other disciplines (including
especially mathematics, theoretical physics, economics, biology, ecology, cybernetics,
and chemistry, among other disciplines, sub-disciplines, and interdisciplinary areas of
research), sometimes independently, sometimes cooperatively developed approaches to
the analysis of their respective subject areas that increasingly focused their attentions on
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Cf. Parsons T., Bales, R. (1955). Family Socialization and Interaction Process. Routledge, London

130

the interactions and complexities of the processes that had plagued their research.
Initially, these approaches drew heavily upon the influx of largely successful linear and
numerical methods of data analysis that dominated wartime and post-WWII engineering
problems; and focused primarily on the conditions of system equilibrium. In 1954
Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Anatol Rapoport, Ralph W. Gerard, and Kenneth Boulding
established the Society for the Advancement of General Systems Theory 249, which sought
to bring into conversation the then disparate systems-based approaches into a unified
scientific program. In his 1968 General System theory: Foundations, Development,
Applications Bertalanffy wrote that:
There exist models, principles, and laws that apply to generalized systems or
their subclasses, irrespective of their particular kind, the nature of their
component elements, and the relationships or "forces" between them. It seems
legitimate to ask for a theory, not of systems of a more or less special kind,
but of universal principles applying to systems in general. (p. 32)

The “General Systems” framework held that it is fruitful to understand any subject of
investigation as “systems” of relations between components, and that such systems
exhibit common, generalizable and formalizable patterns, behaviors, and properties.
Eventually, however, this attempt to unify the special sciences under one generalized set
of universal principles encountered both political and conceptual obstacles 250.
In the 1970s through the 1990s advancements in computer technology made
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Later renamed the Society for General Systems Research, then the International Society for the Systems
Sciences (ISSS). Other influential early general systems theorists included Ervin Laszlo, William Ross
Ashby, Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson, C. West Churchman, Norbert Wiener, William Ross Ashby,
John von Neumann, Heinz von Foerster, Aleksandr Lyapunov, Henri Poincaré, Howard T. Odum, René
Thom, among others.
250
Many of the original contributors to the project felt that it had been co-opted by parties interested in
using its approach to justify Cold War political ends. For further discussion see Hull, D.L. 1970.
“Systemic Dynamic Social Theory.” Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 11, Issue 3, pp. 351–363.
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modeling systems easier and this in turn revealed some of the infelicities in earlier,
structural systems theories. For instance, each of the assumed properties I listed earlier;
modularity, decomposability, hierarchy, and linearity; were shown to often be
unreasonable or inapt when applied to many of the systems that researchers were
interested in, especially systems involving social interactions 251. Instead of being
relatively modular, social systems are made of densely and complexly interdependent and
interrelated parts; and those parts weren’t so rigidly modular, they were more or less
plastic or malleable. They were dynamic. Further, the composition of social systems
tended not to be a neat, organized hierarchy of particular functions subsumed under more
general functions; rather there were denser, complex interrelations and interdependencies
across various levels of functional generality252. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, aided
by still further advancements computing power, researchers in chaos and complexity
theories began modeling rudimentary systems (including social systems) designed with
sensitivities to these complex interdependencies.
Research in chaos theory focused on how relatively simple systems; systems with
relatively few, or simple components; could exhibit unexpected or emergent behavior.
Research in complexity focused on how relatively complex systems; systems with very
many, often very different components that relate to each other in highly complex ways;
could exhibit surprisingly regular behavior. In both camps however, researchers tended to
be more interested in the lawlike generalities they could extract from their models than in
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the particular dynamics of specific research domains. As with the General Systems
theorists, and somewhat ironically, they were more interested in finding the general laws
that govern chaotic and complex behaviors across all domains, rather than being sensitive
to the potential peculiarities of the domains they researched. On the one hand, the focus
on mathematical laws of complexity revealed the importance of temporality and
dynamics. Important systems like social norms, institutions, and practices were no longer
seen as static hierarchies composed of relatively isolable modules, but could now be
modeled with dynamic relations that themselves change as a function of other relations,
and are sensitive to time. Such systems could now be understood as irreducibly
processual. On the other hand, this insight into “sensitive dependence” should have
highlighted the necessity to index particular systems to particular (social, historical,
cultural) conditions; but this was eclipsed by the more universalizing tendencies that
guided such programs.
Along with a new focus on system dynamics and change came emphases on a
collection of interrelated properties that related to the complex and dynamic
interworkings of system processes.
Recently 253, C. A. Hooker has compiled a list of the more central of these
properties that significantly serves to introduce the fundamental concepts of dynamic
systems, chaos, and complexity theories:
Nonlinear interactions; non-additivity;
Irreversibility;
Constraints — holonomic and non-holonomic;
Equilibria and Stabilities — static and dynamic;
253
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Amplification; sensitivity to initial conditions;
Finite deterministic unpredictability;
Symmetry breaking; bifurcations; self-organisation; emergence;
Constraints — enabling and coordinated;
Intrinsically global coherence;
Order; organisation;
Modularity; hierarchy;
Path-dependence and historicity;
Constraint duality; super-system formation;
Coordinated spatial and temporal differentiation with functional organization;
Multi-scale and multi-order functional organisation;
Autonomy; adaptation; adaptiveness; learning;
Model specificity/model plurality; model centredness;
Condition-dependent laws. 254
It will be instructive here to rehearse in brief detail the definitions of some of these terms.
To this end I will follow closely the exposition that Hooker lays out in his “Introduction
to Complex Systems: A” 255
Nonlinearity: “An interaction is nonlinear for some variable v if the
interaction force does not vary proportionately to v.”
Nonlinearity is perhaps best characterized negatively with respect to linearity. Linear
interactions are those that preserve vector additivity and scalar multiplication. Examples
of linear transformations include rotation, reflection, scaling, shearing, squeezing, and
projection. In a general sense, a linear characterization of a system is one that assumes
that any arbitrary local neighborhood of the functions describing a system can be
expressed in the form: f(x)=ax+b (viz. as a line). Nonlinear systems are then those that do
no preserve vector additivity or scalar multiplication, and whose system functions cannot
be expressed in the form f(x)=ax+b for arbitrary local neighborhoods. Nonlinearity will
be discussed in considerable more detail in chapter 4.
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Ibid. pp. 20-1.
Ibid. pp. 21-40.
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Irreversibility: “A process that is reversible can also be run backwards while
still satisfying the same laws. Classical dynamics is time-reversible in this
sense. Every dynamically possible process running forward is equally possible
running backwards. But virtually all real processes are dissipative...so that
they cannot be run in reverse. They are inherently open systems that require
an influx of resources or energy in order to persist.”
Irreversible processes are nonlinear transformations. Linear transformations can be
“undone” by reversals because they preserve vector additivity and scalar multiplication.
Some consequences of the irreversibility of processes are that they break time symmetry,
they make possible emergent behavior and properties, and they allow for novel system
states and trajectories.
Constraints: “Constraints on a dynamical process are those limitations on the
relationships among its variables that arise from the imposed conditions in
which the process takes place.”
Dynamic systems are constrained by the conditions of the surrounding environment—
usually some other system(s). Dynamic systems are constrained by being differentially
coupled to external systems. The influence exerted by conditions external to a system S
give the system’s parameters. If the external conditions are dynamic, then the system’s
parameters vary accordingly. If the conditions are static (e.g. if the environment is
appropriately controlled) then the system’s parameters are fixed. Dynamic systems also
include variables which change depending on the characterization of the system given its
(changing) parameters and constraints. Thus, a dynamic system is defined by the
(functional) differential relations between the parameters and variables. The functional
relations that define a dynamic system are an expression of the system’s constraints – a
system just is its constraints. A dynamic system’s state or phase space is a space where
all possible states of the system are represented. Each possible state of the system
135

corresponds to a unique point in the state space. For dynamic systems differential
equations giving the relations between initial conditions, variables, and parameters
determine the evolution of the system, represented by a plotted trajectory in the state
space. Changes to initial conditions, variable, and parameter values each alter the
evolution of the system, and are expressed as different trajectories or evolutions in the
state space.
Hooker differentiates between limiting and enabling constraints, as well as
holonomic and non-holonomic constraints. Limiting constraints are the most common
understanding of the concept of constraint – they give the boundary conditions for the
system, they shape which states and trajectories the system can take by prohibiting all
other possibilities and reduce the system’s degrees of freedom by limiting dynamical
trajectories to sub-sets of the system’s state space. Enabling constraint is the reverse
side of the limiting constraint “coin”. By giving the boundary conditions for the system,
constraints also positively define the capabilities and possibilities of the system. “By
coordinatedly decreasing degrees of freedom they provide access to dynamical
trajectories inaccessible to the unconstrained system.” These two concepts map
respectively to J. J. Gibson’s terms “constraint” and “affordance”. Holonomic
constraints are conservatory rather than dissipative. Constraints are holonomic whenever
a system is isolated or “closed” (rather than open). By comparison, “open” systems that
involve dissipation are called non- or a-holonomic.
Equilibrium: “Qualitatively, some aspect A of a dynamical system is in
equilibrium if (and only if) there is no net force acting on the A aspect of the
system (its A forces are in balance) and there are thus no net 2nd order rates of
change (accelerations) in A.”
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It is worth noting that this definition of equilibrium is rather broad. It characterizes a
system as being in equilibrium whenever net forces are “in balance”. It is an open
question here whether “net” is meant synchronically, diachronically, or in both ways. If
the “no net forces” condition allows for diachronic variation (depending on the timeframe
selected) periodic oscillations (e.g. the motions of a perfect pendulum) could count as in
equilibrium. If “net” is meant non-diachronically, then as long as the pendulum has some
nonzero angular momentum the motion cannot be considered equilibrious (because
measured non-diachronically there would always be some net force of acceleration).
Hooker further distinguishes between static and dynamic equilibria. Static
equilibrium is when “the time invariance concerns state parameters and variables (A =
system state). Static equilibria require no energy input or output to persist, e.g. a crystal at
rest.” Dynamic equilibrium is when “the time invariance concerns process parameters
and rate variables (A = system processes). Dynamical equilibria typically require an
irreversible ordered energy (negentropy) flow to sustain them, together with appropriate
waste (degraded or entropic) outputs”. Thus dynamic equilibrium requires that the
process parameters or rate variables that comprise A be systemically open, while static
equilibrium requires that such variables are isolated or systemically closed.
Of course, no system that matters to any agent is systemically closed, so it is
reasonable to restrict systems research on the dynamics and relations of open systems.
There is then a question about how such systems can achieve or relinquish equilibrium;
how systems can become stable or unstable. Here Hooker distinguishes between three
possibilities:
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Stability: “An equilibrium in some aspect A is stable, with respect to some
class of disturbances (perturbations) D, if (and only if) its response to any
disturbance from D is to soon return near (including exactly) to its original A
condition under its own dynamical processes and remain there.”
Instability: “An equilibrium is unstable to a class D of disturbances if it does
not return near to its original A condition.”
Meta-Stability: “An equilibrium is meta-stable to D if it is stable for some
disturbances from D and unstable for others.”
Here, because dynamic systems are open, system stability is subject to outside influence
or perturbation. Stable systems are those that are relatively unaffected by perturbation;
unstable systems are those that are significantly affected by perturbation; and meta-stable
systems are sensitively affected by perturbations. However, what needs further
explication is the idea of returning near (including exactly) original A conditions under its
own dynamical processes. This is the basic contour of the concept of an attractor:
Attractor: “An attractor is the closed set of states a system repeatedly
traverses when at equilibrium.”
Attractor Basin: “an attractor basin is the set of states a system can pass
through while still returning to its attractor.”
Because Hooker has defined the concepts of “equilibrium” and “stability” rather broadly,
a system needn’t exhibit static or periodic behavior in order to be at equilibrium. As long
as a system’s trajectories or states remain within an attractor basin (even under
perturbation), that system will be at a stable, dynamic equilibrium. Hooker also
acknowledges that there are different kinds of attractors; mentioning three possibilities:
Point Attractor: “A point to which a system tends; if the system is at that
point, it stays there.”
Cyclic Attractor: “A periodic orbit. The system tends toward some cyclic or
periodic behavior. If it already exhibits that behavior, it continues to do so
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indefinitely.”
Strange Attractor: “An attractor in which the evolution of the system state
space is bounded but aperiodic. Strange attractors are "chaotic" and sensitively
dependent on initial conditions.”
Point attractors are the kinds of systems traditionally associated with equilibrious
behavior. A system with a point attractor dynamically or progressively tends toward
static equilibrium. Cyclic attractors are those that exhibit periodic behavior (e.g. a perfect
pendulum). Importantly, because their dynamics can be expressed by finite polynomials,
the behaviors of both point and cyclic attractors are linearizable while the behaviors of
strange attractors aren’t. Strange attractors also exhibit the three properties characteristic
of chaos:
1. The system’s state or phase space is bounded.
2. The system’s behavior is dynamic and aperiodic.
3. The system’s evolution over time is sensitively dependent on initial
conditions.256
Strange attractors are bounded by the limits of the attractor basin – the state space for
which initial conditions remain on the attractor. However, such boundaries may be
diffuse, dynamically complex, or not well-defined (or well-definable). For this reason it
may be better to characterize (1) instead as:
1*. The system’s state or phase space is not unbounded. 257
To this then, we may add three additional concepts that describe dynamical attractor
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There has been surprisingly little consensus in the literature on the characteristic properties of chaos.
Robert C. Bishop’s entry on “Chaos” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chaos) highlights the issue of lack of definitional consensus well;
however his discussion does not address the specific three conditions given above—which; when taken
in conjunction as severally necessary and jointly sufficient; I believe circumvents each of the worries he
raises.
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139

systems:
Attractor Landscape: “a system’s dynamical signature, expressing its
dynamical form.”
Structural Stability: “A system that remains within a single attractor
landscape is structurally stable (= autonomous dynamics in mathematical
parlance).”
Structural Meta- or In-stability: “A system that does not remain within a
single attractor landscape (= bifurcate in mathematical parlance 258)”
In many systems there are many relevant aspects An that relate to and affect each other.
These are expressed as functional relationships between the variables and parameters of a
system. The higher the number of variables, parameters, and functional relations
(interdependencies), the more complex the system is 259. A system’s attractor landscape
designates the conditions under which a system evolves. Often, however, this landscape
is itself non-static – it changes along with the evolution of the system. Further, there may
be dynamical coupling relations that designate how two or more systems affect each
other’s attractor landscapes. The idea of “structural stability” is equivalent to the notion
that a system is not dynamically coupled to any other systems. A structurally meta-stable
system is one that is coupled to some other system(s), but whose behavior remains stable
through that coupling—essentially re-shaping the attractor landscape to include the
influence of the other system(s). A system that is structurally unstable is one whose
attractor landscape “collapses”. Structurally unstable systems can either re-stabilize, or
258

Bifurcation: “A bifurcation occurs when a structural instability in a system leads to a change in its
dynamical form, that is, a change in the structure of its attractor landscape.” However, these specifics
aren’t important to the overall picture I am presenting here.
259
We can think of a complex system as constraints differentially constraining constraints. On the one hand
because of the systemic interdependence in complex systems, small changes to one parameter or
variable can have wide systemic effects. On the other hand, depending on the particular dynamics and
relations of the complex system, such changes to parameters are more likely to be dampened rather than
amplified by these interdependencies—though both remain possibilities in principle.
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remain unstable. The process of bifurcation (see footnote below) is often understood as a
“period-doubling cascade” of rapid oscillations between structurally stable cyclic
attractors and instability resulting ultimately in unstable-though-bounded systemic
behavior (viz. a strange attractor).
Most highly-complex, coupled, dynamic systems exhibit sensitive dependence on
initial conditions.
Sensitive Dependence on Initial Conditions (SDIC): “small differences in
system state or trajectory are amplified into large differences in subsequent
system state or trajectory.”
Left unconstrained and unbounded, SDIC produces widely divergent system behavior.
Constrained and bounded however, SDIC deterministically produces holistically coherent
patterns of behavior but in-principle unpredictable and random-appearing (though
deterministic) micro-level behavior. Such holistic behavioral patterns themselves may
constitute a macro-level constraint which can function as systemic parameters in
dynamical coupling 260. This has been expressed in the literature by the term “selforganization”:
Self-organization: “Self-organization occurs when a system bifurcates,
sufficiently under its own dynamics, to a form exhibiting more ordered and/or
more complex behavior. Self-organization occurs where (and only where) a
system bifurcates, sufficiently under its own dynamics, so as to bring to bear
an additional system-wide constraint (or at any rate an additional multicomponent, that is, relatively macro, constraint).”
A system that self-organizes is one whose constitution is such that by doing what it does
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For systems that are constituted through their dynamical coupling with the systems and conditions in
their local environment (e.g. open dynamic systems), the influences of these [emergent] macro-level
constraints can affect the conditions of the local environment – which can, in turn, differentially
function to change the system’s [micro-level] parameters . Thus, through dynamic coupling emergent
macro-level constraints can effectively exhibit downward causation.

141

and by being what it is, it brings about change to continually (re)make itself. This sounds
a bit more conceptually complicated than it is. A self-organizing system is dynamic; it
changes over time; but it changes in a way that is determined and regulated internally by
the system itself; it needs to change in order to maintain its identity as the system that it
is. The “additional system-wide constraint” is said to emerge, in part because it genuinely
constrains system dynamics, but also arises solely out of its “lower level” system
dynamics.
Emergence: “the appearance of a phenomenon that could not have been
predicted from knowing only the pair-wise dynamical interactions of
components.”
An instructive and often used example in the literature about emergence and selforganization is the thermodynamically open physical system of a candle flame 261. In
order for this candle flame system to remain a candle flame it must continually combust
oxygen from the local environment and exhaust smoke into the environment. The wax
must continually undergo thermodynamic and chemical reactions in order to maintain the
flame. The candle is “self-organizing” because it is its own source of the dynamic
regulation which maintains its identity as a system. This is slightly different than
Maturana and Varela’s concept of autopoiesis which pertains to systems that continually
reproduce themselves as a mode of propagation. A system can be defined by autopoiesis
whenever the processes of reproduction are what make the system what it is; whenever
the system gains its identity through its reproduction. Maturana and Varela developed the
notion of autopoiesis specifically as a way to explain how biological living systems
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work 262.
3.3

Richard Campbell’s “A Process-Based Model for Interactive Ontology” 263

It is in this historical context that dynamical systems theorist Richard Campbell
has recently developed a taxonomy of distinctions that differentiates between different
kinds of living and non-living systems 264. On his “Interactive Ontology” Campbell
presents a series of binary questions to ask about systems, whose taxonomic classification
depends on responses to these questions. It will be instructive and helpful to further
discussion of DST to consider Campbell’s taxonomy in some depth. The first question is
whether the processes involved in the system are persistent, or if they’re fleeting. If they
are fleeting then the processes that comprise the system do not endure through significant
changes in the environment surrounding system and as a result the system dissipates. If
the processes are persistent they do endure through significant changes in the
environment surrounding the system.
The second question is only asked if the answer to the first question is that the
system’s processes are persistent. It queries whether the processes involved in a system

262

In their 1980 Autopoesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living, Maturana and Varela define
“Autopoesis” as: “a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production
(transformation and destruction) of components which: (i) through their interactions and
transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced
them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the components)
exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network.”
263
Campbell, Richard. (2009) “A Process-Based Model for Interactive Ontology”, Synthese, 166: 3, pp.
453-477.
264
To be fair, Campbell’s approach is found within and amongst a constellation of approaches that together
have been called “interactivist theory”. Some notable contributors to this collection of views include M.
H. Bickhard, L. Terveen, R. L. Campbell, W. D. Christensen, C. A. Hooker, J-C Buisson, G. Stojanov,
and S. Bruno among others. Campbell’s contribution is in some ways here meant to be taken as
representative of some of the more broad characteristics of “interactivism”, but should not be
understood as taking itself to be so representative.
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are cohesive or not. Campbell defines cohesion as “the internal bonds which constrain the
behavior of its constituent sub-processes in such a way that the totality behaves
dynamically as an integral whole.” 265 If the system is persistent but not cohesive it
persists through change and time, but it doesn’t function to cohere itself into a totality. A
leaky faucet is an example of a persistent but non-cohesive system. It produces dripping
behavior, but the dripping behavior doesn’t contribute to integrating the dripping system
as a whole.
Third is the question as to whether the cohesive system is far-from-equilibrium
stable or energy-well stable. Systems that are energy-well stable are those that “persist at
or near thermodynamic equilibrium, and whose organization can be disrupted only by an
input, from external sources, of a critical level of energy.” 266 In a sense, energy-well
stable systems don’t do much of anything. An example of an energy-well stable system
might be a rock 267. One may feel that the phrase “far-from-equilibrium stable” is
oxymoronic. How could a system both be far-from-equilibrium and also stable? Doesn’t
“stable” just mean equilibrious? Campbell defines stability differently, however. The
kinds of systems Campbell is interested in are open systems; systems that constitutionally
interact with their local environments. The local environment is not considered a proper
part of the system itself, but with open systems there is no principled boundary separating
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It should be noted that energy-well stable systems are not necessarily systems at thermodynamic
equilibrium. Energy-well stability is rather a distinction based on relative systemic independence (or
closedness) – the degree to which the system is insulated from or affected by the various kinds of
perturbations occurring in its local vicinity. A rock is relatively energy-well stable because there isn’t
much in the local environment that affects it. Naturally, it is also important to recognize that stability is
also relative to various timescales. A rock is relatively energy-well stable on a human life timescale, but
perhaps fairly active on geological timescales.
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the system from the local environment, because the system, defined as open, is
constituted in part by the character of its interaction with the environment, and so must to
some extent include reference to that environment. Such environments are often dynamic;
so open systems tend to require some semblance of robustness or stability in the face of
change. If they didn’t, they would quickly dissipate (they would fail to persist). Thus,
stability here means robustness rather than stasis. So what is a far-from-equilibrium,
open, cohesive, persistent system? One that is capable of retaining its cohesive processes
in the face of significant changes in the local environment.
The next question is whether far-from-equilibrium stable systems “contribute to
the persistence of the conditions upon which they depend, or not” 268. If a system does,
Campbell calls the system “self-maintenant”, if not, not. A self-maintenant system is one
that utilizes processes in order to change the conditions of the local environment to make
it easier for it to maintain its coherence. It imposes a sort of buffer to keep the local
environment from diverging from conditions consistent with the system’s persistence. In
order for a system to be self-maintenant it must be sensitive and responsive to an array of
potential and actual environmental conditions.
Campbell’s taxonomy continues by distinguishing recursive self-maintenance
from run-of-the-mill self-maintenance. A recursively self-maintenant system is one that
“can maintain stability not only within certain ranges of conditions, but also within
certain ranges of changes of conditions. That is, they can switch to deploying different
processes depending on conditions they detect in the environment” 269. Thus, recursively
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self-maintenant systems are capable of responding to environmental feedback by
selecting amongst multiple processes or strategies for coping / self-maintenance.
Campbell takes this criterion to be the hallmark of living systems. It is possible that selfmaintenant, far-from-equilibrium, open, cohesive, persistent systems aren’t living (e.g. a
candle flame is an example of a self-maintenant system), but all recursively selfmaintenant, far-from-equilibrium, open, cohesive, persistent systems are (Campbell’s
paradigmatic example here is of a paramecium that differentially responds to a sugar
gradient; comparative changes in the amount of sugar in the local environment 270). In a
certain sense, the decision to define life based on this criterion is purely stipulative. But
as a thought experiment we can imagine a totally alien system that happens to be
recursively self-maintenant. We would likely count that system as “living”, if not
intelligent.
One of the most significant questions, however, for the fields I mentioned at the
beginning of this section; sociology, anthropology, communications theory, economics,
and social philosophy; is the etiology of norms. This, perhaps, is the most significant
contribution made by Campbell’s taxonomy. After recursive self-maintenance; which
itself marks a shift from passive interaction with the environment to actively and
differentially shaping the environment to suit the system; Campbell introduces the notion
of error-detection. He writes “either recursively self-maintenant systems are able to detect
that some action they have performed has been in error, or they do not” 271. Campbell is
careful here to distinguish between the system having the concept of error, and being able
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to differentially respond as if it recognized an error and corrected for it. It is at this stage
that Campbell introduces what he takes to be the first, naturalistic kernel of normativity.
One cannot understate the significance of Campbell’s attempt to give a naturalistic
explanation for normativity; as precisely this issue is one that has plagued philosophers
and social scientists since the inception of naturalism itself.
Campbell uses the example of a frog’s attempted consumption of a pebble
(presumably having “mistaken” it for a fly 272):
Consider a frog, sitting on its lily-pad, which regularly feeds by flicking its
tongue at flies and other bugs in its vicinity. If this frog flicks at a pebble
thrown into the air just above its head it will have done something wrong,
which can be discovered to be wrong by the frog itself. It will have a surprise;
or at any rate, will experience some discomfort; if it succeeds in catching that
pebble with its tongue. Even if the frog should swallow the pebble, it will fail
to eat it. Once more in a minimal sense (for each step taken in building this
model should presume no more than necessary), the frog will detect that it is
in error. The error it discovers, however, will not be anything about pebbles or
bugs; its discovery will be that this was not, after all, a situation offering
something good to eat. Its tongue flicking and eating action was not
appropriate in those circumstances. 273
What is important here is that the frog’s action can be “discovered to be wrong” by the
frog; and this discovery comes in the form of a surprise or discomfort. A surprise is a
betrayal of expectation. In order to be surprised, a system must be capable of having
expectations. What are the conditions for being capable of expectation, though?
Minimally, a system needs to, in some way, be able to ‘anticipate’ changes that may
occur in its environment. Recursively self-maintenant systems must also possess this
capability. So in this minimal sense expectation is simply a matter of being able to
272

Campbell makes use of this classic “frog and pebble” example deriving from conversations on the
relationships between error and biological function made popular by Millikan (1986), Dretske (1988),
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anticipate or extrapolate, near-future conditions given current environmental conditions;
and there are many completely naturalistic, sub-conceptual level explanations for how
this can be accomplished. Surprise, then, is to have anticipated, or extrapolated
incorrectly; for the near-future to fail to pare with the anticipation. So far all I’ve
introduced is a minimal sense of correct and incorrect, which is crucial to any conception
of normativity, but it isn’t sufficient. What is additionally necessary is the added
valancing of “right” and “wrong” (or “better” and “worse”). Campbell essentially
suggests here that it is the positive (“right”) derives from the negative (“wrong”). What
makes an action “wrong” rather than merely in error or mistaken is that there is systemic
malfunction. The system has some functional need that is left unfulfilled by some subprocess specifically taken by the system to fulfill that function. In the example above, the
system (the frog) attempts to employ the process of flicking its tongue toward the selfmaintaining function of sustenance. It flicks its tongue for the purpose of eating and
becoming nourished, which allows it to continue to carry out processes that allow it, as a
[frog] system, to continue to persist. When the frog consumes a pebble and that pebble
doesn’t nourish the frog, its employment of the flicking process toward the function of
sustenance has failed. The more general process of system self-maintenance is frustrated.
The system has malfunctioned in its self-maintaining processes. Because the system is
recursively self-maintaining, it can make use of this feedback by differentially
responding. As Campbell says “[The Frog’s] discovery will be that this was not, after all,
a situation offering something good to eat. Its tongue flicking and eating action was not
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appropriate in those circumstances.” 274
Is failing to self-maintain “wrong”? Campbell’s account flips that question on its
head; we can define what it means to be “wrong” in terms of failure at system selfmaintenance. What makes a system capable of acting “wrongly” is precisely its ability to
recursively and differentially respond to future situations. A system cannot be “wrong”
unless it is capable of correcting its behavior; of learning to control its circumstances.
This is the next distinction that Campbell makes in his taxonomy. Combined, errordetection and learning control are meant to constitute a complete naturalistic basis for
normative action. In order to learn, however, the system must have available alternate
potential actions, and must have the ability to select from among them. Without this
capability there can be no sense of “choosing” appropriate (behavior that supports selfmaintenance) or inappropriate (behavior meant to support self-maintenance, but that
wouldn’t, given the circumstances) behaviors for particular environmental conditions.
“All that is needed to explain [a system’s action] is that potential actions be indicated to
and for the [system] by its detecting relevant differences in its environment, and that its
internal processes enable it to select (in some sense) between alternative kinds of action
as a result” 275.
It is important here to again acknowledge that nothing like thought is as yet
playing any role in Campbell’s account. Normative behavior is thus not necessarily
discursive or conceptual, but rather can occur pre- or sub-conceptually. A system need
not recognize or understand that it is selecting between alternatives to succeed in doing
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so 276. There are two relevant considerations here: the difference between understanding
why an alternative is the better of the two and determining that one is better than the
other; and the difference between ascertaining discursively that one alternative is better
than the other, and ascertaining pre- or non-discursively that an alternative is better than
another. Campbell clearly sees the normativity that comes from error detection and
learning to belong in that last category. Further, he sees the other two categories
(discursive knowledge that, and understanding why) as straightforwardly and
naturalistically derivative of the last category277.
Campbell completes his taxonomy with two final distinctions: reflectivity and
social embeddedness. The capacity for reflection marks a distinction from the previous
taxonomic class (flexible learning & control) by recognizing the significance of a
system’s ability to self-reflect. This ability has some important antecedent dependencies;
specifically discursive understanding and self-recognition (which both, in turn, rely on
symbolic representation 278). Campbell doesn’t explicitly emphasize it here, but as we will
see, the suggestion that another important dependency for self-reflection is embeddedness
in certain kinds of social contexts is also consistent with his approach. So the next major
step after adaptive or flexible learning & control is actually the ability for a system to
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Campbell sees representation as a natural phenomenon that emerges through the kinds of systemic
relations that arise in certain types of biological systems with the right kinds of relational
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thematically conceptualize or represent the world 279. Campbell doesn’t dwell much on
this point for a couple of reasons. First, because he wishes to give a naturalistic account
of normativity, consciousness, and social institutions that doesn’t rely heavily on
representations and the metaphysical “baggage” that representationalist approaches have
traditionally carried that has made their brand of normativity so difficult to naturalize 280.
Second, he thinks that the notion of self-reflection itself sufficiently captures the relevant
dependency for his final taxonomic distinction of participation in social activity.
To explain what he means by self-reflection, Campbell first distinguishes between
what he takes to be two varieties of consciousness:
Primary consciousness, which we share with the animals, is simply a
contentful flow, an experiential flow, but the only way that the qualities of
that experiencing could themselves be experienced is if there is a second level
of the overall system that is interactively, contentfully, experiencing the
awareness level of experiential flow. We have to do here with reflection. Such
a meta-level of experiencing has in fact evolved; it is a characteristic feature
of humans. And there is no intrinsic reason why such iterations of
experiencing should stop at the number two. We humans can be aware that we
are conscious of primary experiencing, and so on. 281
Thus, “primary consciousness” is a kind of perceptual awareness of one’s surroundings
including one’s place in those surroundings, and the various affordances and constraints
that a situation avails. By contrast, further meta-level consciousness is awareness of the
quality or character of primary consciousness. In order for a system to possess the
capability to self-reflect, the system must minimally have second-order consciousness;
279

To be clear, this is not the same thing as self-reflection. Thematic conceptualization is conceiving of
experience as being about something. The point here is that reflectivity requires taking one’s self as the
object of contemplation; and in order to do this, more generally the system must be minimally capable
of having objects “show up” or be represented.
280
Namely the seemingly unbridgeable metaphysical gap between facts and norms that representational
epistemic systems seem to entail.
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the ability to reflect on at least some aspects or qualities of its primary consciousness 282.
This second- or higher-order consciousness should be recognizable as the fundamental
source of phenomenology. It is precisely the ability to attend to the qualities of perception
or experience; how experiences “show up” to the experiencer; rather than the objects of
experience themselves. Through attending to the quality of experience, a system exhibits
the ability to recursively monitor and adapt to itself as its own experiential environment,
rather than merely monitoring and adapting to changes in the local environment. Such a
system can take itself, and its ability to take itself, as the target for self-maintenance.
Through this process of self-reflection, the notion of selfhood is borne-out 283.
The terminal taxonomic distinction for Campbell is whether the system possesses
the ability to engage in social endeavors such as cultures, social institutions, norms, and
practices. At this stage Campbell dwells a bit on the notions of emergence and downward
causation. Earlier, Campbell defined emergence, stating that “whenever a complex of
processes organizes itself into a new cohesive system by forming internal bonds that
involve nonlinear forces, the resultant entity has emergent properties and powers. The
result is the familiar picture of a multi-layered model of the world as stratified into
different levels, in a micro-to-macro hierarchy” 284. Central to this definition of
emergence is the notion of nonlinearity, which will be the subject of the next section, so I
would like to table extended remark on that for the time being. However, for current
purposes there are two other things important about this definition of emergence.
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First is the organization of processes into layers or stratified levels “in a micro-tomacro hierarchy”. Emergence, by definition, relies on this hierarchical micro-to-macro
taxonomic sorting of the world. The idea of emergence is that the relations between
lower-order micro-processes that comprise a higher-order system or process provide
“added value” to the system in the form of additional functionality of properties that the
higher-order macro-system or process possesses, but which cannot be attributed to any of
the individual component lower-order micro-processes 285. What is important is to
recognize that it isn’t an intrinsic property of systems that we describe them in this
hierarchical micro-to-macro fashion; it is a decision to highlight certain mereological
features to describe systems in this way. When we recognize that this stratification of
taxonomy is a methodological choice, rather than a metaphysical commitment,
emergence should no longer appear as metaphysically dubious. Emergence is necessarily
indexed to this micro-to-macro hierarchical way of describing and defining systems; but
there is no principled reason why our descriptions and definitions of systems need to be
organized in this way. So hierarchical structuring is more a matter of epistemic
constraints on what can constitute acceptable explanations and a product of systemstheoretic methodology than it is a reflection of the metaphysical facts 286.
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Cf. e.g. Kim, Jaegwon (2006b). “Emergence: Core ideas and issues,” Synthese, 151(3): 347–354.
Things can get complicated here. The above statement suggests a metaphysical realism that needn’t be
assumed. If, instead, metaphysics and epistemology are wed to each other (the commitments in each
entailing and constraining possibilities in the other’s domain) systems theory can be thought of as more
than merely a methodological approach but also a commitment to a certain metaphysical picture. The
skeptical question about whether there can or cannot be parity mismatch between how things really are,
and what we can possibly know (and how) looms large. As a matter of parsimony I have adopted the
view that nothing that cannot possibly matter epistemically should matter metaphysically. Metaphysical
claims are meaningless unless they can be known in some way (in the broadest possible sense of
“know”, which includes especially non-conceptual and embodied knowledges). The choice to adopt a
systems theoretic view is a methodological choice, and thus constrains the conceptual possibilities for
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The second consideration about Campbell’s definition of emergence is its relation
to the idea of “downward causation”. The very idea of downward causation frustrates the
causal well-ordering of the stratified micro-to-macro levels upon which the definition of
emergence depends. “Downward causation” can be understood as an inversion of the
micro-to-macro causal ordering. The initial idea of a micro-to-macro causal ordering is
the “bottom up” reductionist assumption that higher-order macro-processes are composed
out of lower order micro-processes. The idea of emergence maintains the causal wellordering of the reductionist approach, but frustrates the principle of reducibility to
component micro-processes. With the addition of the principle of downward causation
“higher-order” macro-processes can causally affect “lower-order” micro-processes. This
has the effect of fundamentally undermining the ordering principle that organizes
processes into higher and lower functions or processes. In this sense, the concept of
“downward causation” is self-undermining because it both definitionally relies on the
hierarchical ordering while simultaneously undermining that very ordering 287. The result
of taking both notions of downward causation and emergence seriously is that there can
be no principled hierarchical causal ordering of “higher-level” macro-processes, and
“lower-level” micro-processes. Instead the field of discourse about the relations that
define systems is either flattened out, or made into an utterly alien highly multidimensional (and unordered) landscape 288,289.
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legitimate explanations—it renders what is and is not thinkable within its domain. The above point just
suggests that it is a feature of the systems approach that weds emergence to a hierarchical structuring.
Viz. without hierarchical ordering, there is no orientation for the word “downward”. Similarly, the
concept of “cause” is frustrated by this potential multi-directionality. Causation is an ordered concept,
and notion of “downward causation” introduces disorder.
Either all relations are on a par (in the sense that they are not hierarchically ordered, in principle), or
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To be clear, neither of these two considerations is discussed by Campbell, but is
implicit consequences of his taxonomic account. In a sense, they undermine his account
qua taxonomy, but give credence to his more general intentions to give a process-based
account of important qualitative distinctions in the kinds of systems capable of social
interaction. With notions of emergence and downward causation in tow, Campbell now
has the conceptual resources required to explain social influence on individuals, and
individual influence on society at-large. He can give a naturalistic explanation of what
exactly society is in the language of complex systems comprised of constituent processes,
and how the persons and societies mutually constitute and constrain each other as systems
with certain key attributes (e.g. far-from-equilibrium, recursively self-maintenant, selfreflective, social, etc.).
3.4

Nonlinearity & Process Ontology

Some quick accounting is now in order. We are amidst an account of Dynamic
Systems Theory which began with the structuralist approaches of Durkheim, Mauss and
Parsons. This structuralist approach was seen as too static or equilibrious by later
theorists who preferred to emphasize dynamics, change, self-organization, recursive selfmaintenance, and nonlinearity. In our discussion of recursive self-maintenance, I took an
opportunity to introduce some of the Systems Theory terminology by examining Richard
Campbell’s taxonomy of “interactive ontology”. Thus, I have now discussed all of these

each relation is sui generis and thus cannot be ordered beyond the particular role(s) they play within a
system. The effect is that cause as a global concept is undermined, but may operate locally in particular
system relations.
289
On the other hand, both emergence and downward causation can sustain a mereological hierarchy, or
well-ordering (thanks due to M. H. Bickhard for this insight).
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topics of emphasis with the exception of nonlinearity; to which I now turn. After this
section I will return to the narrative with which I began this chapter by discussing more
recent developments relevant to the relationships between embodied agents and social
practices institutions that have shaped Dynamic Systems Theory.
In a certain sense the concept of nonlinearity is very much like or even equivalent
to the concept of emergence. The idea of nonlinearity in complexity- and chaos theories
derives from the mathematical study of system models. Linear systems are those systems
that are decomposable into linear combinations or relations between linear systems. If a
system can be modeled by constructing it exclusively out of linear systems and linear
functions relating those systems, that system is linear. If a system cannot be modeled in
this fashion, it is said to be nonlinear. In this sense a nonlinear system is one that cannot
be reduced to the sum of linear parts while linear systems can be so reduced 290.
Linear functions are those that map one domain to another in a way that produces
a definite solution. Some examples of linear functions or mapping are rotations,
reflections, scalings, inversions, homomorphisms, injections, surjections, identity
mappings, definite integrals, first and second order differential equations, and Laplace
and Fourier transforms. Nonlinear functions are those that map one domain to another in
a way that doesn’t produce a definite solution. Some examples of nonlinear functions or
mappings are differential equations with higher than second order variables, and many
partial differential equations 291.
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thorough treatment see Jordan, D. W.; Smith, P. (2007). Nonlinear Ordinary Differential Equations
(fourth ed.). Oxford Univeresity Press.
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Linear systems satisfy two main constraints: one called variously “superposition”
or “additivity” and another called either “homogeneity” or “scalar multiplication”. Both
of these constraints amount jointly to the requirement that linear systems be closed under
the basic operations of arithmetic (addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division).
Nonlinear systems are by comparison negatively defined such that one or the other of
superposition (additivity) or homogeneity (scalar multiplication) does not hold 292.
Linear systems are much easier to model because their computational time
complexity is far shorter than nonlinear systems. Certain classes of nonlinear systems can
be shown to be computationally intractable (or near-intractable) and thus extremely
difficult to accurately model. In the first half of the 20th century, much of the research in
modeling nonlinear equations served engineering attempts at approximating nonlinear
systems by linear systems. A good analogy is approximating a continuous smooth curve
by depicting it with pixels. For certain purposes such approximations were useful, as long
as they satisfied the tolerance constraints of the specific, practical engineering task;
however such linearized models, rather than revealing the actual principles at work
within a nonlinear system, effectively ignored or concealed what actually takes place.
The cost was model accuracy, but the benefit was practical tractability. In certain
domains like meteorology there were no benefits; no linearized statistical model of
weather prediction was accurate to a minimum acceptable level of tolerance (more than
five days forecast with any accuracy), and many theorists began to suspect that some
classes of nonlinear systems may, in principle, have no acceptable linearizations. Then in

292

University Press, New York.
Ibid.

157

1963 meteorologist Edward Lorenz published a paper called “Deterministic Nonperiodic
Flow” in the Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences in which he proposed the initial
foundations of what is now Chaos Theory.
As noted earlier, Chaos Theory is concerned with modeling complex behaviors in
relatively simple systems as they arise from the workings of relatively simple rules. The
general reason chaos theoreticians cite for this complexity out of simplicity is a system’s
sensitive dependence on initial conditions (SDIC), sometimes called “path
dependence” 293. The concept of sensitive dependence suggests that small (and in some
cases immeasurably minute) differences in conditions can quickly effect major
differences in subsequent evolution, even given relatively simple functional rules. This
has the significant conceptual effect of allowing deterministic systems comprised of few
simple rules to exhibit in principle unpredictable behavior. Weather is a prime and
paradigmatic example of chaos because the basic functional constituents (wind speeds
and direction, atmospheric moisture and temperature) are quite simple and easily
modeled separately, but their combination within one weather system exhibits extreme
sensitive dependence. Slight differences in the initial state of a weather system quickly
develop into major differences in future states. And because of this, predicting weather is
quite difficult.
However, predicting weather is also difficult for another reason. Weather systems
aren’t simple. To improve the accuracy of the model more than just a little bit vastly
293

Such systems are also variously called “non-” or “aholonomic” systems, or are said to exhibit
“hysteresis”. The general concept is that such systems’ current and future states depend in some ways
on the past or “history” that brought them to that state. Path dependence is also closely related to timeirreversible processes (e.g. thermodynamic tendency toward entropy) and thus processes that contribute
to the emergence of qualitatively novel system states, properties, functions, and capabilities.
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increases the complexity of the components involved. So, for example, now let’s add the
irregular contour of the Earth’s surface; a fairly simple addition; one new parameter; but
a major change to the complexity of the system. Sensitivity to the complexity of realworld systems is the primary concern of Complexity Theory. On the other hand,
however, complexity theory is also interested in the relatively simple behaviors exhibited
by such complex systems. To keep with the example of weather, we’ll add one more
component to the system (to make it just a little more accurate) and then look at some of
the more predictable weather patterns we can see. Let’s add the fact that the surface of
the Earth isn’t static, it changes in ways that also alter, or perturb, the conditions that
produce the weather; and it continually does this throughout, while the model is running
(after all, the changes in the shape of the surface of the earth, including people and
animals moving around, and the effects of weather, plants growing, etc. are also complex
and chaotic systems). Even with this now seemingly hopelessly complex weather system,
we are still capable of detecting certain weather patterns. We can identify and predict the
behavior of hurricanes, nor’easters, jet streams, and derechos with surprising accuracy,
given their complexities.
The relationship between chaos and complexity is a hallmark of nonlinear
systems. The equations that Lorenz and other Chaos Theorists use to model chaotic
systems are usually quite simple. For example, Lorenz famous “strange attractor” is given
by three ordinary differential equations with three parameters and three possible system
states, and time 294. The result is that, as the system is iterated it traces out a path that

/dt σ(y – x), dy/dt x(ρ – z) – y, dz/dt xy – βz; where x, y, and z define the system state, t is time, and σ, ρ,
and β are the system parameters. See Figure 1 in chapter 4 for a graphical representation of the Lorenz
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never actually repeats but exhibits seemingly periodic behavior. The Lorenz system is
chaotic; slight variations to the initial position drastically alter the path taken as the
system is iterated; but it also exhibits the kind of regularity in pattern that complexity
theorists study. A chaotic (strange) attractor is a relatively steady pattern of behavior that
certain chaotic systems reliably tend toward. An attractor isn’t in, and never reaches, a
state of (static) equilibrium; in fact a constitutive characteristic is that attractors are
decidedly aperiodic and far-from-equilibrium systems. However, attractors do exhibit
stable and regular behavior. Depending on the degree of abstraction and with what
considerations for specific characteristics that one views an attractor the behavior may
seem utterly regular, seemingly random, or surprisingly emergent. When we consider an
attractor as an aperiodic, far-from-equilibrium, chaotic system the fact that there is any
pattern to be recognized is surprising. As the system evolves, characteristic patterns begin
to emerge qualitatively at a macro-level; the patterns emerge from the micro-level
dynamics of the attractor system. The pattern isn’t a component built in to the parameters
of the attractor, but develops out of the interrelations of the equations, the parameters, the
initial conditions, and the constraints that give the possible system states. It is a higherorder macro-level property irreducible to the lower-order micro-level component
processes.
Thus, nonlinearity can provide some clues for how discernible properties,
characteristics, or patterns can arise at (or emerge from) a macro-level of the system
without applying to any micro-level component properties, characteristics, or patterns; at

Attractor’s state space. Lorenz’s system of equations is meant to model patterns of thermal convection
in an enclosed torus with one point-source of heat.
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least for complex, chaotic systems; and it seems at least reasonable to presume that
embodied agents and social institutions and practices are such (complex and chaotic)
systems; though I will be discussing this more thoroughly in due course.

Much of the foregoing has taken for granted the ideas of “patterns”, “functions”,
and “systems” and their ilk. I would like at this point to take a step back and more fully
elucidate precisely how I understand such notions, and how I do not; and to do this I will
have to briefly discuss the differences between the two fundamental metaphysical
approaches of substance- and process ontologies.
The decision between substance and process metaphysics is one of the most basic
bifurcations in metaphysics. It is the question of which between being and becoming is
essential, and which is accidental (in Aristotelian terms); which is fundamental, and
which is derivative. Substance ontology commits to the view that being is essential and
change (or becoming) is accidental. So, for example, a gold statue is essentially gold
because the substance of which it is made does not, or cannot change; and its shape,
which can be altered, is accidental because it can, or does, change. On the other hand,
Process ontology take the alternative approach in committing to the view that becoming
is essential and stasis (or being) is fleeting and accidental. So, for example, what is
essential about a gold statue is whatever it does, and what significant factors it
contributes and roles it plays in the goings-on in which it participates. What it happens to
be made of is accidental; a part of the factors and roles it can contribute; but if the
substance the statue was made of is altered, without changing the processes the statue
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was involved with, this change would be of little-to-no consequence to the identity of the
processual identity295,296.
More recent substance ontologies have construed the world as structured by three
things: thin particulars, properties, and inherence relations 297. Thin particulars are the
propertyless “objects” or substances that exist in the world 298. Properties are the
characteristics that belong to substances. If thin particulars and properties both exist in
the natural world, presumably there needs to be something to relate them to each other.
This relation is said to be an inherence relation which is the type of relation an attribute
has with its subject; in this case properties are the attributes that inhere in particulars.
295

One should be careful in characterizing Aristotle’s views in particular. He is often taken to espouse a
substance metaphysics—but there are infelicities in the use of the word “substance”. For Aristotle
substance (ousia) is the combination of matter (hyle) and form (morphos); however, later
metaphysicians have tended to refer to only matter as “substance”, leaving the issue of Aristotelian form
out of the picture. Separating matter from form can be seen as one of the major causes for confusion in
subsequent substance metaphysics. The Aristotelian picture of metaphysics includes both substance (in
the anachronistic sense) and process (as a matter of substantial form in conjunction with the four causes,
actuality, and potentiality). Aristotle’s is then not straightforwardly a “substance metaphysics” in the
way I have been discussing it.
For a sustained discussion of Aristotle’s metaphysics as it pertains to the relationship between
contemporary distinctions between substance and process, see Louise-Gill, M. (1989) Aristotle on
Substance: The Paradox of Unity. Princeton University Press.
296
The history of substance metaphysics is often characterized as a progression toward materialist
naturalism which privileges two of Aristotle’s “four causes”—material cause and efficient cause—
while deprivileging or eliminating final and formal causes. For Aristotle the four causes functioned as
modes of explanation—he saw them as four kinds of acceptable ways to understand the workings of the
world. Material cause explains something by expressing what it is made of. Efficient cause explains
something by expressing the agent that made it do what it is doing. Final causes explain by identifying
the ends intended by some action, and formal cause explains something in virtue of its relational
configuration. The materialist naturalism that developed out of the Scientific Revolution removed all
agency (and normativity) from the natural world, reducing the modes of acceptable explanation to what
is often characterized as “efficient cause”. However, Aristotle’s efficient cause and the “efficient cause”
of the Scientific Revolution are considerably different from each other—particularly in how they treat
agency. Further, as a substance materialism, instead of treating material cause as a mode of explanation,
matter became reified as a condition for natural existence. By comparison, process metaphysics retains
the original Aristotelian concepts of “efficient” and “formal” causes while downplaying the explanatory
role of “material” causes and reinterpreting “final” causes in terms of function (often biological
function—which since Darwin can be expressed in a non-teleological manner).
297
The terminology of “thin” and “thick” particulars derives from: Armstrong, D. M. (1978): Nominalism
and Realism: Universals and Scientific Realism, vol.1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
298
Cf. e.g. Chisholm, R. (1969): “The observability of the self”, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 31, 7–21.
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Together they constitute a “thick particular” or substance.
By comparison, process ontologies carve the metaphysical landscape in a
considerably different way. According to a process metaphysical approach the world
consists of modes of becoming and types of occurrences. Modes of becoming are the
various, different, qualitative ways in which the world dynamically unfolds through time.
Types of occurrences are abstractions about concrete, particular goings-on that allow
subjects to perceive patterns in those concrete situations 299.
While the substance approach construes the world in a way such that what
something is is what it is made of, essentially separable from temporal changes it
continuously undergoes; the process approach alternatively construes the world such that
what something is, is what it does. On this construal, temporality and the dynamics of
change are essential to what something is, and cannot meaningfully be separated from it.
Put slightly differently, according to the substance approach a thing’s quiddity; its
“whatness”, its constitution, what makes it what it is; cannot include the elements of time
or change, or change through time; while the process approach incorporates dynamicism
(temporality and change) as essential to a thing’s quiddity.
If we attempt to approach the DST-oriented concepts of “pattern”, “function”, and
“system” by taking a substance-metaphysical tack, we will significantly misconstrue
what DST has to offer. Since on a substance-metaphysical approach properties inhere in
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There are many different approaches within process metaphysics. Alfred North Whitehead’s Process and
Reality is often identified as the first contemporary, sustained articulation and defense of a process
metaphysics. Nicholas Rescher, Johanna Seibt, and Mark Bickhard are also strong proponents for
process-based approaches to metaphysics. Further, the Continental tradition is replete with diverse
philosophies that establish or depend on what are variously called “event ontologies” or “metaphysics
of becoming”.
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particulars, a substantist concept of “pattern” would cast it as a property or treat it as
inherent in the object that possesses that pattern. What makes something an instance or
exemplification of a pattern would be the fact that the object under consideration has, as a
part of what it is, that pattern as a property. If the object that is under consideration is a
system, then the system exhibits or exemplifies the pattern because it is constituted by
that pattern as an attribute. The system itself is not the pattern; the system is a bare
particular in which the pattern inheres. But this is incoherent; what is the system apart
from the pattern(s) that define(s) it? What more is there to defining a system than the
patterns that identify that system as that system?
This is a specific example of a more general worry with substance ontologies. If
everything that exists is substantial, what is the metaphysical status of properties, or
inherence relations? Are they also substances? And further, if something’s particular
array of properties is what makes it what it is; what differentiates it from anything else;
then what explanatory need could there possibly be for substance (or “thin particulars”)
at all? Certainly the substance; the thin particularity; of the system does nothing, in itself,
to explain anything about that system. Substance does not, and cannot factor into
explanation and so cannot contribute to understanding. The general worry is that
substance ontology decouples metaphysics from epistemology; and when our modes of
knowing are principally separated from what we claim exists, empirical efforts to
uncover the nature of reality are doomed.

A similar historical dispute also establishes functionalist approaches in the
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philosophy of mind. Historically, functionalism has been put forth as an alternative to the
unpalatable consequences that result from behaviorism and mind-brain identity theories.
Behaviorist theories are meant to rely exclusively on materialist substance metaphysics;
on which all there is to the meaning of mental life is content expressed by purely physical
behavior. There is no need to posit sui-generis mental states 300. Unfortunately,
behaviorism largely failed to surmount the very basic methodological problem of varied
and inconsistent interpretations of what behavior specific physical actions express. In
essence, the problem for behaviorism was that there was no principled way to say that a
particular physical occurrence means a particular behavior. In every occurrence of
behavior there always lurked the problem of determining from underdetermined evidence
what that behavior is (or is not) 301.
As a means of remedying this methodological infelicity, mind-brain identity
theorists attempted to index the meaningfulness of behavior to specific events or states in
the brain. Thus, mind-brain identity theory was also meant to rely exclusively on
materialist substance metaphysics, as mental life can be explained completely by
identifying the appropriate (and purely physical) brain events or states. Strictly speaking,
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Two behaviorist theses can be distinguished here—methodological behaviorism, and metaphysical
behaviorism. Methodological behaviorism is the comparatively weaker claim that whether or not minds
exist (over and above the behavior exhibited by agents) the only thing we have epistemic access to is a
subject’s behavior. Metaphysical behaviorism is the stronger claim that outside overt behavior there is
simply nothing that can be called a mind—minds either are just behavior, or minds don’t exist.
Generally, however, both methodological and metaphysical behaviorism can be treated as one thesis of
behaviorism.
301
U.T. Place offers this and other criticisms of behaviorism forcefully in “Is consciousness a brain
process?” in: British Journal of Psychology 47 (1956), pp. 44–50. Other canonical criticisms of
behaviorism have been put forth by Noam Chomsky (1971) “The Case Against B. F. Skinner,” New
York Review of Books, 30: 18–24.); Armstrong, D.M. (1968), A Materialist Theory of the Mind,
London: Routledge.; Chisholm, R. (1957). Perceiving. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.; Geach, P.
(1957). Mental Acts. London: RKP.; and Putnam, H. (1963). Analytical Philosophy: Second Series.
Ronald J. Butler (ed.). Blackwell.
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both behaviorism and mind-brain identity theory can be construed as process rather than
substance-based positions. This is particularly evident in the use of the language of “brain
events” rather than “brain states”. While some commentators were careful to be inclusive
of either of these uses of language (in an attempt to preempt foreclosing the possibility
that a process-based approach may prove superior to the received materialist substance
approach) very few genuinely attempted to make the case for a strongly process-based
stance. Ultimately, among other problems (including issues distinguishing types from
tokens, and an incompatibility with multiple realizability discussed in chapter 1), the
mind-brain identity approach faced the insuperable criticism that it was incapable of
explaining the qualitative character of consciousness, in principle 302.
Hence, functionalism was developed as an alternative to both of these major
problems with behaviorism and mind-brain identity theory. Functionalism
reconceptualized the mind in totally new terms. Instead of focusing on the substance that
comprised the mind, or the physical medium through which the mind operates,
functionalism focused on the mental operations; or functions; themselves, as the subject
of inquiry303. Much like behaviorism and mind-brain identity theories, functionalism can
be cashed out in strictly physicalist terms; we can think of functions as the purely
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Granted, this is also a criticism of behaviorism, and as it’s designation as the “hard problem” of
consciousness suggests, it hasn’t yet been adequately addressed by any theories. Process metaphysicians
such as Bickhard (2009) have argued that the “hard problem” is made even more difficult by substance
metaphysical assumptions that work to stifle progress on the issue—specifically the assumption that all
cognition must operate and traffic in representational encodings; which compounds problems.
303
Early proponents for what is now identified as “functionalism” were Turing A.M. (1950). Computing
Machinery and Intelligence. Mind 59 (October):433-60.; Putnam, H. (1960). “Minds and Machines”,
and (1967) “The Nature of Mental States” in Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press..; Fodor, J. (1968). Psychological Explanation. New York: Random House.; and
Block, N. and Fodor, J. (1972). “What Psychological States Are Not”. Philosophical Review, 81: 159–
181.
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physical causal operations that occur in the brain. However, if we do this, we should
recognize a couple of things: first, such brain operations cannot be brain states; they must
be events or processes. Any causally ordered explanation must necessarily have a
temporal dimension to it. This, secondly, means that while physicalist, functionalism
cannot be a substance-based physicalism, it must take a process-based approach to the
physical. Thus, functionalism is the first primarily process-based theory of mind. A
consequence of this processual, physicalist functionalism is that both types and tokens
must be thought of as processual (rather than substantial) kinds. Functional tokens, then,
map to occurrent brain events or processes 304, while functional types map to the systemic
functional roles that are enacted by particular tokens 305.
In its most general formulation, functionalism states that what the mind is is
exclusively a matter of what it does. Mental states are defined by their causal relations to
sensory inputs, other mental states, or behavioral outputs. These causal relations are
functional in that they accept input and produce output. In a more abstract sense, the
relations are functional because they enact manipulations on media; they do something.
So in the most abstract sense, it should come as no surprise that functionalism is

304

The phrasing I use here betrays a commitment that I don’t hold, but which is held by a vast majority of
functionalists; a commitment to methodological individualism or what Andy Clark (2008) has called the
“BRAINBOUND” dogma – the commitment that all processes relevant to cognition occur in the brain.
A sufficiently enactive, ecological, embodied, and extended account like DEA does not, however, take
the surface of the brain to mark a principled functionally relevant boundary.
305
I am not here endorsing a functional token identity theory of the kind expressed and advocated by
Davidson (Davidson 1970) and subsequent functionalists. Instead, what I have in mind is that functional
roles can be expressed at differing levels of abstraction. One could, if one wanted, define a function so
narrowly that it could be identified with particular tokens. This does not seem to be at all what
Davidson et. al. have in mind; but there may be reasons based in embodiment and ecological accounts
of the mind for doing so. At the end of this chapter I discuss the relationship between defining functions
and defining systems.
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essentially processual 306.

The concept of a pattern, on the other hand, is quite complicated. Patterns are
detectable regularities. We may ask of a pattern whether it exists (metaphysically, in
itself) or whether pattern detection is, at base, more so a function of epistemic modes of
perception. “I see a pattern”; do I see a pattern, or do I see a pattern? An initial
observation is that this dynamic; this interplay in the concept of patterns; transcendentally
reveals the close relationship between metaphysics and epistemology. If we were earlier
concerned by the way in which it seems that substance ontologies separate metaphysics
from epistemology, the notion of pattern then appears at first glance to be more grist for
the processualist’s mill. If the term “pattern” is to mean something to us, it does so only
because metaphysics and epistemology are closely related in a mutually constraining
dynamic. One’s epistemic commitments have metaphysical consequences, and vice versa.
For something to be a pattern means, simultaneously, that it is detectable; that it has
epistemic import; but it also implies that there is something (metaphysical) to be detected.
Our detections may be fallible, but the fact that we detect patterns at all indicates that if
we are able to say anything about metaphysics it must be consistent with our epistemic
ability to detect patterns. Likewise, pattern detection is constrained to what is
metaphysically possible.
If we accept the definition of patterns as detectable regularities, there is also an
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However, perhaps because it is conceptually difficult to escape the entrenched substantist conceptual
framework, most functionalists (following Putnam, Fodor, Block, et. al.) instead reify functional kinds
as a separate kind of substance from materialism. In this guise, functionalism rather recapitulates
problems similar to those faced by Cartesian dualism.
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added normative dimension. What makes something a regularity? Lurking here are very
fundamental questions about how norms work. Robert Brandom tracks a distinction close
to the one I have in mind when he discusses the differences between what he calls
“regularism” and “regulism”. According to Brandom 307, regularism is an approach to
norms in behavior that marks their descriptive regularity of occurrence as their
distinguishing feature. So, for example, on a regularist interpretation of normative
behavior one detects the descriptive fact that people happen to be acting in a certain way;
say, wearing black at funerals; and from that makes an ordinary inductive inference
generalizing from these regularities to the conclusion that “one wears black at funerals”.
This doesn’t yet explain normative prescriptions (just because I recognize the functioning
of a social norm like wearing black to funerals doesn’t yet motivate that I should also
wear black to funerals), but it does give an explanation of where norms come from; they
are derived through an inductive inferential process on the regularities one detects.
However we may ask the further question “how does one detect these (rather than those)
regularities? For instance, how is it that the observer in the previous example about
wearing black at funerals identifies this as a relevant potential regularity? What is the
mechanism by which the regularities that comprise the basis for the inductive inference
become identified as regularities? To be identified as a regularity is for the pattern to
already to have (somehow) arisen as a pattern of something; it is to already have
precipitated from the multiplicity of experiences into a regularity; and for this we still
lack an explanation on the regularist account 308. The regularist appears not to be able

307
308

Making it Explicit (1994), pp. 27-34
There is a striking resemblance here to Wittgenstein’s considerations of rule-following in Philosophical
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account for the origins of detectable patterns.
We can understand the regularist approach as comparably more epistemically and
empirically based than regulism because it emphasizes the detection of patterns. By
comparison the regulist approach appeals to the metaphysical realist because it identifies
regularities or patterns as something that exist in the world; independent of patterndetecting perception. By situating the existence of regularities in the world independent
of perception, regulists explain prescriptive normativity where regularists could not.
Implicitly we may recognize the bootstrapping norm that one should cohere one’s
epistemic construction of the world to the facts about the world as they are, independent
of our perceptions, whenever possible (viz. one should not intentionally delude one’s
self). Since on the regulist account norms are perception-independent metaphysical facts
(the norms are in the world, not just in our heads), and since one should cohere one’s
understanding with the perception-independent metaphysical facts, then (by modus
ponens) one should cohere with extant norms whenever possible. This kind of reasoning
justifies why, given the existence of the norm that one wears black at funerals, I should
also wear black at funerals. Not doing so would be to deny or delude myself about
normative reality.
Where regulism falters is precisely where regularism excels: in explaining where
norms come from. Instead, regulism takes the existence of norms as a metaphysical
primitive; and thus outside the boundary of what can be explained. Unfortunately, this is
nothing more than a crafty rhetorical device for shutting down philosophical demands for

Investigations, §201: “This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because
every course of action could be made out to accord with the rule.”

170

explanation; what Stephen P. Turner calls an “explanatory stop-gap” 309. Equally
problematic for both regularist and regulist approaches is the issue of deriving what the
norm is, given the multiplicity of experiences. On the regulist account there may be an
objective, metaphysical, fact-of-the-matter as to what the norms are, but that doesn’t help
in explaining how (by what means) one can go about identifying them. In order to explain
regularity, norms, and patterns, all three of these criteria must be satisfied:
1. Explain where regularities / norms / patterns come from.
2. Explain how regularities / norms / patterns become prescriptively binding.
3. Explain the mechanism by which regularities / norms / patterns are detected by
the agents for whom they are binding.
Because they are closely related, a failed explanation in one of these three areas
undermines the entire explanatory project. Both the regularist and regulist approaches
fail, because each fails in at least one of these areas (regularism fails 2 & 3, regulism fails
1 & 3) 310.

309

An “explanatory stop-gap” is a request to cease inquiry because one detects a looming regress and needs
to “bottom-out” explanation somewhere. In this case what is being claimed is that regulism—in its
attempt to take norms as metaphysical primitives—is merely begging that we not inquire into the
etiology of norms. The problem is that when we’re faced with the question “where do norms come
from?” it doesn’t help explain this question by saying that they’re metaphysically primitive. It doesn’t
make the question go away, and it doesn’t explain it—so it isn’t helpful.
310
In Making it Explicit, Brandom tries to navigate a middle passage between regularism and regulism. He
does this by arguing that all conceptual content is discursive, and that normative knowledge is
constituted by the set of “materially good” inferences on propositions that define each concept. These
inferences are discursive, though implicit, rather than explicit symbolic representational tokens
harbored in the brain. Thus, Brandom avoids the charge of regulism by making normativity procedural
and implicit, rather than having explicit normative rules. He avoids regularism by giving an account of
what makes norms binding – pragmatic and intersubjectively assessable commitment. For Brandom,
social practices are then nexūs of implicit, discursive, norms (assessable as commitments with practical
relations to contextual circumstances and consequences). So all social practices are, at least in principle,
expressible linguistically—they can all be “made explicit”. Because of this, Brandom sees no need for
non-conceptual content, and as a result secures a representationalist theory of mind (even though he
argues against the need for explicit representational discursive tokens). What matters is representability,
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We’ve already seen one alternative approach that, at least partially, gives an
account that is meant to simultaneously explain all three areas: Richard Campbell’s
interactive ontology. Campbell’s interactive ontology is explicitly a process-based
ontology meant to sketch a taxonomy of the relevant differences in kinds of systems,
where the notion of what constitutes a “system” is to be cashed out in exclusively
processual terms. We will be returning to this issue shortly, but first I’d like to briefly
discuss why we should be impressed by the adequacy of Campbell’s theory in explaining
pattern detection and normative behavior.
Campbell explicitly identifies where he believes norms first appear in his
taxonomy: error-detection. Systems capable of error-detection are capable of a very basic
kind of normativity; even if not yet normative action. A system’s ability to detect error
makes it a normative system because in order to detect error the system must also be able
to differentiate between actions that succeed and actions that fail. This success or failure
is not something that merely recursively self-maintenant systems are capable of
differentially responding to. Campbell’s example of a (merely) recursively selfmaintenant system is a paramecium. The paramecium can detect the differential gradient
of sugars in its immediate environment, and use that information to “decide” whether to
swim or tumble. But, unfortunately for the paramecium, it cannot differentiate between
nutritive sucrose and non-nutritive saccharin. When the paramecium swims up a
saccharin gradient it is incapable of detecting its error. The consequence of this inability
to detect error can be dire (e.g. the paramecium fails to self-maintain; it dies), but one

not actual representation. The only problem here is that Brandom still lacks a naturalistic etiology of
norms (or more generally of discursivity)—that is, his view still falters on the joint questions of 1 & 3.

172

cannot fault the paramecium for failing in its functioning; as it is not the kind of system
for which failure in error detection is a fault. What we can fault the paramecium for is in
not possessing adequate or appropriate self-maintenance mechanisms for the particular
environments in which it finds itself (being evolutionarily “unfit” for navigating
saccharin gradients).
A paramecium-like system that can detect error would do so, perhaps, by
detecting that the saccharin that it just consumed is failing to nourish. However, this is
still not a system that we would say is “fully” normative; because a system capable of
detecting an error that it cannot act upon cannot be expected to act normatively. For
normative action, Campbell requires an additional capacity for flexible learning &
control. Using the paramecium example, a system that is capable of flexible learning &
control would be able to detect that the saccharin wasn’t nourishing the system and it
would be capable of differentially employing alternative actions in order to change the
situation; it would be able to do something other than swim toward the highest sugar-orsaccharin gradient as a response to its determination that this mechanism is failing in its
function to help procure nutritive sucrose (e.g. to tumble from saccharin, but swim
toward sucrose). A system capable of flexible learning & control can change its actions
based on feedback from the environment.
So how does Campbell’s account fare in addressing the three issues above? Let’s
consider them in order. Campbell explains where regularities, norms, and patterns come
from by explaining the properties attributable to the kinds of systems capable of
differentially responding regularities, norms, and patterns. Thus, for example, patterns
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come from the fact that a system is capable of responding to its environment in a way that
rely on pattern detection. A paramecium is capable of detecting the pattern of sugar
gradient in its environment because it has a certain bodily configuration of mechanisms
that sense sugar levels all around its body, can pair-wise compare those levels, and can
differentially alter its motility (swim or tumble) as a function of the output of these
processes such that the overall action is recognizable as the paramecium swimming
toward the highest sugar concentration. “Sugar gradient” is a pattern for the paramecium
because the paramecium differentially responds to it. Likewise, we can explain where
patterns come from for humans by identifying the regularities that play a functional role
in the processes of determining action and behavior. Perhaps Jim decides to punch Frank
in the face because (among possible other contributing and constraining factors) he is
capable of detecting the difference between a real and fake Rolex watch. Perhaps Jim’s
brother John, on the other hand, is incapable of such a discrimination. Jim employs some
pattern recognition capability, while John doesn’t. Jim can use his ability to detect this
pattern to affect his actions, John cannot. We can treat pattern recognition in this way, on
a system-by-system basis. In many cases the system that is capable of differentially
acting based on its ability to detect patterns will be an organismal system (like the
paramecium, or like Jim), but there is no principled reason it needs to be. In fact, it is
important to the Dynamic Embodied Agency account that the relevant systems can
change to encompass greater or fewer constitutive components, or (more generally)
different components, or can be social systems comprised of (amongst other elements and
relations) individual dynamic embodied agents.
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Next, let’s consider how Campbell’s account handles the issue of explaining how
norms can become prescriptively binding; how it is that we can hold some (and not other)
systems responsible for their actions, say their actions are good or bad, or that they
should have or should not have acted the way they did. Since Campbell explains where
regularities, norms, and patterns come from by explaining the properties attributable to
the kinds of systems capable of differentially responding to regularities, norms, and
patterns; this also contributes to his explanation of how norms can be binding. Certainly a
norm cannot bind a system incapable of acting in accordance with that norm. We cannot
hold a paramecium that is incapable of differentially responding to the nutritive
difference between sucrose and saccharin responsible for failing to differentially respond
to the nutritive difference between sucrose and saccharin. There must be minimal parity
between the capabilities of a system and the kinds of norms that can hold sway 311. A
paramecium that is capable of differentially responding to the nutritive difference
between sucrose and saccharin (e.g. it tumbles away from non-nutritive saccharin, it
swims toward nutritive sucrose) is bound to doing so by its capabilities, and by its being
the kind of system that it is; namely a recursively self-maintenant system. Tumbling away
from non-nutritive saccharin is part of the paramecium’s recursion as a self-maintaining
system. Counterfactually, if it, being the kind of system that it is, didn’t tumble away
from the saccharin, and as a result failed to self-maintain; this is all that is required to say
that it failed as the kind of system that it is supposed to be.
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One can think of the way I talk about the capabilities of a system as analogous to the way in which
Brandom discusses implicit inferable normative propositions. A system’s capabilities may not be
externally ‘explicit’ but instead inhere in the kinds of affordances and constraints that can arise as
significant for the system’s possible actions in a given situation.
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Here we run into some difficulties. We may ask: what is the difference between a
system that is incapable of error detection and flexible learning, and one that refuses or
fails to adequately detect error or learn flexibly? More generally we may ask: what is the
difference between a failed or bad flexible learner & controller and something that simply
isn’t a flexible learner or controllers? Presumably, we are supposed to be able to hold the
former normatively accountable (this is, after all, why we get to use normatively charged
language like “failed” and “bad”), while the latter cannot or should not be held
normatively responsible (after all, we cannot and should not hold something responsible
for that which it is incapable; to do so would be the fault of our judgment and not of the
organism’s). This kind of argument has seen purchase in somewhat recent philosophical
debates about biological function 312, and can also be seen in Wittgenstein’s arguments
about rule-following. If we don’t know which rule someone is following, how can we say
they are mistaken in applying the rule? In Wittgenstein’s words:
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule,
because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The
answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can
also be made out to conflict with it. And there would be neither accord nor
conflict here (PI, §201).
For his part, and the better part of a half-century’s worth of subsequent Wittgenstein
scholarship, it is still unclear whether Wittgenstein resolves this paradox, or what his
resolution is, if he does. It seems that a system can only fail at a function that it has; and
that only the system can “know” what that function is (and in many cases even that
system may not be capable of such “knowledge”). This, of course, raises the specter of
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Cf. e.g. Cummins, R. (1975). “Functional Analysis.” Journal of Philosophy 72: 741.765; Millikan,
R.G. (1989b). “An ambiguity in the notion of function.” Biology and Philosophy 4: 172-176; and
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some canonical problems with theories of meaning in the internalism / externalism
debate 313. Something cannot acquire its meaning from internal sources only (e.g. meaning
cannot be solely agent-relative), because then meaning couldn’t transcend the boundaries
between agents; and nobody could hold anyone else accountable or responsible; or know
what anyone else means when communicating; in fact communication becomes
impossible for meaning internalists. Alternatively, if meaning is exclusively external then
we face Wittgenstein’s paradox; that there is no way to (externally) determine the
difference between failure to obey one rule, and success in obeying some other rule. For
our purposes, the way out of this problem is to know what the relevant functions and
capabilities of a system are; and these, for the dynamic systems theorist, are determined
through the complex and chaotic dependencies that shape the concrete dynamics of the
particular situations in which open, far-from-equilibrium systems interact. We may not be
able to identify these functions and capabilities exactly or absolutely; but the focus that
complexity theory brings to bear on extremely complex systems that produce perceptibly
and approximately regular behavior may aid in our abilities to confidently (if
provisionally) decide the problem.
The third issue that needs to be addressed is explaining the mechanisms by which
regularities, norms, or patterns are detected by the agents for whom they operate.
Campbell’s approach puts much of the explanatory weight here on the taxonomic
classifications he gives. Basically, the idea is that as long as a system satisfies the
inclusion criteria for a specific taxonomic class, there will be naturalistic mechanisms
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that enact the relevant regularity, norm, or pattern detection functions that allow for its
class inclusion. These mechanisms are; it is important to remember; processes “all the
way down”. By giving both the taxonomic classes and naturalistic explanations for the
transitions between classes within his hierarchy, Campbell provides a blueprint (or to
keep with a more processual metaphor, a procedure or algorithm) through which one can
construct, for any specific system, a naturalistic explanation of mechanisms that produce
the functions and capabilities that determine its inclusion within a taxonomic class.
However, it should also be noted that a blueprint (or procedure, or algorithm) for an
explanation is not itself an explanation. Further, we should acknowledge that while his
taxonomy is meant to apply generally to the kinds of systems with which we are
interested, it may not always track the most relevant or appropriate capabilities or
functions for such systems in particular. The degree to which this is problematic will
depend on the degree to which one seeks a more general, or more specific explanation
(e.g. do I wish to explain how embodied agents enact social practices in general, or do I
wish to explain why I am dressing in black, in particular, here and now?). Explanations
are always indexed to the phenomenon that is in need of explaining; just as problems
always proscribe and constrain candidate solutions.

Last for this section is to discuss what is meant by “system”, and in particular to
understand systems with respect to process-based ontologies; that is, dynamic systems.
The early structuralists like Durkheim, Mauss, and Parsons established a way of talking
about systems that is sensitive to organizational and dynamical complexities. The
178

dynamical systems approaches that developed out of these structuralist considerations; in
conjunction with a shift away from substance and toward process metaphysics; has
coalesced a powerful framework through which phenomena can be explained. The basic
conceptual unit of this framework is the “system”. At its most basic, a system is a model
of some phenomena structured as a set of elements or components and their functional
relations to each other and to the system as a whole, that together comprise a whole in
which some property or functionality is achieved 314. Systems can be either
decomposable; which means that the properties or functionalities of the whole can be
expressed by the collection of the components without maintaining all of their functional
relations to each other, or to the whole; undecomposable; which means that the
functionality of the whole depends on the specific interactions of the component parts
with each other and with the whole; or partially [or nearly] decomposable; such that the
whole can be decomposed into some subset of components, but not completely
decomposable into only basic components (e.g. some components are themselves
subsystems comprised of more components, but the functions and properties of such
subsystems are undecomposable). Systems that are undecomposable either possess
properties or perform functions that are emergent; such properties or functions are a
holistic result of the interworkings of the whole 315.
It is important to understand systems primarily as epistemic tools or models; or
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Systemics, The Primer Project, 2007.
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conceptual or perceptual frames rather than metaphysical entities. What makes something
a system is its definition; and its definition is a function of how its boundary conditions
are defined. The boundary conditions that define a system may be functional (the system
accepts certain input and produces certain output), temporal (the system is bounded in
time; it begins, does something, then ends; though it needn’t be temporally contiguous; it
may exist between moments of non-existence), and/or spatial (the system is bounded in
space; it has a definite extension; though its extension needn’t be contiguous; there may
be space between its extended parts). Boundary conditions are defined by epistemic
agents; they do not exist as metaphysical entities independent of the observers who make
use of them 316.
Though systems are defined by their boundaries, their boundaries needn’t be
(functionally, temporally, or spatially) rigid. Systems can be open or closed; they can be
nested within, or overlap with other systems; and they can interchange functions,
components, or relations with other systems or the environment. An open system is one
whose properties or functions are sensitive to conditions (functionally, temporally, or
spatially) surrounding but not strictly included within the boundaries of the system. In a
certain sense, what makes a system open is its status as continually open to definitional or
boundary revision; an open system has the property of being provisionally-defined. A
closed system, by contrast, is one that is not sensitive to external stimulus. They are selfcontained and have no bearing on or relation to anything beyond their boundaries. They
are absolutely-defined. A system can vary in its degree of openness or closedness; and it
316

The issues here are fraught. Agents may not have any control over the boundaries they perceive—and
the [meta]physical world in a real sense contributes to the possibilities that afford and constrain (or
bound) perceptual and conceptual possibilities.
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may vary as to whether it is open or closed along different dimensional axes (e.g. a
system may be temporally open but spatially closed; or functionally open but temporally
closed, etc.)
In an abstract sense, all systems are functional because they all exhibit some
property or function as a whole, as a result of the interworkings of their components. The
term “interworkings” here may or may not imply a temporal relationship, however.
Process models are those whose ontologies are comprised only of systems that include
both functional and temporal components. Many process ontologies also include systems
with spatial components (for example, this may be a requirement of physicalist theories),
but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for a model to count as a process-based model.
Because they necessarily include a temporal component, the systems studied under the
heading “Dynamic Systems Theory” must be process-based models.

Dynamic Systems Theory (DST) is a general framework rather than a particular
research project or methodology. It is an approach that can be applied to any discipline or
area of research; but is distinguished by its focus on dynamic systems, which are; as we
have just seen; based in a process metaphysics. DST is closely related to General Systems
Theory (GST), but is distinguished from it in DST’s comparative emphases on temporal
change, nonlinearity, and far-from-equilibrium open systems. To date, many DST
researchers have adopted the related methodologies of chaos and complexity theories to
describe and explain the features, components, relations, and patterns in the systems they
investigate. The purpose of this project is to bring these resources to bear in philosophical
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discussions about the relations between individual agents and social practices and
institutions. My contention is that the DST framework has much to offer these
discussions in terms of explanatory power and possible empirical research opportunities.
The next chapter will utilize the vocabulary and conceptual resources afforded by
the foregoing discussion in application toward the notions of Dynamic Embodied Agents
(DEAs) and social institutions and practices discussed in the previous two chapters. The
goal of the next two chapters, then, is to flesh-out how understanding DEAs and social
practices and institutions as interacting dynamic systems helps to explain what social
agents, practices, and institutions are, and how they mutually co-constitute DEAs.
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Chapter 4 – Persons as Dynamic Systems

The purpose of this chapter is to bring the conceptual resources developed in
Dynamic Systems Theory (DST) in contact with the kinds of agents I described in
chapters 1 and 2—what I have called Dynamic Embodied Agents (DEAs). In doing so;
and because DEAs are ecological, extended, embodied, embedded, and enactive agents; it
is important to understand them in concert with the local environment that necessarily
factors into their very constitution. In particular, we are interested in a certain kind of
DEA: agents that are capable of social interaction. For such agents, the qualities and
characteristics of this social interaction are important constitutive factors that shape and
define who and what these agents are. However, this gives only one half of the theoretical
picture; and for this picture to emerge as one whole coherent theory it must also address
what social practices and institutions are from within the same theoretical framework.
DEAs and social practices and institutions must lie on the same ontological continuum.
Historically, much of the difficulty in explaining social practices has been the result of a
discontinuity in metaphysics and epistemology: theories have used one theoretical
framework to explain the workings of individual, autonomous agents; and different
theoretical frameworks incompatible and discontinuous with the first to explain social
practices and institutions. It is a benefit of the theory of Dynamic Embodied Agency that
it can explain how individuals and social practices and institutions interact by using one
consistent theoretical vocabulary and explanatory framework.
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4.1

Dynamic Embodied Agency (now with more Systems Theory!)

At the end of chapter 3, I briefly put together an image of the kind of agents that
will interest us in this chapter. In the context of that chapter, whose purpose was to
establish the conceptual framework of Dynamic Systems Theory, I noted that some
systems are complex, chaotic, dynamic, far-from-equilibrium, and open. Using Richard
Campbell’s taxonomy, we can further narrow our focus to a subclass of such systems that
also exhibit the capabilities of recursive self-maintenance, error-detection, flexible
learning, self-reflection (and by extension the ability to represent), and the ability to
socially interact. Of course, most humans and possibly even many non-human animals
fall into this specialized subclass of systems. It will be important to keep in mind that, on
the account of Dynamic Embodied Agency that I have in mind, social practices and
institutions also fall into this subclass. If we take a moment to unpack and apply these
qualities to our uninitiated intuitions about social practices and institutions we will see
that this is a substantive and potentially contentious claim (especially when it comes to
the ability to self-reflect). I intend to defend this claim later in the chapter, but for current
purposes it suffices to simply keep this intention in mind.
First I would like to demonstrate that what is usually understood by terms like
“human agent” or “person” is adequately expressed by the conjunction of the features just
listed. The notion of personhood is itself controversial and it would help to briefly
canvass some of views with respect to this controversy in order to better appreciate the
contribution of the Dynamic Systems approach to this debate.
One characteristic often thought to constitute personhood is agency. Agency at its
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most basic is the idea that an autonomous individual is capable of making decisions and
choosing to act based on the outcome of their decisions. Different theorists put forth
different explanations of how decisions are made, whether the decision-making process is
deterministic or indeterministic, how the decision-making process connects up with
action processes, and so on. These are important and significant contributions to action
theory, but delving too deeply in to these details would take us too far afield. What are
relevant to our discussion are the notions of choice, autonomy, and self-movement.
Another common attribute thought constitutive of personhood is self-awareness.
Significant to this view is that persons are the kinds of things that can get a hold of who
or what they are as a unity and in so-doing have some sense of self. This sense of self is
often thought to be a self-conception; but some commentators 317 believe that concepts
aren’t required to have an awareness of one’s self. Many phenomenological accounts
require self-awareness as a precondition for self-reflection 318—and, as a precondition for
self-reflection, there is a strong historical thread in phenomenology that requires
embeddedness and interaction within a social context of other agents as a condition for
the possibility of self-awareness 319. It is a live philosophical question as to whether one’s
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E. g. Many of those following in the tradition of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach, such as
Jose Luis Bermudez (1998, 2001, 2003), Owen Flanagan (1992, 1998, 2007), Peter Poellner (2003),
Dan Zahavi (1999, 2002, 2005), Shaun Gallagher (2000, 2005, with A. Meltzoff 1996, with J. Shear
1999, with S. Watson 2004), Alva Noë (2004, 2009), and Mark Rowlands (1999, 2006, 2010), Evan
Thompson (2003, 2010, with Francisco Varela & Eleanor Rosch 1991), just to name a few. Opponents
such as David Armstrong (1971, 1981) , Peter Carruthers (1996, 2000, 2006), Daniel Dennett (1992,
1997, 2007), Jerry Fodor (1975, 1987, 1996), William Lycan (1987, 1996), Zenon Pylyshyn (1984,
1986), David Rosenthal (1986, 1992, 2002, 2005) [among scores of others] follow broadly neo-Kantian
and/or Computationalist approaches, arguing variously that the notion of the self is intrinsically
conceptual, discursive, thematic, representational, etc.
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Notably Jean-Paul Sartre, though this is a theme that is manifest in most phenomenological thought.
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I am thinking here, again, of Sartre’s discussions in Being and Nothingness, Part III, Chapter 1, section
IV: The Look, though as Sartre himself recognizes, similar ideas can be found in Hegel, Husserl, and
Heidegger. The issue is a little more complicated with respect to Merleau-Ponty—as in Phenomenology
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sense of self is more or less fundamental than one’s social involvement, though there is
some consensus that social interaction is the sine qua non in developing a sense of self 320.
A third characteristic commonly thought necessary for personhood is a robust
temporal sense of one’s self: the ability to understand one’s self as an entity that
progresses through time. Some believe that notions of past and future are fundamental to
the fully developed temporal sense required for personhood; but others have argued that
there are alternative and perhaps more important or fundamental senses of temporality
that do not make use of such notions as past and future 321. Crucial to the understanding of
temporality as a basis for personhood is often the idea of personal narrativity—of
understanding’s one life as an ongoing unfolding of events moving toward its completion
as a temporal whole 322. Often implicit in narrative conceptions of personhood are
normative and moral directives to live in such a way as to craft an excellent life narrative.
On the other hand, it is not obvious what aesthetic criteria determine the excellence of a

of Perception, (p. 96) Merleau-Ponty seems to suggest that one’s initial experience of otherness is most
likely of one’s self as other; and that others (in the usual sense of the term) derive from this selfothering experience.
320
Though there is much disputed about character of social interaction. The famous disagreement between
Sartre’s “confrontation” and Heidegger’s Mitsein is a conspicuous case-in-point. One rather striking
account of the formation and development of other-relations is Annette Baier’s “Cartesian Persons”
(Philosophia, 10:(3-4), 1981) in which she theorizes that one’s self concept is fundamentally an
inversion of more primary second-personal “you” relations (e. g. being taken as a “you” by significant
others such as parents, inverted into a taking of others as a “you”, and finally of taking one’s self as a
“you” for others). Similarly, Martin Buber’s account of the phenomenal character of interpersonal
relations in I and Thou is also significant. From an experimental psychology perspective, Meltzoff’s&
Moore’s now de rigeur 1977 “Imitation of Facial and Manual Gestures by Human Neonates”(Science,
198, 75-78) suggests ways in which a formative capacity for social interaction may be innate (as
exhibited by neonates’ abilities to imitate facial and manual expressions and gestures). Further research
in so called “mirror neurons” has suggested biological mechanisms whereby others’ affective
expressions are simulated by one’s own limbic system (cf. e. g. Gallese, V. (2005). Embodied
simulation: from neurons to phenomenal experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4: 2348. ).
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This will be discussed more thoroughly in the section on temporality, below.
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Cf. Harry Frankfurt (1988), Alasdair McIntyre (1989), Charles Taylor (1989), and Marya Schechtman
(1996).
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narrative. Further, some theorists following Heidegger base personhood on the notion of
futural projection 323—the ability to understand one’s self as engaged in a continual
process of making or crafting one’s life as a whole by taking a stand (outside one’s self in
the present) on one’s future self.
One last common characteristic considered important to many definitions of
personhood is moral responsibility. Certain kinds of entities can be held responsible for
their decisions and actions; they can be praised or blamed for them; they have rights and
duties with respect to the ways in which they interact with other persons. This
characteristic is a relatively “high-level” condition for personhood—that is, it requires
one or some of the other characteristics as a condition for its possibility. One cannot be
held responsible if one is incapable of decision and action—if one isn’t already an agent.
As with the criterion of narrartivity, however, determining the relevant and binding
norms and moral standards by which to judge responsibility is not a trivial problem 324.
There are many other live considerations in determining what constitutes
personhood, but these four aspects—agency, self-awareness, temporality, and moral
responsibility—give a good sense of the basic contours of the discussion. Appropriately,
Charles Taylor combines all of them in his 1983 essay “The Concept of a Person” 325:
Where it is more than simply a synonym for ‘human being’, ‘person’
figures primarily in moral and legal discourse. A person is a being with a
certain moral status, or a bearer of rights. But underlying the moral status, as
its condition, are certain capacities. A person is a being who has a sense of
323

Ek-stasis.
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Ganguli Memorial Lectures 1981. Delhi, Oxford University Press. More commonly found in Taylor, C.
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self, has a notion of the future and the past, can hold values, make choices; in
short, can adopt life-plans. At least, a person must be the kind of being who is
in principle capable of all this, however damaged these capacities may be in
practice.
Running through all this we can identify a necessary (but not sufficient)
condition. A person must be a being with his own point of view on things. The
life-plan, the choices, the sense of self must be attributable to him as in some
sense their point of origin. A person is a being who can be addressed, and who
can reply. 326
Here Taylor sums up what it means to be a person as an entity capable of temporal
experience of self, and occupying a subjective perspective. These in turn contribute to the
constitution of persons as moral and legal entities. On Taylor’s construction of persons,
what matters most is one’s ability to commit one’s self (including especially one’s future
self) to things; to “own up” to one’s life and life choices. I will return to the notion of
self-ownership as a determinant of personhood later; but for now I am more interested in
showing how the collection of qualities in dynamic systems that I listed above are
consistent with these four conditions for personhood. This, in turn, justifies my using the
conceptual resources of DST in discussing the kinds of persons in which most social
theorists are interested.
Minimally speaking, virtually all biological organisms are complex, chaotic,
dynamic, far-from-equilibrium, and open systems. They are complex because they
involve “high-bandwidth” interactions among a huge number of interworking and
dynamic parts across wide ranging and changing internal and external parameters. They
are chaotic because they are sensitively dependent on particular conditions in their bodies
and their environments. There are two important related biological concepts to consider
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in thinking of biological systems as chaotic: plasticity and robustness. Plasticity is the
idea that a biological system has the capacity to change itself in order to adapt to its
changing environment. Conversely, robustness is the idea that a biological system is
capable of maintaining its features despite its changing environment. Maturana and
Varela’s idea of autopoesis combines both plasticity and robustness into one concept.
Autopoesis is the idea that an organism is plastic, and through this plasticity, exhibits its
robustness: an organism maintains its phenotypic (outward, general) features because it is
capable of adapting to its changing environment. Similarly, organisms are both chaotic
and complex: an organism exhibits higher-order (more abstract, emergent) characteristics
through the complex and chaotic workings of and relations between its components 327.
Organisms are dynamic, far-from-equilibrium, and open, for interrelated reasons.
They are dynamic because they are open and far-from-equilibrium, though stable—that
is, because they are open and far-from-equilibrium, in order to remain stable, they must
do so by dynamically interacting and engaging with their environments. Similarly, it is
the fact that the biological system is both dynamic and open that keeps it from reaching
equilibrium. And no system that is both dynamic and far-from-equilibrium can be closed.
In essence, all biological systems engage in a commerce with their local environments
that allows them to recursively self-maintain. On the other hand, not all biological
systems have the abilities to detect error, learn flexibly, self-reflect (and by extension
represent), or socially interact. Further, there is nothing essentially special about humans
that makes them exclusively capable of any of these processes, however tracking these
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processes is sufficient for capturing the four criteria many action theorists take to be
constitutive of human personhood.
4.2

Agency

Recall that agency is the idea that autonomous individuals are capable of making
decisions and acting based on the outcome of their decisions. In order to adequately
capture the notion of agency then, the DST approach must establish the equivalent ideas
of autonomy, choice, and action. The very act of defining a system simultaneously
determines its autonomy with respect to the surrounding environment. The Greek root of
the word “autonomy” literally means “self-governing” 328. By giving the functional,
temporal, and spatial boundary conditions for a system, we give the grounds upon which
that system is differentiated from all else that is functionally, temporally, and spatially
definable. These grounds may be provisional, but if so such provisonality does not in
principle undermine the functional, temporal, or spatial boundaries that shape the system;
it only makes the system dynamically defined. Such boundary conditions also act as the
“law” of self-governance. Merely by defining a system, that system is made
autonomous—as a definition gives the rules of inclusion and exclusion329. Often the idea
of autonomy is bundled with independence 330. However, many action and moral theorists

From the Greek “αὐτονομία”; αὐτός (autos) meaning “self”, and νόμος (nomos) meaning “law”.
However, it is often a nontrivial task to define a dynamic system; in large part because of its dynamicity,
but also for the Wittgensteinian reason that some systems may not be well-definable (viz. they are not
rule-based, rather they bear “family resemblances”.
330
There are also often further distinctions, as with the concepts of “procedural” and “substantive”
independence. These do not substantively affect my discussion here; as the point pertains to
independence more generally. What I have in mind regarding independence is the ontological idea that
a thing is independent insofar as its constitution does not rely on any external relations or influences. In
this way, I am not here discussing intensive independence (independence as a matter of degree—the
328
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have argued that the idea of an autonomous, independent agent is incoherent 331. DST can
help articulate why this is so. No dynamic, far-from-equilibrium, open system can be
independent, because the constraint of independence is equivalent to the requirement that
a system be closed. Since all agents necessarily interact with their environments (a
condition for the possibility of action), no agent can be a closed system. Thus no agent
can be completely independent. If there is independence in such a system, it must be with
respect to some specific parameter; it cannot be a general characteristic of the system.
DST adequately captures the basic contours of choice through the related concepts
of recursive self-maintenance, error-detection, and flexible learning. The qualitative
phenomenal feeling of what it is like to choose can be thought of as emerging from some
lower-level, physical, deterministic processes that, themselves, are the choosing
processes 332. We can think of error-detection and flexible learning as the processes of
comparing what the system is capable of taking to be the relevant factors for a particular
decision-making scenario and adjudicating as to which action should be taken. As a
deterministic process, error-detection and flexible learning can be understood as the ways
in which a system is differentially sensitive to its surroundings. It detects some of the

notion that something can be more or less independent, or more or less dependent)—rather, what I mean
by independence is an all-or-nothing proposition. .
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I am thinking here specifically of communitarian and feminist criticisms of autonomy as exaggerating
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(Sources of the Self), and Michael Sandel (Liberalism and the Limits of Justice) express precisely these
concerns. Excellent feminist critique along these lines can be found in Benjamin, B. The Bonds of Love:
Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination, New York: Pantheon Books, 1988, 183224. ; and Harding, Sandra and Merrill B. Hintikka, eds. , Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives
on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, 2 ed. . Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2003.
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aspects of its surroundings and through some process of differentiation produces behavior
that is recognizable as a decision in how to act.
Action is expressed in DST as the continuously updated negative feedback loops,
decision processes, and differentially-sensitive responses enacted through a system’s
sensitivities to and sites of interaction with the local environment. The local environment
informs the state of the system; and the system, sensitive to various kinds of changes in
its local environment, responds in a way that affects and changes the local environment.
The new state of the environment is then detected by the system, and it responds
accordingly. All recursively self-maintenant systems involve such low-level feedback
loops 333. The difference between these low-level systems and higher-level systems like
those capable of error-detection and flexible learning is that higher-level systems have
multiple potential responses to the same environmental condition(s) 334. This process of
selecting amongst potential alternatives is another sense of what is meant by “choice”
according to the DST model.
4.3

Temporality

Likewise, because dynamical systems depend on a process-based metaphysics,
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These “loops” shouldn’t be seen as periodic or cyclical; but rather as “attractors”; stable but nonrepeating patterns of actions that are sentitive to certain environmental parameters. Through these
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its own abilities to detect the state of the environment and (3) its ability to respond. An example of the
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weight I am capable of lifting, my relation to the weights that are to be lifted, and my weight-lifting
technique. These changes are sensitively dependent on each other—a change in one effects a change in
the others.
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Thus the difference between “lower” and “higher” level systems is a difference in degree of complexity
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and this in-turn relies on taking change and temporality as primitive, the idea of
temporality as a hallmark of personhood should be easy for DST to accommodate.
However, the kinds of ideas often expressed under the banner of temporality when it
comes to discussing persons (and especially within Heideggerian scholarship) do not bear
immediate resemblance to the ideas of temporality as they are expressed in the more
mathematically-oriented fields in which DST is often brought to bear. It is important,
then, to expend a bit of effort in getting these two seemingly disparate senses of
temporality to meet up.
Throughout DST’s development as an offshoot from General Systems Theory in
the 1960s through the 1990s, it has always had a distinctively mathematical flavor. Its
main area of concentration has been in developing nonlinear differential equations to
model complex and chaotic natural behavior in hopes of explaining (often physical, but
sometimes social and economic) systems that have traditionally resisted adequate
explanation by more linear methods 335. In breaking with linear methods of analyzing
systems, one particular traditional and formative concept in history of mathematics came
into question. Traditionally in modeling systems as a time-series, the x-axis of the
coordinate plane was assigned to the regular, linear progression of time. This axis has
335

The word “natural” often doesn’t help in these discussions. The kinds of behavior that dynamical
systems theory has often been employed to help explain may be excluded by some as sufficiently
“natural”. Some examples of systems that DST assesses are astronomical systems (like the solar
system), meteorological systems, systems that have traditionally been treated by classical mechanics (e.
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structural similarities between various systems (e. g. how is a traffic jam like an ant colony? If ant
colonies can solve traffic problems, can we employ similar strategies?).
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traditionally been called the “independent variable”, and since time was assumed to
elapse in uniform series (one moment after another, progressing unidirectionally from the
past to the future, an ever—though regularly—moving present) not much thought had
been given to the variability of a time-series. Generally when modeling or plotting some
phenomenon as a function of time, the uniform linearity of the passage of time is
assumed.
But what happens when one is no longer willing to assume that time is linear? In
the wake of Einstein’s groundbreaking theories of special and general relativity,
theoretical physicists began to grapple with the idea of space-time curvature. Arthur
Eddington’s May 29th, 1919 solar eclipse experiment showed that the propagation of light
is affected by gravity. Later, in 1964 Irwin Shapiro demonstrated that light takes longer to
travel deep in a gravity well than it does outside one 336. Paired with the limiting physical
constraint of the speed of light as the only possible time-constant, physicists were forced
to face the possibility that since the speed of light is variable due to space curvature, time
may also be variable (not strictly constant). Einstein referred to this phenomenon as
“gravitational time dilation” 337. On the other hand, it can be shown that the speed of light
in a vacuum is constant relative to any local inertial frame of reference 338. So whether
time is constant or variable, from any observer’s standpoint it is effectively constant.
Nonetheless, the idea of variation in the passage of time found application in DST models
336

A phenomenon predicted by Einstein in 1908.
Einstein, A. (1907) “Über das Relativitätsprinzip und die aus demselben gezogenen Folgerungen” (“On
the relativity principle and the conclusions drawn from it”), Jahrbuch der Radioaktivität und Elektronik
4, 411–462.
338
The point about the variability of the speed of light is confirmed when considering non-inertial frames
of reference. Whether a frame of reference is inertial or non-inertial is a good basis for defining locality
(or non-locality).
337
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of physical phenomena. Instead of linear time-series, DST researchers began to model
time nonlinearly339. There are four basic models (really, spatial metaphors) of nonlinear
time; what I will call cyclic, dilation, intensive (serial), and meshwork (parallel).
However it will help to contrast these models with the “received”, linear view(s) of time.
The Modern philosophy and mathematics of Descartes, Galileo, Leibniz, Newton,
and Laplace, (among myriad others) firmly entrenched the view that time happens to
occur in a linear progression from past to future, but that the laws of physics do not
distinguish which is which. This is the idea that time is linear but symmetric. The laws of
physics would apply whether time elapsed from past to future (as it happens to) or from
future to past (as it happens not to). Additionally, time is taken to be uniform, or
homogeneous: all moments of time, considered without respect to any other qualities or
quantities, are identical to all other moments of time. There is no way to differentiate one
moment, considered in its bare temporality, from another 340. It doesn’t matter whether
one attempts to roll a ball down a slope under specific physical conditions one million or
one trillion years after the big bang; as long as the conditions are physically identical, the
ball will roll in an identical fashion 341.
In 1927, Arthur Eddington proposed the idea of time asymmetry. Time could still
be understood as elapsing in a uniform, linear manner; and time could still be understood
339

Cf. e. g. Tong (1990), Granger and Teräsvirta (1993), Franses and van Dijk (2000), and Kim and Nelson
(1999).
340
This is a consequence of the indistinguishability of indiscernables (or “Leibniz’s Law”).
341
In philosophy, the primary touchstone in the analysis of time is J. M. E. McTaggart’s 1908 The
Unreality of Time. In it, McTaggart assesses three “series” or theories of time. He shows that the first
two series, A and B, require the reality of time but that their doing so ultimately makes them incoherent
as theoretical position. He then offers his C series which doesn’t require time’s reality, and he proposes
that it functions as an adequate alternative. All three time series assume a linear temporal ordering. For
this reason, I do not engage directly with McTaggart’s work, or the subsequent scholarship that has
since grown around it.

195

as homogeneous; but now the laws of physics wouldn’t work the same in either temporal
direction; e.g. holding the natural laws constant, if the universe were “run” in the
opposite temporal direction (from future to past) the events that unfolded wouldn’t pair
identically with the way they do when the universe is run from past to future. The idea of
time asymmetry has been termed “the arrow of time”, because it runs unidirectionally.
Both symmetric and asymmetric conceptions of time can be considered linear, as long as
the direction in which time elapses doesn’t reverse 342.
The weakest sense of nonlinear time, then, might be the idea of the Big Crunch or
Big Bounce. The Big Crunch supposes that time is symmetric and that at some point the
cosmological expansion of the Big Bang will cease and reverse. It is theorized that at this
moment time (which is indexed to space, as space-time) will reverse directions and elapse
from future to past. The Big Bounce elaborates on this idea, suggesting that eventually the
universe will return to the moment of the conditions of the Big Bang, and reverse
directions again; and this Bang-and-Crunch process will be repeated infinitely 343. The
Big Bounce is a nearly linear, cyclical notion of time. It can be represented onedimensionally by tracing a continuous path smoothly oscillating back and forth over a
line segment.
Another form of cyclical time can be represented two dimensionally by tracing a
continuous path along a circle. Cyclical time of this variety continuously returns to its
previous states (continuously traces over its previous path) but not by reversing
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For an excellent elaboration on the idea and history of the concept of the “arrow of time” see: Price,
Huw (1996). Time's Arrow & Archimedes' Point: New Directions for the Physics of Time. Oxford
University Press.
343
Cf. Bojowald, Martin (2007). “What happened before the Big Bang?”. Nature Physics 3 (8): 523–525.
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directions. In his famous “Eternal Return” thought experiment, Friedrich Nietzsche
conceived of cyclical time as a way of expressing a moral imperative to commit one’s
self fully to every choice and moment of one’s life as if one had to live that moment
again and again for eternity. Cyclical time of this variety is, again, weakly nonlinear (or
nearly linear) because it is confined to a strictly periodic temporal trajectory. One can,
however, entertain a variation on the concept of cyclical time that is more strongly
nonlinear by applying the idea of a chaotic attractor. An attractor is an expression of a
system in “phase space”—the set of possible “locations” a system can occupy based on
the possible values it can take for each of its variables and parameters—as it iteratively
progresses or “evolves”. Chaotic attractors are semi-periodic, which means their motions
are aperiodic but exhibit a noticeably periodic-seeming pattern from which they never
deviate. On this view events do not repeat, but they bear noticeable resemblance to past
events. With cyclical, and semi-periodic conceptions of time, time is nonlinear and
unidirectional, but can be uniform or non-uniform, and homogeneous or nonhomogeneous. Periodic time like the Big Bounce is very weakly nonlinear, can be
uniform (or non-uniform), and homogeneous (or non-homogeneous), but not
unidirectional because it periodically changes temporal direction (this periodic time
reversal is the only thing that makes periodic time nonlinear).
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Figure 1: A view of the Lorenz Attractor in 3-D phase space.
Courtesy http://complex.upf.es/~josep/Chaos.html (accessed 12/29/2012).

The second model or metaphor for nonlinear time is dilation. The basic spatial
metaphor of time as dilation is that it expands outward in all directions from a center. The
rate of expansion may be uniform or non-uniform, while the quality of temporal moments
must be non-homogeneous because each moment (understood by analogy to the
continuously dilating outer boundary) contains within it all previous moments (e.g. the
qualitative character of each moment is unique because it incorporates into its makeup
previously unincorporated moments). One way to think about time as dilation (or
“dilationary time”) is as a continual update, alteration, or revision to the character of
time. On this view, what time is—how time is constituted—itself changes as time
continues to expand or dilate. It is nonlinear because it does not expand out in one
temporal direction. To use the metaphor of a “time line”—a line representing time
extending infinitely to the left and right, with the left representing the past, the right
representing the future, and a point representing the present—part of the idea of
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dilationary time is that it expands simultaneously out from the present (center) in both
past and future directions. The past develops in concert with the future in an essentially
dynamic (or processual) and eternal unfolding of the present. The model of time as
dilation also has the capacity to accommodate many simultaneous temporal
dimensions 344 at once. One way to envision this on the visual metaphor of a dilating
horizon is to run multiple time lines through the present center. These multiple time lines
represent the unfolding of various distinct events as they occur “on their own time”.
However, such time lines needn’t maintain their boundaries—they may bleed into each
other—representing the possibility that the boundaries defining some events aren’t so
rigid or clear. Just as events bleed into each other, so may time lines on the dilation
model.
By comparison the intensive model of time is relatively simple. One can take the
received symmetric or asymmetric view and alter it slightly by removing the constraints
of unidirectionality, uniformity, and homogeneity. The intensive model naturally
constructs time as intensive—varying in degree. There are a couple of ways that time can
vary in degree. Time can elapse “forward” or “backward” along the time line at varying
speeds. It can move with a relatively constant “velocity” or it can accelerate or decelerate,
or alternate between relatively uniform and non-uniform spans. Time can possess more of
some qualitative temporal feature at one moment, and less at another. The basic point of
the intensive model is to problematize the assumption of temporal regularity or
uniformity.

344

To conceptualize the idea of multiple temporal dimensions, think of various events unfolding on their
own timescales, concurrently.
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Finally, the meshwork model of temporality can be thought of as an elaboration of
the intensive model. If the intensive model maintains the basic, linear, serial structure of
the received time line, the meshwork model doesn’t. As with the dilation model of time,
the meshwork model allows for multiple events to unfold on their own time and in
accordance to their own rhythms. Such events may interact intensively or relate with each
other and in complex, nonlinear ways. One simple way to imagine meshwork time is by
considering the particular moment at which you read this sentence. At once, processes are
occurring according to their own durations. The universe is expanding on cosmological
time. The Earth is unfolding and going to the process of geological change on geological
time. The human species is evolving on evolutionary time. Your life is playing out at its
own rhythm. We’re living in the contemporary era. The U. S. Constitution is developing
in concert with the norms upheld by the continually changing set of people that constitute
American society. These are all different temporalities unfolding on their own times, but
there are also ways in which they can meet up and interact. Temporalities existing in
parallel with one another can causally affect each other. These interactions can
occasionally be deterministically predictable, happen purely by chance, or be sensitively
dependent on the particular conditions in which they occur. In essence, the meshwork
approach models temporality as multiple overlapping timescales varying in multiple
interacting dimensions of qualities, intensities and durations. It is a highly nonlinear
model of temporality 345.
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These four nonlinear models of time rely on an analogy to developments in the intellectual history of
space—particularly in Mathematics from linear Euclidean geometrical spaces to non-Euclidean
geometries; in Physics from flat or rigid space and time to curved spacetime; in many engineering fields
from linear approximations to nonlinear systems of differential equations. In philosophy, there is no
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Figure 2: Seven graphical representations of models of temporality.

4.4

Some Quick Accounting

Let us take stock of the argument thus far. We are in the middle of an argument
meant to justify the aptness of DST in expressing four criteria thought to be constitutive

sustained apt analogue from linear to nonlinear conceptions of time. As briefly mentioned in a previous
footnote, the philosophy of time has focused almost exclusively on linear ordinal or cardinal orderings.
There are scant attempts to conceive of time nonlinearly outside highly abstract mathematical domains.
In philosophy one may look to Henri Bergson’s Time and Free Will, Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology
of Internal Time Consciousness, Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and
Repetition, and Roland Barthes’ The Empire of Signs. Manuel De Landa draws upon all of these sources
the accounts of temporality he outlines in his 1997 A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History and 2002
Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy. My exposition of the cyclic model of time draws primarily
from a reading of Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy. My account of dilationary temporality is
influenced in large part by Deleuze’s discussion of Bergson in Bergsonism, and A Thousand Plateaus.
The intensive and meshwork concepts of temporality owe their inspiration to the conceptions of
temporality De Landa sketches in Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, and the “bricolagic”
temporality of A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, respectively.
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of personhood. This, in turn, is intended to justify the appropriateness of developing an
account of agency based on DST with the purpose of explaining the relationship between
agents as persons and social practices and institutions. We have already looked at how
DST handles the personhood criterion of agency and the associated concepts of
autonomy, choice, and action. Currently, I have just completed describing five (or so)
theories of temporality from a DST perspective—(1) the received linear
symmetric/asymmetric views, (2) the periodic/cyclic/semi-periodic attractor views, (3)
various versions of dilation, and (4) the intensive and (5) meshwork views. What remains
is to show how at least one of these views is adequate in capturing the contours of the
temporal criterion for personhood (the criterion that persons must exhibit the ability to
understand themselves as an entities that progress through time; or to plan and understand
their lives as narratives). This accomplished, I must then show how DST constructs the
concepts of moral responsibility and self-awareness—both thought to be conditions for
personhood. We will then be in a position to see how Dynamic Embodied Agents, as well
as social practices and institutions—each understood as dynamic systems—interact with
and relate to each other co-constitutively.
4.5

The Temporality Criterion for Personhood (Narrative Unity)

The temporality criterion for personhood is the supposition that in order to count
as a person something must be capable of grasping itself as a narrative unity. The term
“grasping” is used here intentionally to beg-off commitment to conceptual understanding
one’s self as a narrative unity, at least for the present. Here, “to grasp” doesn’t mean to
conceive, but rather to have a kind of perceptual awareness, in this case of one’s self as a
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being whose life takes on a narrative form. At its simplest narrative form, as it applies to
one’s life, is the temporal sense that one progresses through life starting from a
beginning, developing through the course of one’s life and ultimately culminating in
some meaningful way in one’s end 346. Necessary to the concept of narrative structure is
temporal boundedness: one is fundamentally bounded by one’s beginning and one’s end.
One is born, and one dies. Considered temporally, every narrative must have an origin
and a terminus which establishes a scaffolding of intelligibility onto which experiences
can be grafted. Further, narrative unity binds together a life into a singular whole; it
makes the progression from birth to death coherent and meaningful.
According to Charles Taylor, it is narrative unity that signifies the necessary (and
perhaps sufficient) condition for inclusion in personhood:
Agents are beings for whom things matter, who are subjects of significance.
This is what gives them a point of view on the world. But what distinguishes
persons from other agents is not strategic power, that is, the capacity to deal
with the same matter of concern more effectively. Once one focuses on the
significance of things for agents, then what springs to view is that persons
have qualitatively different concerns. . . The essence of evaluation no longer
consists in assessment in the light of fixed goals, but also and even more in the
sensitivity to certain standards, those involved in the peculiarly human goals. .
. openness to certain matters of significance [is] now what is essential to
personal agency. (Taylor 104-5, emphasis added)
What Taylor is concerned with here is what he takes to be the “peculiarly human”
capacity to have one’s life as a unity matter to one’s self. He thinks this capacity is sui
346

For just one example Jerome Bruner’s functionalist approach to narrativity views narrative as the ways
in which persons construct reality in order to make sense of their lives. This construction isn’t
independent, however, of social and cultural influences. Instead, narrative meanings are created and
shared by the members who co-participate in a society—that is, narrative meaningfulness is determined
socially. This relationship between social interaction and sense-making has a dual-effect: because
meaning is made socially through narrative construction, narrative construction is reinforced as thatthrough-which something can be signified as meaningful—counterpositively: if it isn’t expressed in a
way that is socially expressible as a narrative, it cannot signify meaningfully. Cf. Bruner, Jerome
(1991). “The Narrative Construction of Reality”. Critical Inquiry 18 (1): 1–21.
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generis as compared with other, lower level capacities for things (in general) to be in
some way significant to an agent. A person is distinct in his capability to care for, and
about, his life—how things stand with and are going for himself. Through this attitude of
caring, persons recognize and structure their lives around their finitude—their grasping
that they are temporally bounded; that they will die.
The notion of personhood that Taylor develops in “The Concept of a Person” is
modeled on Martin Heidegger’s concept “Dasein” 347. Heidegger calls this comporting of
one’s self to one’s finitude “Being-toward-death” (Sein-zum-Tode), and this attitude of
“being-toward-death” works to (re)cast the significance of current concerns by putting
them in the context of caring for one’s life as a whole—of wanting for one’s self for
things to come-together into an excellent life narrative. Qualitatively, this is enacted as a
“futural projection” of one’s self outside the present (ek-stasis); a temporal thrusting
ahead of one’s self into the future. For Heidegger, futural projection creates a tension or
struggle (polemos) between the way things are in the present (facticity, Faktizität) and
this ek-static futural projecting of Dasein out onto the wholeness of its life (including
one’s potential future). This struggle is expressed as existential angst, and as vacillation
between inauthentic immersion in occurent (ontic) concerns and an authentic
transcendent attention to what he takes to be the more significant (ontological) question
of the character and quality of one’s being in general (ousia) 348.
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I do not wish to delve too deeply into Heideggerian exegesis. For our purposes it is sufficient to
understand “Dasein” as “Das Dasein ist ein Seiendes, das nicht nur unter anderem Seienden vorkommt.
Es ist vielmehr dadurch ontisch ausgezeichnet, daß es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein um dieses Sein
selbst geht. “ (Sein und Zeit §4, p. 12) (“that entity which in its Beinghas this very Being as an issue”
(Being and Time, trans. Macquerrie & Robinson, p. 68).
348
Cf. Guignon, C. (2012). “Becoming a person: Hermeneutic phenomenology's contribution”, New Ideas

204

If there is anything that is clear about the Heideggerian notion of “futural
projection”, it is that it relies on a conception of temporality much different than the
“received”, linear understanding of time 349. The kind of care for and about the
significance of one’s life as a whole that interests Taylor (following Heidegger) must
instead derive from a nonlinear understanding of temporality. Dasein is a phenomenal
locus of experience with the specific capacity to make its own existence an issue for it—
that is, Dasein is defined by its ability to attend to its own self-caring. For Heidegger, the
temporal moment of the present (now) always contains within it both the past and the
future. Temporality structures, and is structured by Dasein’s caring—which encompasses
the totality of Dasein’s being (past, present, and future). Such distinctions as “past”,
“present”, and “future” are then secondary, or derivative as compared to the more
fundamental and holistic temporality of the care structure 350.
This Heideggerian notion of temporality operates by way of a dual mechanism
that simultaneously brings the past and future into the present while also projecting
Dasein out of the present onto its life as a whole 351. It is both immanent and transcendent:
immanent because Dasein is temporally contained or bounded by the finitude entailed
within the certainty of death; transcendent because Dasein, in its caring, extends out

in Psychology, Volume 30, Issue 1, Pages 97-106.
For instance, Heidegger writes: “Die Zeitigung bedeutet kein »Nacheinander« der Ekstasen. Die
Zukunft ist nicht später als die Gewesenheit und diese nicht früher als die Gegenwart. Zeitlichkeit
zeitigt sich als gewesendegegenwärtigende Zukunft. “ (Sein und Zeit, §68, p. 350) (“Temporalizing
does not signify that ecstases come in a ‘succession’. The future is not later than having been, and
having-been is not earlier than the Present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes
present in a process of having been. “ (Being and Time trans. Macquerrie & Robinson, §68, p. 401))
350
Ibid. Guignon C. (2012).
351
Here I am attempting to express Heideggerian temporality though the lens of the received linear view of
time. If Heidegger is taken seriously, this way of expressing things would be thought to be highly
misleading because it reverses the order of ontological primacy.
349
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beyond the bounds of the present. It seems apt to say that for both Heidegger and Taylor,
the meaningfulness or significance of one’s life emerges from one’s understanding and
owning up to one’s life as a whole, and is not reducible to understanding or owning any
component temporal part(s) in isolation.
Similarly, the meaning of a narrative can only be understood within the context of
having the whole narrative in view. One cannot assess the meaningfulness of either a
portion of a narrative or the narrative as a whole, or before that narrative is complete,
because meaning can only be assessed by reference to the narrative as a whole 352.
Narratives can have many structures. They can follow linear or nonlinear plots. They can
be arranged chronologically or non-chronologically. They can exemplify a theme, have a
moral, express truths, and they can reveal the absurd. Narratives resonate with and
become meaningful to us through our relating to or identifying with them in some
(usually analogical) way.
But it is this holistic element of a narrative—the idea of living one’s life as if it is
a story, of crafting one’s life as if one is the author of a narrative, of acting as if one were
the protagonist—it is this powerful analogy between finding meaning in one’s life and
meaning in a narrative that impresses and motivates thinkers like Charles Taylor,
Alasdair McIntyre, and others to suggest that living one’s life as a narrative provides the
basis for an ethical life. Usually such narrativists emphasize cohesion, unity, and
352

Viz. Sophocles Oedipus Rex l: μηδέ᾽ ὀλβίζɛίν, ρρὶν ἃν ṯέρμα ṯοῦ βίου ρɛράση μηδεν ἀλγɛίνὸν ραθὼν,
(“deem no man happy, until he passes the end of his life without suffering grief”); Ovid Metamorphoses
iii. 135: dicique beatus Ante obitum nemo‥debet, (“nobody should be called blessed before his
death”); Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I. 10: Τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν τελείαν
ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον;
(“he is happy who is active in accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with
external goods, not for some chance period but throughout a complete life”). Thanks to Alex Levine for
this observation.
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diachronic continuity in a narrative as “healthy” or positively valanced; while
fragmentation, incoherence, and discontinuity or episodicity are “unhealthy” narratives.
Often, these normative valuations are either implied or asserted as self-evident or their
opposites suggested as absurd, without critical reflection or justification. Some thinkers,
however (Galen Strawson in particular 353) offer critical assessment of these assumption,
and argue instead on behalf of lives not lived as narratives. According to narrativists,
however, such lives would not be the lives of persons. It is unclear how much of this
narrativist rejoinder is mere disqualification on terminological grounds and how much
turns on substantive philosophical dispute of the concepts involved.
Here we can see that “narrative” explicitly depends on a discursive and
conceptual organization of a story. That is, stories are the kinds of things that can be
told—stories are expressed linguistically, or minimally, if expressed non-linguistically as,
say, through interpretive dance, the meaning or significance of a story derives from the
audience members’ translation or interpretation of the dancers’ movements into
meaningful discursive or conceptual content 354. Thus, narrative ability requires that an
agent be capable of conceptual representation or discursivity355. So the narrativist
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Cf. e. g. : Strawson, G. “Against Narrativity” (2004) Ratio 17, pp. 428–52. ; and Strawson, G. (2009)
Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. Oxford University Press, London.
354
That meaning is interpreter-relative is not a feature exclusive to non-discursive expressions. Here I mean
to suggest that all meaning is interpreter-relative. In the case of self-conceptions, one is one’s own
interpreter; so the ability to interpret discursively must be possessed by the expresser (who is also the
interpreter); even in cases of non-discursive self-expression (e.g. gesturing to one’s self); because qua
interpreter such expressions gain meaningful representational purchase discursively. This, however does
not mean that interpreters must be indexed to individual humans (or brains) – it would do better to talk
of interpretive systems, like DEAs.
355
Once again, Brandom’s inferentialism is a good touchstone. According to Brandom, discursivity is
required for meaningful expression. Not everything needs to be actually spelled out discursively—there
needn’t be explicit representational propositional tokens—rather the discursivity that undergirds
expressibility must at least be implicit in a way that can be procedurally (or inferentially) made explicit.
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conception of personhood that requires self-reflection by conceiving one’s life as a whole
is necessarily representational 356; while non-narrativist conceptions of personhood do not
necessitate representation in the same way (though often still require representation for
other reasons). 357
At any rate, for both Taylor and Heidegger, a crucial aspect of personhood (or
Dasein) is an attitude or comportment of openness (ἀλήθεια (aletheia), Unverborgenheit,
Erschlossenheit variously rendered as “unconcealment” and “disclosedness”) to one’s
personal narrative possibilities. This openness to the world is usually understood as a
self-transcendent reliance on a holistic “background” of intelligibility or meaningfulness
encountered through one’s mundane and practical involvement in their everyday
activities. Mapping this onto the conceptual vocabulary of Dynamic Systems Theory, we
might say that a person (or Dasein) is necessarily an open system. Recall that open
systems constitutively depend on their openness as a condition for their systemic
identities; open systems are defined through their differential sensitivities to constraints
and affordances made available for practical involvement by their local environments.
356

Or minimally, representable. The general point is just that there is no non-discursive concept of
narrativity.
357
The much-debated problem of the relationship between “derived” or “non-derived” content and
intentionality are relevant here; however I would like to table discussion of this issue until a more
detailed picture of self-recognition emerges. For now, it is sufficient to note that the necessity of others
in the intersubjective interactions that condition one’s self-concept seems to support a view of derived
intentionality; while the novel embodied interactions of particular agents in their specific local
environments seems to support a view non-derived or ‘original’ intentionality. I wish to hold that
intentionality and content do transcend the bounds of self (though this may already be implied by the
problematization of self-boundaries found in embodied and extended accounts of cognition). Just as
functions are functions in virtue of their roles within the wider systemic whole, content and
intentionality are meaningful in virtue of the wider (embodied/extended) circumstances in which they
mean. On the other hand, such meaning is always immanent or indexed to and cannot transcend such
novel and particular agent-oriented circumstances. Open and far-from-equilibrium systems are
meaningfully influenced by external factors; but such influence should not be mistaken for transmission
or sharing of meaning between epistemic perspectives. Interaction and influence are neither sharing nor
transmission.
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Insofar as personhood requires narrative unity, we can also say that persons must
possess the ability to self-reflect (cf. the taxonomic class of “self-reflection” in Richard
Campbell’s process-based model for an interactive ontology), which is a characteristic set
of interrelated recursive and reflexive relations that system can exhibit. Further, as long
as persons must constitutively continually be open to their life-possibilities, this makes
them far-from-equilibrium—as equilibrium entails a closing-off of future possibilities (or
a concealment of one’s ownmost potential for being). Being-toward-death means being
far-from-equilibrium 358.
With the idea of aletheia (openness or unconcealment) in conjunction with an
understanding of one’s life as a narrative unity, we can also get a better sense of the kind
of nonlinear temporality that Taylor and Heidegger have in mind. As a narrative unity,
one’s life shouldn’t be seen as a haphazard meshwork or hodgepodge of temporal
timescales and influences. A life lived as an effort to complete a narrative in a unified
way does not chaotically reverse temporal directions—at least not if one is successful at
living “authentically”. On the other hand, Heidegger certainly realizes that Dasein
continually “falls back” into the inauthentic preoccupation by (ontic) concerns. In this
sense, Dasein can be understood as alternating (perhaps chaotically) between authentic
and inauthentic temporal modes. But what is crucial is that when Dasein falls back into
358

For an open dynamic system equilibrium is death – it is the system ceasing to differentially respond to
environmental factors, a closing-off or systemic isolation. Dynamic embodied agency can then be
literally understood as definitive of life; as a requirement for being alive. On the other hand, the
relationship is asymmetrical. I say that being-toward-death means being far-from-equilibrium, but the
converse is not true; being far-from-equilibrium does not necessarily mean being-toward-death. Many
systems are far from equilibrium (e.g. a paramecium) but cannot or do not comport themselves in a
manner that is being-toward-death. In order to comport oneself in any way, one must be capable of
grasping and taking a stand on one’s self; one must perceive one’s self as a self. Thus, in order to betoward-death, a system must also minimally satisfy the conditions of recursive self-maintenance (care)
and self-reflection.
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this inauthentic mode of being—Dasein ceases to express that which constitutes Dasein
qua Dasein—namely care for its own being, as a whole; allowing its Being to be an issue
for it. By not comporting one’s self to one’s narrative unity, one ceases to fully be a
person, according to narrativists like Charles Taylor. Perhaps when we’re talking about
the kinds of agents that humans are, we mean the kind of thing that can (or does) move
between fully being persons and failing to live up to that potential. If so, perhaps the
intensity model of temporality may be appropriate after all.
However, it seems that the most appropriate model of nonlinear temporality for
capturing the kind of temporality that narrativists like Taylor, McIntyre, and Heidegger
have in mind is either “dilationary time” or a well-organized (rather than haphazard)
thematically-attuned meshwork temporality. Unfortunately an adequate critical treatment
of the comparisons between Heidegger’s temporality and these two temporal models
would require substantially much more space than is available here. Instead as a proof of
concept I will sketch a model that bridges the language of Dynamic Systems Theory,
dilationary time, and narrativity. It should be clear by now that, as an approach based in
process metaphysics, every aspect of a dynamic system is fundamentally temporal. Each
component or relation involved in a dynamic system is a process; and all processes
operate diachronically (in, or through, time).
The complexly interrelating processes involved in most biological systems—
metabolic pathways, homeostatic functions, motility operations, etc. —occur on varying
and different timescales. These processes, and the timescales on which they carry out
their functions, are sensitive to and in many cases dependent on other processes and their
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correlating timescales for their functioning. This means that, in open, far-fromequilibrium systems such as biological organisms both the (identities of the) processes
and the timescales on which those processes occur are in continual flux. This fits well
with the meshwork conception of temporality, and indeed on some accounts of agency
this conception is likely the most appropriate. However, for describing systems that
exemplify narrative unity, a dilationary model of time (which can be thought of as
consistent with, or a special case of meshwork temporality) may be more appropriate
because of its ability to depict both the provisionality and complex interrelations of
processes with varying and different timescales for occurrent processes as well as the
non-totalizing, open unity that defines narrativity.
A dilationary temporal model expresses the unity of the processes occurring on
varying and different timescales in a narratively unified system. It does this by giving an
ever-dilating present horizon that expresses the multiple changing timescales of different
processes and events significant to the identity of the narratively-structured system. It
also provides an orientation (viz. dilation is a dynamic process of outward expansion, so
there is the bidirectional orientation of “inward” and “outward”) that expresses the
general movement from past to future without enforcing a uniformity in that motion. By
expressing the present as a dilating boundary or horizon, the dilationary model also
captures the provisionality of interpretations of past significances, and accommodates the
revision of the significance past occurrences to come into alignment with the unity of the
narrative. The shape and character of the inwardly-oriented past is continually
reinterpreted by the shape and character of the ever-expanding present. Future prospects
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are likewise continually reinterpreted in a dynamic process of temporal attunement. One
can also understand the acts or moments of interpretation as themselves processes that
influence the processes and significances of events, and help shape them into a unified
narrative.
One can also use the dilationary model of time to express or explain the
differences between systems that are unified narratives and those that are not; as well as
the differences between systems that strive for narrative unity versus those that do not 359.
A system organized as having a unified narrative formulates some end that functions as a
temporal terminus for that system. Since most narrative systems do not have an exact
model of what their particular ends are 360, most systems capable of narrativity are instead
characterized by their striving toward abstract ends (rather than their attainment of
narrative unity361). This striving is expressed in the dilationary model of temporality as a
linearization362of many of the processes that factor into whatever is sought as the end for
that system. Processes that the system takes to be relevant to its ends are aligned with or
359

The former distinction (whether a system is narratively unified or not) is a descriptive difference
between the qualities and capabilities of a system. The latter distinction (whether a system strives for
narrative unity or not) is a prescriptive difference between the kinds of activities in which such systems
engage. It should be noted that only systems capable of narrative unity can strive (or not) for narrative
unity; though striving for narrative unity also suggests that the system is hitherto not yet narratively
unified.
360
Viz. most systems aren’t capable of predicting particular futures—if systems predict, their predictive
success tends to be general or abstract—predicting that it will rain tomorrow is comparatively more
general than predicting the particular motions of the molecules of atmospheric water tomorrow. If
physical phenomena are genuinely chaotic, then the sensitive dependence on exact conditions should in
principle bar such predictability. This in turn would rule out the possibility of genuinely narratively
unified systems in the descriptive sense (see previous footnote). All narrative systems, are then systems
that strive for narrative unity.
361
The fact that such narrative ends are abstract, and not concrete is significant. Far-from-equilibrium,
open, sensitively dependent, dynamically-coupled systems cannot possibly narratively entertain their
concrete ends. However, abstract ends do not map to particular concrete conditions (they map to
general abstract conditions), so one could imagine a set of possible concrete outcomes, the attaining of
any one of which would satisfy the abstract conditions of meeting one’s ends.
362
An extrapolation—a “futural projection”.
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attuned to the more general process of attaining that end—so as to facilitate and reinforce
the attainment of it 363. Of course, the formulation of this end itself may be sensitive to the
effects of environmental influence, and become subject to alteration. When this happens,
the qualitative effect is that the unifying end that such a system previously took to be
formative of its narrative identity is altered and the system must as a result either redefine
its narrative identity, or abandon narrative unification altogether. The identities of
systems that strive for narrative unity are defined by their ends—but as dynamic systems
whose ends are provisionally stipulated, updated, and altered; the dynamic nature of the
identity of projected ends entails that the narrative identity of such systems must also be
dynamic.

Figure 3: Graphical representation of dilationary model depicting the
linearization or attunement of processes toward attaining an end.

An example will help elucidate. Suppose a narrative system had established as its
end to achieve notoriety as an architect. As a narratively unified system, it would
organize and align its other processes so as to facilitate achieving notoriety as an

363

This also undergirds the normativity of action: an action can be considered good or correct or better if it
contributes to or facilitates the attainment of posited ends; bad or incorrect or worse otherwise.
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architect. This may include taking up projects that develop the bodily skills required for
notorious architecting, following a narrative path socially accepted as the way to become
a notorious architect including going to school for architecture, seeking the advice of
expert architects, etc.. Altogether, this narrative system is organized such that its
formulation of this end functions as a guiding norm (either directly or indirectly) for the
rest of the system’s processes. Perhaps the projects taken to facilitate this guiding norm
are frustrated to the extent that the system is no longer capable of unifying a narrative
around achieving notoriety as an architect. The system has a couple of general options: it
can replace its formative narrative end with something else, say becoming a skilled
carpenter; it can continue striving “against all odds” at achieving notoriety as an architect,
even though it doesn’t seem like a possible option anymore; or it can abandon striving to
fulfill any narrative end whatsoever. If it does the latter, it ceases being a narrative system
(at least by its own lights) and becomes a non-narrative system 364. If it continues despite
the impossibility of attaining its end, one might call it a deluded narrative system, or a
broken or malfunctioning narrative system. If it changes its end, it is no longer the
narrative system it was—its identity has fundamentally changed, but it remains a moreor-less functional narrative system (of some or another sort). Its previous attempts at
attaining notoriety as an architect are now re-cast in a new light—taken now as
contributing in some meaningful way toward this new narrative; perhaps as an
364

Whether a system is narrative may be interpreter-relative; that is, one may judge of another that she
sufficiently satisfies the strictures of a life lived narratively, while the other doesn’t perceive, plan, or
construct herself in such narrative manner. Does this make her a narrative, or non-narrative system? I
see no reason why such an assessment cannot remain indexed to the perspective of the interpreter. To
herself, she appears as non-narrative; to the second- or third-person observer she appears as narrative.
There is no need to hypothesize an interpreter- or observer-neutral “fact of the matter”. Naturally, on the
dilationary temporal model these assessments as to whether one lives a life narratively or not are
provisional and updatable on retrospective reflection for first, second, and third personal accounts.
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explanation for how the system was able to come to discover its (current) narrative
identity as a skilled carpenter. That is, by taking up a new narrative identity, or by
discarding narrativity entirely, the significances of past occurrences become re-signified.
However, this process of re-signification also occurs when the narrative identity is
thought not to change 365. Thus, the narrative identity, on the dilationary model, requires a
concept of identity that derives from a dynamic process of differentiation instead of
stasis. This should not come as a surprise, however, as DST already depends on a process
rather than substance metaphysics.
So, as time dilation continues, both the shape of the future (what is yet-outside the
broadening boundary of the present)—how the future shows up for, and meaningfully
factors into, the system’s occurrent processes—and the shape of the past (what is inside
the broadening boundary of the present) and its significance(s) for the system’s occurrent
processing, are continually altered and re-signified with respect to the developing
narrative system. This allows us to see dynamic narrative systems 366 as temporally open
with respect to both past and future; which means that both can influence present or
occurrent decisions, representations, interpretations, etc. while the system navigates its
present local environment. Thus, narrative systems should be understood as open, far365

It is important to note here that when a narrative identity is thought not to change, it doesn't mean that it
isn't changing. There is a reciprocal relationship between a unifying narrative identity in its role as a
guiding norm and the concrete processes which are taken to facilitate the attainment of the end(s) that
define that norm. So, for example, as the system strives to become an architect of note, its formulation
of what an architect of note is continually changes and is changed by the experiences thought to
facilitate the system's becoming an architect of note. The identity of the narrative system is always in
flux, but is still continuously regarded as having “the same” end (viz. “notoriety as an architect”). Thus
narrative identities, when understood on the dilationary model of temporality, are constituted
dynamically by their difference and change, rather than by their sameness and persistence. For a
sustained discussion of a difference-based concept of identity, see the introduction in Gilles Deleuze's
Difference and Repetition.
366
Systems dynamically striving for narrative unity.
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from-equilibrium, and nonlinear with respect to both spatial and temporal dimensions;
and the dilationary model of time adequately captures all of these aspects. Further, these
features fulfill the temporal requirements for personhood posed by narrativists 367.
4.6

Self-Awareness (Self-Reflection, Representation, Social Ability)

One of the more difficult to pin-down conditions often thought to be at least
necessary if not sufficient for personhood is the criterion that persons must be either selfaware or minimally capable of self-awareness. This produces five possibilities of
progressive strength. One may be synchronically self-aware, or capable of synchronic
self-awareness. One may be diachronically self-aware, or diachronically capable of selfawareness. The strongest requirement is that in order to count as a person one must be
both synchronically and diachronically self-aware. This means that a person would need
to both be self-aware (here and now), and continuously maintain that self-awareness over
time. If the candidate strongly-self-aware person comes and goes; if there is any
discontinuity in self-awareness; the candidate would not be considered a person on this
strongest requirement. Less stringent are requirements for only one of synchronic or
diachronic self-awareness 368. Weaker still are requirements that one be merely capable of
either diachronic or synchronic self-awareness; and the weakest personhood constraint is
that one be merely capable of synchronic self awareness 369. However, there are different

367

I do not mean to suggest here that the dilationary model of temporality is unique in its ability to satisfy
these constraints; in fact I would like to suggest (without protracted argument) that a careful
formulation of the meshwork model should also be able to satisfy them as well.
368
Though it would seem that to require diachronic continuity in self-awareness would itself entail
synchronic self-awareness. The requirement of only synchronic self awareness doesn’t care whether one
has been self-aware in the past, or will be in the future; it is concerned only with here and now.
369
See Fig. 4, below.
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understandings of what awareness and self-awareness, themselves, are. For instance, we
may ask whether attentive, thematic focus is required for self-awareness 370. If so, then it
can be argued that perhaps many humans—on the stronger self-awareness requirement—
often fail to count as persons, because they often are not attentively or thematically
focusing on their selves or their awareness of their selves.
Diachronic

Synchronic

is

x

(x)

is capable

(x)
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Figure 4: Chart of possible self-awareness requirements for counting as a person.
(Parentheses indicate the requirement is logically entailed by another requirement)

The weaker requirements that take self-awareness as merely sufficient condition
for personhood would not, on the other hand, rule out a candidate for personhood merely
on the basis that it isn’t currently (synchronically) self-aware. This weaker requirement
only holds that a candidate must be capable of, or have the capacity for, self-awareness in
order to count as a person 371. In this sense, most socialized, adult humans meet the
weaker requirement for personhood—even when they aren’t thematically attending to
their self-awareness. You’ll notice, however that I still qualified the candidate persons by
370
371

Daniel Dennett is well-known for advocating this view.
As with the stronger version, one can formulate synchronic and diachronic versions of the weaker
requirement. The synchronic version holds that, at some time one possesses the capability or disposition
for self-awareness, even if one isn’t expressly exhibiting it. Such a formulation, of course, encounters
difficult hurdles when it comes to epistemic verification. The diachronic version holds that one has in
the past, or may in the future expressly exhibit self-awareness. The latter is what I have in mind for the
above.
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saying that they are both socialized and adult. Many theorists 372 believe there is an
intimate, perhaps even constitutive, connection between the processes of socialization
and the development of one’s capacity for self-awareness. Most newborns are often
thought not to be self-aware, while most adults are 373. Thus self-awareness is not an
innate capacity, but rather something constructed or learned—either as a matter of
biological or social development (or both) 374.
Additionally there is a strong thread in Continental phenomenological thought 375
which takes as formative the processes of socialization, and the recognition of one’s self
as primarily belonging to or with others; of grasping first the personhood of others before
one is capable of grasping one’s self as a person; and of understanding personhood as
dependent on concrete experiences and encounters with particular others—all of which

372

Especially the phenomenologists listed in the first four footnotes in this chapter.
There is some dispute on this issue. Gallagher & Meltzoff (1996) have argued that neonates display a
rudimentary form of “body image” which is a form of self-awareness. Others such as Susan Jones
(1996), Georgy Gergley (1995, 2004), Anisfeld, Turkewitz, & Rose (2001), Victoria McGreer (2001)
have argued in various ways against this claim. See Walsh, Talia (2006): “Do Neonates Display Innate
Self-Awareness? Why Neonatal Imitation Fails to Provide Sufficient Grounds for Innate Self- and
Other-Awareness”, Philosophical Psychology, 19:2, 221-238.
374
It may still turn out that some rudimentary forms of self-awareness are innate, but there are strong
reasons to believe that such self-awareness is not of the narrative variety—if for no other reason than
that we have strong evidence that newborns must learn language. Alternatively, based on an inference
about poverty of stimulus and the systematic complexities of natural language, Noam Chomsky has
argued (1965) for the existence of an innate “Language Acquisition Device” (LAD) that provides
neonates with the genetic capacity for language-use. If this is so, it is at least possible that the capacity
for narrativity is likewise innate. Chomsky has since abandoned his LAD theory in favor of a more
robust (though arguably ad hoc) theory of Universal Grammar which suggests that linguistic grammar is
generative rather than genetic. Similarly Jerry Fodor has offered his “Language of Thought” hypothesis
(LoT, or LOTH) suggesting that all cognition traffics in symbolic representations that are manipulated
in accordance with general language-like rules (1983). While there is no widespread agreement as to
whether representational thought is innate or if it manifests later through childhood development, the
LOTH is often taken to lend support for nativist arguments.
375
Owing especially to works of Edmund Husserl (Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge,
1973 [1931]), Max Scheler (Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, 1973 [1912]), Edith Stein (Zum
Problem der Einfühlung, 1989 [1916]), Martin Heidegger (Sein und Zeit, 2008 [1927]), Maurice
Merleau-Ponty (Phénoménologie de la Perception, 1945), Emmanuel Lévinas (Le Temps et L’Autre,
1979), andJean-Paul Sartre (L’Étre et le Néant, 1976 [1943]).
373
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requires social interaction and entails that such capacities cannot be strictly innate.
Further, there has been much debate about what precisely constitutes selfawareness. In particular, there is lively discussion as to whether self-awareness requires
only “primary” or “first-order” consciousness (consciousness of the current situation in
one’s local environment, current emotional state, etc. ), or whether it requires
“secondary” or “higher-order” consciousness (consciousness that one is conscious, or
consciousness of one’s consciousness, awareness of one’s emotional state) 376. The
general issue is a question as to whether self-awareness must be thought of as recursively
defined. Some theorists 377 combine secondary consciousness with narrativity, suggesting
that the ability to conceive of one’s current situation, or one’s life as a whole, in terms of
a narrative which incorporates (minimally) one’s past experiences and emotions or
biographical history, is precisely what it means to be self-aware.
Others have related self-awareness to the cognate concept of self-recognition.
These “recognition theorists” draw mainly on the Frankfurt School interpretations of the
“dialectic” philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel. The basis for “recognition theory” is in
explaining how personal and social understandings of personhood or selfhood are
developed historically (and dialectically) through intersubjective and social processes of
recognition and misrecognition 378. When one experiences another as sufficiently similar

376

This distinction may be traced to Kant's differentiation between transcendental and empirical modes of
apperception. Cf. also Bickhard, M (1993).
377
Notably Daniel Dennett’s “Multiple Drafts Model” (Consciousness Explained, 1991, and “The Self as
the Center of Narrative Gravity”, 1992). His account takes the self to be a “center of narrative gravity”
which is a sort of epiphenomenon that results from the generally serial construction and reconstruction
of narratives that make sense of occurrent events. For Dennett, self-awareness is just one’s sense of that
center of narrative gravity—which itself is just an abstract (or epiphenomenal) relation borne of
particular moments of experience.
378
Cf. e. g. Honneth, Axel. (1996) The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts.
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or dissimilar, the “phenomenal feel” is characteristic of that similarity or dissimilarity,
and one’s understanding of one’s self, by relation to the perceived similarity or
dissimilarity of the other, is affected. Similarity and dissimilarity are a difference of
degree, as are recognition and misrecognition.
At the extremes one may misrecognize someone as absolutely dissimilar to one’s
self—this has the effect of “Othering” the other 379—of experiencing the other as entirely
foreign or alien. As a misrecognition, this means that one’s phenomenal experience of the
other is mistaken; one experiences the other as alien even though the other is more
similar to one’s self than one perceives. One may also misrecognize another as very
similar. This results in taking another to be quite similar when really the other is quite
different from one’s self. Alternatively, one may recognize others as either similar or
dissimilar. When another is recognized as dissimilar it is still a manner of “Othering” the
other. According to the “recognition theorists” everything that is meaningful to a person’s
self-understanding is informed by this dialectic social dynamic of recognition,
misrecognition, taking as similar, and Othering; and it is this dynamic that defines
personhood. Persons are the kinds of things that are defined and shaped by their being
caught-up in recognizer-recognizee relationships with others 380. One important
consequence of “recognition theory” is that it construes the definition of personhood as

Polity Press. ; and Honneth, Axel. (2007) Reification: A Recognition-Theoretical View. Oxford
University Press.
379
In the sense of the “constitutive other”—taking one to be radically different from and utterly alien to
one’s self. “Othering” is a process of differentiation, of abstracting differences rather than similarities,
of constructing something as categorically different or entirely alien. Canonical discussions of
“Othering” are found in Levinas, Emmanuel (1974). Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence. ; and
Said, Edward W. (1978) Orientalism.
380
Cf. Taylor, Charles. (1994) “The Politics of Recognition”. Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of
Recognition. Ed. Amy Gutmann. Princeton University Press. pp. 25-73.
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indexed to the dynamic processes that define our concrete relationships with others.
Further, the Hegelian spirit of this scholarship suggests that such dynamics work at
higher levels of abstraction—e. g. at the level social group interactions, or in wider
cultural dynamics 381.
More generally the idea of self-recognition involves developing a sense of self
and coming to acknowledge that self as in some way being characteristically owned, in
contradistinction to what is understood as either unowned or owned by another 382. One
comes to a recognition of one’s self by first recognizing others as persons, then
redirecting that recognition toward that which can be recognized by others 383. This is
made possible by coming to understand the bidirectional relationship between recognizer
and recognizee—that persons occupy the dual roles of recognizing others and being
recognized by others. Once one understands that they can be recognized by others, they
can simulate putting themselves in the position of the other and use their capabilities as a
recognizer on themselves, as simultaneously recognizer and recognizee. This is the
recursive and reciprocal process of self-recognition 384. One becomes a person through
realizing this self-recognition. Importantly, to realize such a self-recognition requires

381

For a slightly different approach that reaches remarkably similar conclusions see the preface to MerleauPonty’s Phenomenology of Perception.
382
Taylor writes: “Being true to myself means being true to my own originality, which is something only I
can articulate and discover. In articulating it, I am also defining myself” (Ibid. p. 31)
383
Cf. e.g. Gopnick, A. (1993) “How we think about our minds: the illusion of first-person intentionality,”
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16:1
384
This “dialectical” process is expressed in G. W. F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit—in particular the
section commonly referred to as the “Master-Slave Dialectic”. In this section Hegel shows how being
“Othered” (being taken as an inferior and alien other by someone else) results in self-recognition, while
failure to do so results in failure to self-recognize. In the Master-Slave Dialectic the slave is “Othered”
by the master, and comes to recognize himself while the Master—not having been “Othered” doesn’t.
Ultimately the slave—having achieved self-recognition—is capable of continued development while the
master is ‘left behind’ as obsolete.
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understanding one’s self as a self defined by and existing amidst others selves alike in
kind 385. The basic difference between one’s awareness or recognition of their self and
one’s awareness or recognition of others is the phenomenal feel of ownership.
However, one must take care in clearly describing the phenomenal feeling of
ownership. One concept of ownership is that of possession. On this concept of ownership
one has, or is laden with, one’s self. Possession as ownership is not a matter of identity—
of being one’s self—rather it is a distancing from that identity. The idea of possession
both draws objects in to be included as owned, while simultaneously excluding what is
owned as object rather than subject—as other rather than self. The possessed self is a
detached self; one who owns by distancing and objectifying the self. An alternative
concept of ownership is that of identity, or what Heidegger refers to with his use of the
word “Eigenste” (often translated as being one’s “ownmost”). Ownership as identity is a
matter of being one’s self. As identity, there can be no distancing between what is owned
and what one is. Thus, on this concept of ownership the self just is (nothing but) whatever

385

It is extremely important here to understand that I have been using terms like “recognize” and
“understand” in a more colloquial rather than technical sense here. Others, particularly those in the
Pittsburgh School, like Brandom, take the terms and related concepts of recognition and understanding
to be fundamentally discursive (so conceptual and representational). I do not mean to imply such things,
however. The way I use words like “recognize” and “understand” here are less specific and include the
kinds of non-discursive embodied self-perception that Merleau-Ponty describes in a passage on pages
93-95 in Phenomenology of Perception, then later in the final chapter of The Visible and the Invisible
with his notion of “chiasm”. Chiasmatic self-recognition is the ability to discover one's self as the kind
of thing that both perceives and is perceived by and through using one's body to simultaneously sense
and be sensed. His most well-known example includes touching one's left hand with one's right hand,
and shifting from one aspect (right hand as touching, left as being touched, or vice versa) to the other—
and dwelling in the ambiguity of the sensation. Much like [discursive] recognition of others functions
dialectically for Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre in the development of self-recognition, so too for
Merleau-Ponty does this “chiasmatic” experience work to develop a non-discursive but bodilyperceptual sense of self-perception. The way I use the term, both discursive (representational) and nondiscursive (embodied sensory-perceptual) experiences are forms of recognition.
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is phenomenally felt as owned 386. These two concepts of ownership can be seen in
different attitudes toward embodiment. Understood as a possession, one has a body and
this body is both owned by and distanced from the self. Understood as identity, one just is
this body (so there can be no distance from the self). The former follows a generally
Cartesian conception of self, while the latter expresses an alternative to Cartesianism 387.
Self-awareness in terms of self-recognition is conceptual, discursive, and
thematic 388. In order to recognize anything as something, one needs to draw upon the
resources of representation. Thus to recognize one’s self as being owned is to represent
one’s self to one’s self. One may then ask whether there is any distance between this
representation of one’s self and one’s self; or if one’s ownmost self just is this
representation—in which case the formulation of self is not so much a representation, but
rather a presentation of self. However, as a conceptual, discursive, and thematic
presentation, the self that is presented must be presented representationally—through the
thematic use of language (or some representational language-like “Mentalese” 389). If this

386

Nietzsche expresses this pointedly in Ecce Homo where he, citing Pindar, implores: “Werde der du bist”
(“Be [become] who you are”).
387
Mark Rowlands explores these differences at length in his 2010 The New Science of the Mind: From
Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology.
388
These three, in addition to “representational”, comprise a cluster of related terms such that each depends
on and entails the others. Altogether, they belong to a general view about the structural and functional
composition of the mind variously called “Cognitivism”, “Classical Cognition”, “Computationalism”,
or more generally “Representationalism”. This approach takes cognition as fundamentally the
nomological manipulation of discrete, representative, symbol tokens. On this picture, “concepts” are
such tokens. The rules for the manipulations that can be performed on these tokens are generally
thought to be language-like with the basic unit of semantic cognitive meaningfulness being the
propositional sentence—this is what is meant by “discursivity” and what is referred to in discussions of
“conceptual content” (by comparison “non-conceptual content” is then the idea that there is something
meaningful but is not expressible in propositional or discursive form). To say an experience is
“thematic” is to say it can be expressed narratively—and as mentioned in a previous footnote, narrative
expressibility depends on discursivity.
389
“Mentalese” is one of the common names for the domain-general mental language that Jerry Fodor
posited with his “Language of Thought” hypothesis.
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is so, then selves are thoroughly discursive—there can be no “non-conceptual content”.
If, on the other hand, there is distance between the representation of one’s self and
one’s (ownmost) self—there is something more to one’s self than what one can express
representationally—then this opens up a space in which one’s self may outstrip
discursivity, and we can then ask in what does such a (non-discursive, non-conceptual,
non-thematic) self consist? What am I (qua self), over and above however I can represent
myself to myself? One avenue may be to acknowledge that self-recognition is
fundamentally social—in my ownmost I may be that which I am taken to be by others—
that which I am recognized by others as. Interestingly, here one’s ownmost self is still
representational, but in a way that is somehow inaccessable to the subject for whom that
self is owned (but accessable to others).
However, there may also be more to self-awareness than self-recognition. Selfrecognition may be necessary but insufficient for self-awareness. Whatever else may be
involved with self-awareness, we can ask of it whether it is representational (conceptual,
discursive, or thematic). So far I have not said much about how sensation, perception, or
emotion relate to self-awareness. If there is more to self-awareness than recognition (by
one’s self, or others) these seem like appropriate areas of phenomenal experience to
query.
Sensation and perception go hand-in-hand. At their most general, senses are
physiological mechanisms that provide perceptual “data” about the local environment to
an organism. There are many ways of sensing. Paramecia sense sugar gradients using
apparatus sensitive to specific classes of chemicals in the surroundings. Homing pigeons,
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it is now thought, are sensitive to fluctuations in the Earth’s magnetic field, and relate
those fluctuations to smells (chemical sensitivity) in order to establish unique location
signatures. Humans possess the familiar “five senses” (sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch),
as well as the less familiar senses of equilibroception (sense of equilibrium or balance
and acceleration), thermoception (sensitivity to heat and cold), proprioception (relative
sense of one’s body in space), kinesthesia (how that body relates to the space surrounding
it through movement), nociception (sensitivity to pain, or nerve and tissue damage), and
chronoception (sensitivity to the quality of the passage of time 390). All these senses detect
aspects of the external local environment in a way that can be perceived by the human
organism. In addition to these there are regulatory and homeostatic senses internal to the
organism such as various muscular stretch and chemoreceptors that provide intrasystemic information to the perceiving organism.
However, one may reasonably wonder how important is the inside/outside
distinction in organismal sensation. Each sense modality has its own perceptual
significance for the organism. Each sense contributes a sui generis component to the
overall sensory-perceptual apparatus and as such we might do well to distinguish equally
between the multiplicity of sense modalities rather than categorize them into two
conceptual groupings in accordance with a familiar Cartesian scheme. On the other hand,
the grouping of sense modalities as “inside” and “outside” may itself be the product of
proprioceptive and kinesthetic processes for which such a distinction may be
significant—the fact that a sense modality operates inside or outside may matter
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proprioceptively, whether or not it matters conceptually.
Perception is generally understood as the processes through which information
from the various sense modalities functioning for an organism become identified and
interpreted: the processes by which sensory experience comes to bear significance for the
organism. There have been many theories of perception attempting to explain and
describe the mechanisms by which perception occurs (often in humans), as well as how
perceptual content comes to bear semantic or conceptual content. The differences in these
theories shape and constrain the basic phenomenal qualities and character of experiences
possible for the organisms to which they pertain. Indeed, how one understands perception
bears directly on the resources available for understanding agency and thus personhood.
Unfortunately, this chapter cannot sustain a prolonged discussion of the relative
differences between theories of perception and how these differences affect theories of
mind, cognition, action, and personhood 391.
Self-awareness can be understood as perceiving one’s self as a self, or as a person.
Here, epistemic constraints shape dialogue on the subject. One may ask for the conditions
or criteria that must obtain in order for one’s perceptual processes to count as genuinely
self-aware. We may ask “what is it like for one to have perceptual self-awareness?”. I
suspect, however, that because of phenomenological limitations, specifically that one
cannot experience another’s phenomenological experiences, this question quickly
becomes incoherent. The phenomenological character of self-awareness must necessarily
be immanent to the phenomenological being for which the question of self-awareness is

391

For a more comprehensive treatment of this topic, see Shaun Gallagher’s 2005 How the Body Shapes the
Mind .

226

an issue. One cannot meaningfully ask what it is like for one (in general) to have
perceptual self-awareness—rather, one can only meaningfully ask what it is like for me
(in particular) to have perceptual self-awareness. It is possible that for different subjects,
what it means to have perceptual self-awareness is phenomenally different. However
even such speculation runs up against the same epistemic limitations that quash the above
question. If one is in search of general criteria the best one can hope for is intersubjective
assent about the conditions of perceptual self-awareness; and this requires concrete,
dynamic, embodied interaction between specific agents with unique epistemic
perspectives. However, it also isn’t clear that such general criteria would help elucidate
anything about particular instances of perceptual self-awareness. And what else could
self-awareness be apart from particular concrete instances of self-awareness? The
problem here is a fundamental disconnect in applicability between general musings about
conditions common to all and only those entities thought to be self-aware (of which there
is no common assent), and the particular concrete epistemic conditions that constitute
instances of self-awareness (which may be token-sui generis).
Narratively speaking, we could make a similar point by saying that the character
of self-awareness may be synchronically and diachronically episodic. Synchronic
episodicity is the idea that experiences occurring at the same time are distinct from one
another. So, for instance, your current experiences are distinct from my current
experiences 392. As it pertains to defining perceptual self-awareness, synchronic
episodicity means that at any given time different loci of perception may have different
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definitions or phenomenal feelings of perceptual self-awareness—that you and I may
have different phenomenal experiences of what self-awareness “is like”. Diachronic
episodicity is the idea that for some temporal entity moments signify differently across
time 393. So, for instance, the significance of an event (say writing a dissertation) may
mean something different now than it did in the past, or something different in the future
than it does now; and there may be thematic discontinuity in these significances across
time. As it pertains to defining perceptual self-awareness, diachronic episodicity means
that for some temporal perceptual entity, what it means to be self-aware, or the
phenomenal feeling of self-awareness may change or be different for that perceiving
entity at different moments across time.
The narrativity thesis required by some theorists as necessary (or sufficient) for
personhood can come in stronger and weaker versions. The weaker version requires only
diachronic narrative unity (as opposed to episodicity), but does not demand synchronic
narrative unity. This weaker position argues for strongly individualist narrative identity as
a requirement for personhood. By not emphasizing synchronic narrative unity, it
downplays the importance of social relations and interactions and belonging in social
groups for shaping narrative meaningfulness in one’s life. This weaker version of
narrativity would be included in what Shaun Gallagher has called “philosophically
autistic” theories of intersubjectivity—those that do not adequately incorporate social
interaction in constituting personhood 394. The stronger version of the narrativity thesis
argues that in order to be fully considered as a person one must strive to unify both
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synchronic and diachronic narrativities. This means locating and defining one’s self or
one’s personhood within social norms, practices, and concrete interactions with others (in
addition to the weaker diachronic narrative requirements). This view ameliorates
Gallagher’s charge of philosophical autism by properly including social factors (such as
concrete interpersonal interactions) as essentially constitutive of personhood. Few
narrativists argue for the weaker narrativity thesis 395—generally those who argue for
narrativity defend this stronger position 396.
Ultimately however, perceptual self-awareness is a matter of phenomenality—
what it is like to have awareness of self. And it is a non-trivial question as to whether
there can be some set of satisfiable, severally necessary, and jointly sufficient conditions
for counting as perceptually self-aware. For this reason, while perceptual self-awareness
may be an important consideration in the calculus of determining inclusion in
personhood, the only meaningful contribution to discourse on the matter must come from
the areas of conceptual rather than non-conceptual self-awareness. This does not mean
that phenomenal, non-conceptual (or pre-conceptual), perceptual and sensory experiences
necessarily do not or cannot play a role in actually determining personhood—but only
that, by dint of the intractable epistemic constraints that preclude decidability on the
skeptical worry of the comparability of similarities and differences in perception and
phenomenality across subjects, such considerations cannot fruitfully contribute to the
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debate about what constitutes persons 397.
There are two ways to approach self-awareness from the perspective of Dynamic
Systems Theory. First, we can understand self-awareness as a process by which the
various qualitative states of a system are monitored, affected, and/or maintained. Selfawareness, then, would be a more general metaprocess whose domain consists in the
synthesized domains of the various occurrent sensory and perceptual (sub)processes.
Functionally, self-awareness accomplishes the dual task of bringing together into a
common domain sensory and perceptual modalities that are otherwise distinct; as well as
reflexively assessing the qualitative status of this more general domain. To be clear, it is
not necessary that this more general domain comprised of synthesized sensory and
perceptual modalities must be representational, since the assessment of the status of this
domain needs only be qualitative. Thus, self-awareness may be enacted as a nonconceptual bodily awareness. However, nothing precludes representation from
contributing to or even underwriting the qualitative assessment involved in selfawareness. The DST approach is capable of supporting theories with varying degrees of
representation.
The second way that DST approaches self-awareness is by addressing inextricably
phenomenal character of self-awareness. Self-awareness is, at bottom, a phenomenal
experience. There is something it is like to be self-aware—to experience awareness of
397
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one’s self as a self. How can DST assess or express the essential phenomenality of selfawareness? In short, it can’t. But this doesn’t put it at any comparative disadvantage with
competing theories. If we take phenomenology as epistemologically primitive (as was
argued in chapter 1) then it should come as no surprise that the phenomenal character of
experience definitive of self-awareness cannot be further explained in terms of any more
basic theoretical constructs 398. Primitives, by definition, are taken as that which is not and
cannot be explained further (if they could, they wouldn’t be the primitives—rather
whatever constitutes the further explanation would be more primitive). So DST cannot do
any better than the most popular theory of mind in explaining the phenomenal experience
of self-awareness. But it doesn’t do any worse on this point either (namely because DST
is robust enough to subsume most broadly functionalist theories about cognition). So
DST doesn’t obviously or immediately solve “The Hard Problem of Consciousness”.
What is important is that it allows multiple avenues of investigation and provides a
general framework 399 through which research questions can be expressed and explored.
As mentioned previously, the systems posited by DST are an expression of the
epistemic and conceptual constraints of the positor and do not purport to describe or
explain the metaphysical contours of the world as it really is, in itself. Explanations are
always explanations for someone. The world “as it is in itself” does not need anything
explained; only that which is epistemically constrained does. DST provides a framework
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through which particular kinds of epistemic interrogators with specific types of epistemic
constraints (such as humans with their unique sensory and conceptual apparatūs) can be
explanatorily satisfied. Many such investigators are very interested in explaining the
conditions for inclusion as persons in a “naturalistic” way; in large part because
possessing the social status of a person is significant to many social practices and
institutions, and because the naturalistic (or vaguely “scientific”) attitude holds a
privileged social position with respect to explanation. DST contributes meaningfully to
such a project.
For what it is worth (which I do not think is much, if anything at all) I think that
as far as the project of determining inclusion in personhood goes, both conceptual and
non-conceptual, perceptual self-awareness should be included among the sine qua non of
personhood. I would resist both strong and weak versions of the narrativity argument,
however. I believe that neither diachronic nor synchronic narrative unities are necessary
(nor sufficient) for inclusion in personhood (viz. there are persons who satisfy neither
constraint). Agency on the other hand, is a significant constitutive factor in personhood
because without the ability to choose and execute actions, there simply is nothing
resembling what anyone means in talking about persons. Alternatively, navigating moral
responsibility is precisely the reason for caring about the bounds of personhood so is
essential to such discussions. It is this subject to which I next turn.
4.7

Moral Responsibility

Moral Responsibility is a surprisingly complex subject when approached from the
perspective of naturalism. Some basic questions are:
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•

How is moral action possible (for naturally evolved entities such as ourselves)?

•

How do we as persons develop our sense(s) of moral understanding?

•

How do individual and social moral judgments relate?

•

How can morality be explained in purely naturalistic terms?

These are four of the many questions that anyone who wishes to naturalize morality (to
explain morality using an exclusively naturalistic framework) must address. The purpose
of this section is to sketch how DST—as a sufficiently naturalistic framework—can
adequately address these four questions.
Moral, or normative, behavior is behavior that can be characterized as good or
bad, right or wrong, better or worse, etc.. Earlier I discussed how one DST-oriented
position (Richard Campbell’s “Process-Based Model for an Interactive Ontology”)
explained the emergence of normative behavior. Normative behavior is based in a broad
sense on what it means for a system to “self-maintain”, and is exhibited by any system
capable of differentially interacting with its local environment. Any system capable of the
most absolutely basic sense of “choice”, and which can succeed or fail to self-maintain,
acts normatively. In a certain sense, preferring self-maintenance as “good” or “right” or
“better”, and its alternative (dissipation or dissolution of the system) as “bad” or “wrong”
or “worse” is system-relative. There is no generalizable, fundamental grounding for
taking this normative orientation. There are two different senses of system-relativity here,
however: relativity with respect to the system for which the norms are binding; and
relativity with respect to the epistemic interests of the party investigating the system. The
former is necessarily epistemically opaque and its normatively-binding scope is
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immanently limited to the system itself. With regard to the latter, there may be a
psychological explanation that grounds normative orientation. As temporally limited
systems—systems that arise, develop, function, then dissipate or die—we tend to make
better sense of prolonging functioning and delaying dissipation than of accelerating
dissipation. We may then graft our preferences for self-maintenance of ourselves onto our
assessments about dynamic systems in general as a way of relating to or making better
sense of normativity in systems. Since we are the epistemic interrogators for whom DST
is meant to help explain things, it should not be surprising that part of helping explain
things involves understanding them in terms that cohere with our own attitudes. If I am a
dynamic system, and I believe that my self-maintenance is good and death is bad, it
makes sense to understand other dynamic systems by way of the same sort of normative
valuation. We imagine that, from the paramecium’s perspective, its own self-maintenance
is good for it, and its own death bad. This helps us to explain (to ourselves) why it
chooses swim toward, rather than tumble away from the highest concentration of sugar. It
is choosing in favor of self-maintenance. But these normative impositions are our own, as
epistemic investigators.
This is also how error is possible. Without tethering normativity to a concept like
self-maintenance, one encounters the result that error becomes impossible. Without
having a touchstone, there can be no basis to assess whether some action is “good” or
“right” or “better”. For any action one could make such an assessment (or its opposite)
and there would be no basis for affirmation or dispute. But, even though the selection of
self-maintenance as positive and dissipation as negative is somewhat system-relative, its
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establishment as a basis for normativity is crucial—especially in the assessment of error.
Only if we know that self-maintenance is “good” can we say that the paramecium’s
swimming toward a high concentration of non-nutritive saccharin is an error (because it
doesn’t facilitate self-maintenance, and may accelerate dissipation).
However, this does not yet distinguish between choosing wrongly, and choosing
in error 400. In the case of the former one chooses so as to accelerate dissipation, while in
the case of the latter, one chooses in favor of self-maintenance, but is mistaken in that the
action chosen fails to facilitate self-maintenance (and may even accelerate dissipation).
The difference is one of low-level intention. With the same action or overt behavior one
may intend self-harm and succeed, or intend self-maintenance and fail. Functionally,
there may be no difference at all between acting in error, and acting wrongly—the
relevant functional difference is with whether a certain function was performed
sufficiently or not; and the consequences thereof. Functionality needn’t involve
normativity at all. If it does, normativity is indexed to and dependent upon the identity of
the function being executed. The system can succeed or fail (where in some cases success
and failure can be understood as a matter of degree, while in others it is a bivalent
difference) at some function it is taken to be performing. However, if instead we
understand the system to be performing a different function, the success and failure
conditions will change accordingly. So for example if we see the paramecium as
performing the function of swimming toward the highest concentration of “sugar-orsugar-like-substances”—we may assess that it succeeds at that function. If instead we see
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the paramecium as performing the alternative function of satisfying its nutrition
requirements—we may assess that it fails at this function. Again, success or failure of
function is indexed to the identity of that function and the conditions that define its
successful or unsuccessful execution.
So we may then ask: what are the relevant functions that correlate with moral
action? And what are the characteristics of systems capable of these functions? First, we
may notice that moral action can only be accomplished by systems that are capable of
moral responsibility—systems that are accountable for the morality of their actions. Here
morality is usually taken to have two significant dimensions: responsibilities to one’s
self, and responsibilities to others. Remember, the primary reason for discussing moral
responsibility is because it is taken by many theorists to be constitutive of personhood.
So, insofar as moral responsibility is constitutive of personhood; personhood involves
obligations both to the self and to others. And by extension, if systems are to be counted
as persons they must also be able to bear personal and social responsibility. So the
functions relevant to moral action are those functions that facilitate and enact personal
and social responsibility. But what are these responsibilities?
Here we may return to issue of recognition. Recognition operates along the same
relations that moral responsibility does—it functions reflexively (as self-recognition) and
it functions interpersonally (as an asymmetric relation of recognition of and by others).
How one reflexively recognizes one’s self is informed both by how one is recognized by
others and how one recognizes others. How one recognizes others is the mode by which
one goes about recognizing one’s self; and how one is recognized by others provides a
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filter or constraint through which the content of one’s self-reflection is informed.
Likewise, one’s self-recognition informs the way one recognizes others, as well as the
way in which one understands how they are recognized by others. This dynamic
dialectical process continually operates as a sort of triangulation to identify one’s self and
one’s roles in society401.
Analogously, moral responsibility functions reflexively (as one’s obligations to
one’s self), as well as interpersonally (as one’s obligations to others in particular, and
society at-large). How one reflexively bears their moral obligations to one’s self is
informed both by how others bear moral obligation to one, and how one bears their moral
responsibility to others. How one bears one’s moral responsibility to others is the mode
by which one goes about bearing one’s moral obligation to one’s self; and how others
bear their moral obligation to one provides a filter that informs the content of one’s moral
obligation to one’s self. Likewise, one’s moral obligation to one’s self informs the way
one bears one’s moral obligation to others, as well as the way in which one understand
how others bear their moral obligation to them. As with recognition, this dynamic
dialectic process continually works as a triangulation to identify one’s moral status with
one’s self, with others, and within society.
We have already discussed one way in which dynamic systems can have a
minimal normative obligation to themselves—recursively self-maintenant, far-fromequilibrium, open systems capable of error-detection and flexible learning bear the
reflexive obligation to employ their capabilities in interacting with their local
401

Husserl makes use of this kind of account in his phenomenological explanations for how
intersubjectivity works. Cf. Husserl, E. (1988 [1931]) Cartesian Meditations, trans. D. Cairns,
Dordrecht: Kluwer.

237

surroundings toward their own self-maintenance. It doesn’t take much to elaborate this
obligation to a moral obligation that one do what is required in order to take care of one’s
self. Of course, the devil is often in the details, and here it is a nontrivial question as to
what consists in “taking care of one’s self”. The DST approach would suggest that taking
care of one’s self will sensitively depend on the particular conditions formative of the
situation in which such “taking care” would be occurring. So giving general, severally
necessary, and jointly sufficient conditions for “taking care of one’s self” may turn out to
be a practical impossibility.
Further, the very notion of what one’s “self” is, is inextricably tied up with, and
constitutively defined by one’s relations with others, and within society [at-large]. Thus,
to “take care of one’s self” necessarily includes other particular persons as well as society
at-large. One cannot bear a moral responsibility to one’s self without also bearing moral
responsibilities to the others that contribute to defining and identifying both one’s “self”
as well as what it means to bear moral responsibility—just as one cannot recognize one’s
self without also recognizing others, being recognized by others, and understanding one’s
self and others as the kinds of things that can both recognize and be recognized by others
(amongst which one is included). Because the self and moral responsibility are both
essentially social they are both bounded or circumscribed by the particular social
relations that shape them, while simultaneously transgressing that boundary through their
essential reference to the very relations that give them shape.
This means that because the self is defined through social relationships and roles,
the moral obligation to “take care of one’s self” extends to taking care of the social
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conditions that provide for the relationships and roles that define the self. This is
analogous to Richard Campbell’s idea of “flexible learning” which involved the organism
making changes to its external environment as a mode of self-maintenance. As flexible
learners, organisms take differential control not only of their internal conditions in order
to robustly cope with changing external environmental factors; but rather also attempt to
control the external environmental factors so as to lessen the burden of internal
differential adjustment. However, while organisms can either be flexible learners or
not—they can either self-maintain by making changes to their environment, or not—
selves, or persons, must extend into the social realm. Campbell writes:
So crucial and significant for human development is this nurturing and
induction into sociality that the nice symmetry of the ontological model I have
been outlining no longer applies. It is not the case that some reflective persons
come together to form social groups, while others do not. While a few rare
individuals have chosen to live as hermits, even they could not cut themselves
off completely from social interaction. Rather, the emergence of reflective
persons and the emergence of social institutions and certain social groups are
mutually dependent and interactive. 402
The point here is just that any claims we make about individual persons, and any qualities
or characteristics that constitute their inclusion in personhood, must essentially affect or
apply to the things we say about the qualities or characteristics pertaining to social
relationships, practices, and institutions; as a sort of “transitive property of
personhood”.
We began this chapter by identifying four common characteristics thought to be
constitutive of persons—agency, a temporal sense of self (or narrativity), self-awareness,
and moral responsibility. The “transitive property of personhood” suggests that these
402
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constitutive characteristics of persons must also relate constitutively to concrete social
conditions, practices, institutions, etc. (and vice versa). It does not mean that social
practices and institutions are persons, or that all characteristics constitutive of persons
bear the same or isomorphic analogical relations to social practices and institutions. I am
not claiming that social practices must be agents, narrativistic, self-aware, or possess
moral responsibility. Rather I am saying that because these are characteristics constitutive
of persons, they affect the character of the kinds of social practices and institutions that
are possible; and inversely, that the kinds of social practices and institutions available
affect the qualities that are constitutive of personhood. So, for example, what it means for
a person to be self-aware depends (at least partially) on the social conditions, practices,
and institutions through which personal self-awareness can be expressed. Likewise, the
kinds of social conditions, practices, and institutions that are possible are shaped (at least
partially) by constraints in self-awareness.
This point may be understood more generally as expressing a close co-constitutive
relationship between embodiment and social practices and institutions. The bodily
sensory modalities that comprise perception are just the different capacities or
capabilities for bodily interaction with the local environment 403. Perception is limited to
or constrained directly by these capacities or capabilities. In turn, self-awareness, for
instance, is constrained by the limits of perceptibility; as perception is the vehicle through
which one recognizes others, and other-recognition is itself a condition for selfrecognition (and thus self-awareness). Self-awareness then, constrained by the conditions
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of perceptibility amongst other constraints, affects the possibilities for social encounters
and the types of practices or social institutions in which the agent cant engage. In the
reverse direction (the “downward causation” direction) concrete social practices and
institutions constrain the kinds of activities that agents actually embody—literally
shaping the perceptive body so as to influence and accommodate the transparent
engagement and execution of these very social practices and institutions. One example
might be the social practice of wearing shoes, boots, and other footwear. Here the
practice literally constrains the body; the wearing of shoes shapes feet, and the ways in
which feet can interact with the world. By wearing footwear, embodied agents are
afforded new possibilities in the kinds of terrain that are traversable; but also constrain
the shape and texture of feet that might otherwise have callused. New potentialities
emerge for bodies coupled with the social practice of shoe-wearing; but some old
potentialities (like running barefoot on rough terrain) are restrained.
4.8

Looking Ahead

The purpose of this chapter was to show how the framework afforded by DST is
minimally adequate for talk of persons in all the relevant and important aspects of the
literature. Naturally, one of the most important aspects of personhood is participation in
social roles, relationships, practices, and institutions. So far we have only addressed this
aspect of personhood obliquely. The next chapter will address social practices and
institutions through the framework of DST in a way consistent and continuous with what
has been expressed here. The chapter will end with a concise construction of Dynamic
Embodied Agency, drawing upon all of the resources hitherto.
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Chapter 5 – Social Practices and Institutions as Dynamic Systems

This chapter’s purpose is to bring together the rather motley assortment of
resources, concepts, theoretical frameworks, and historical approaches presented thus far
into a sketch of an explanatory account that synoptically treats: a metaphysics of agency,
a phenomenological epistemology, and a social theory of practices and institutions. The
result should bring into view (however blurry) a way of understanding persons and
practices as birds of a[n ontological] feather. The culminating point is to show that the
conceptual resources of Dynamic Systems Theory prove a potent explanatory basis for
thinking of persons and practices in concert – an undertaking not often treated under one
explanatory framework.

5.1

Social Practices and Dynamic Embodied Agents Co-Constitute One

Another

A Dynamic Embodied Agent is an agent that differentially interacts with the
surrounding environment by employing its body in the appropriate ways. What makes a
bodily employment appropriate or inappropriate is the degree to which the activities
undertaken in particular instances contribute to or detract from the maintenance of the
embodied system. As an embodied system, a DEA is sensitive to various aspects of the
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surrounding environment. These sensitivities can be thought of abstractly; they needn’t
exclusively involve sensory apparatuses, they can also be cognitive apparatuses, social
apparatuses, and technological or infrastructural apparatuses 404 – anything that can be
deployed in a way that constitutively factors into the “calculus” of recursive selfmaintenance. As far-from-equilibrium, open, recursively self-maintenant systems capable
of error-detection and flexible learning, Dynamic Embodied Agents develop and learn
modes and strategies for differential and highly interactive coping with particular
situations through creative processes of detecting and recognizing patterns that can
contribute to recursive self-maintenant action. These processes may be instantiated in any
number of ways, but a helpful analogy is the evolutionary process of natural selection.
At its most basic, natural selection is a set of processes whereby favorable
characteristics are selectively retained through the gradual and interrelated processes of
reproduction (sexual reproduction, for metazoans), genetic mutation and recombination,
and a host of other “epigenetic” factors. What counts as “favorable” is, like selfmaintenance, a matter of propagation. That which is capable of persisting over time is
favorable; while that which is not, is not 405. Favorable characteristics are those that
contribute to a species’ continued existence as determined through the specific contingent
processes of selection at work on the particular units of selection (whether they are
phenotypic or genotypic individuals; whether they’re organisms or genes).
Likewise, we may consider the patterns that are recognized by recursively self404
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maintenant systems to be analogous to the genetic mutations or recombinations that alter
the selection units. An alteration that produces a pattern “favorable” to self-maintenance
is selectively retained, while patterns detrimental to self-maintenance are gradually culled
out. Those patterns that do not greatly adversely affect self-maintenance may be retained,
or not. Thus – as with the processes of natural selection – it is possible for a recursively
self-maintenant system to recognize and operate using patterns that do not actively
contribute to self-maintenance. In fact, the retention of maintenance-neutral patterns may
itself help contribute to creative processes of recombination that may increase system
plasticity with respect to self-maintenance 406.
Nothing important hinges on the correctness of this model of pattern recognition
and retention. Different recursively self-maintenant systems will have different modal
types of interfaces with their local environments; just as different species have different
potential modal interactions with their environments. For example, in order to find their
ways around in the world bats echolocate, homing pigeons are sensitive to combined
magnetic field and aroma profiles, ants scaffold the world with chemical paths, etc..
These various modal interactions constrain and afford different available possible
patterns for their respective (organismal) systems to recognize and utilize. What is
important here is that the Dynamical Systems model provides a framework through
which the mechanisms of pattern recognition and differential actions of embodied
systems (whatever they may be) can be expressed and explained.
Over time, DEAs hone bodily habits through the highly-interactive world406

That is, the retention of maintenance-neutral patterns may itself be a favorable pattern with respect to
self-maintenance. The evolutionary analogue to this hypothesis is that increased species diversity
increases species robustness.
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involving processes they develop through their self-maintenant copings. These habits
needn’t optimize, nor need they even contribute to self-maintenance. Their only
necessary constraint is that they not overtly cause system dissipation 407. The embodied
skills and habits developed by DEAs are behavioral attractors—relatively stable, though
aperiodic, nonlinear patterns of activity resistant to perturbation. These behavioral
attractors are constrained by the “parameters” of available affordances and “variables” of
contingent and dynamic situational factors. Again, for DEAs these situational factors and
affordances crucially include social relations 408.
How a DEA develops or constructs the self that functions normatively as the basis
for self-maintenance is defined in part by its perception of itself in relation to general and
particular others – that is, its social perception. These general relations are exhibited
through the phenomenal sense of one’s “belonging” or inclusion as a member in a social
group. The particular relations are enacted through concrete agent interactions—
specifically those whose situations dictate multiple agents acting in concert with each
other to accomplish a shared outcome 409. Thus, the habits and skills developed by DEAs
are simultaneously oriented both “inward” toward the self, and doubly “outward” toward
general and particular others. Embodied habits and skills are therefore ineliminably
social.
Further, since DEAs have myriad open and dynamic relations to general and
407

Even self-destructive behavior can be habitualized so long as the system remains intact (and far-fromequilibrium). If we consider living organismal systems the point is just that nothing that kills the
organism can be habitualized. Anything that sends far-from-equilibrium open system into equilibrium
cannot be habitualized.
408
In part because DEAs are constitutively identified through their relations with others.
409
The outcome is shared, but its significance need not be the same for the agents involved in the joint
activity.
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particular others, the embodied habits and skills that they develop can be causally
influenced and shaped through these very relations. A DEA’s social relations constitute a
genuine source of perceptual constraints and affordances. Consequently, social practices
can factor causally into a DEAs development of embodied skills and habits 410.
But what exactly are social practices? In Ch. 2 I discussed this issue with some
seriousness, comparing Turner’s, Gallagher’s and Schatzki’s theories. I concluded that
social practices are regularities of behavior detected and detectable by DEAs 411; and that
DEAs normatively “attune” themselves to the practices and styles of practice exhibited
by particular others in concrete encounters. This may happen at the pre-noetic, nondiscursive “level” of body-schema, or at the thematic, or discursive “level” of bodyimage. DEAs may be aware and attentively attuned to the practices and styles they
encounter, or pre-reflectively unaware of those practices and styles, yet still perceptually
attuned to them. This process of “attunement” works both to triangulate a sense of self
through relating with others, as well as to emulate skills and habits that may be of
potential use in self-maintenance. Thus, “attunement” is a positively reinforcing (or
“rectifying”) attractor whereby DEAs are continuously socialized and sociality is
continuously constituted.

410

Recall, Turner’s conclusion in The Social Theory of Practices that embodied habits and skills should
replace the “stop-gap” incoherent notion of causally efficacious social practices. My contention is that
social practices are enacted through embodied habits and skills, but further that because DEAs “attune”
themselves to social norms and practices these habits and skills are causally affected by social relations
to and with general and specific others. This may be consistent with Turner’s position, but it is unclear
from the texts (The Social Theory of Practices, and Brains/Practices/Relativism).
411
Perhaps non-consciously, at the level of body-schema.
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5.2

Social Practices and Institutions are DEAs

It should be clear by now that Dynamic Embodied Agents and social practices can
and should both be considered with recourse to the conceptual framework availed by
dynamical systems theory. In addition, I hope to have shown in the previous chapter that
DEAs are consistent with most full-bodied construals of persons. Understanding both
DEAs (or persons) and social practices on the same ontological continuum 412 is helpful
for two reasons: it establishes a continuous explanatory link between a naturalistic
construction of DEAs 413 (so, persons) and social practices; which in-turn helps us to
understand each of these domains better. However, one might be skeptical about my
claim that social practices and institutions are themselves Dynamic Embodied Agents.
Are social practices – like waving goodbye, thanking someone for a gift, and cooking
food – really far-from-equilibrium, open, recursively self-maintenant embodied systems
capable of differentially responding to available constraints, detecting error, and flexible
learning? In this very paragraph it also seems I have even conflated DEAs with persons –
does this mean that I’m claiming that social practices are also persons?
First it is important to distinguish DEAs from persons. Not all DEAs are persons,
but all persons are DEAs: dynamic embodied agency is necessary but not sufficient for
personhood. In addition to definitive characteristics of dynamic embodied agency,
persons also possess the distinguishing capabilities of conceiving themselves temporally,
perhaps thematically structured as an ongoing narrative. Persons are self-aware, perhaps

412

As far-from-equilibrium, open, recursively self-maintenant systems capable of error detection and
flexible learning.
413
See my discussion of this in considering Richard Campbell’s process-based ontology in chapter 3.
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in many conceptual and non-conceptual ways. Persons are capable of and socially
beholden to morally responsible action. Some of these characteristics may also apply to
certain social practices and institutions. If all of them do, then it would not be hyperbolic
to ascribe personhood to those practices and institutions. However, to claim that all social
practices and institutions exhibit these characteristics would be highly misleading.
Consider the social institution that is an American university. Richard Campbell
helpfully writes:
As I used to tell my students, it is the university which admitted them as
students, and which might eventually confer on them a degree. As an
individual, I cannot perform those actions, not because someone else performs
them, but because no individual person does. Even when I was the one whose
role it was to sign the relevant documents, that was not something I did as an
individual person. I was exercising a role, a function that only makes sense,
and only has validity, because it derives from the structure and dynamics of
the institution.414
It is the university itself that possesses the capacity to confer degrees upon students, not
any individual. The university is mereologically comprised of functional roles (such as
“Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences”, “Registrar”, “Bursar”, and many others); as
well as the persons who instantiate those roles (e.g. Eric Eisenberg in his capacity as
Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, or Eric Eisenberg in his capacity as professor
in the Department of Communications); the physical resources of the university
(campuses, classrooms, labs, whiteboards, lab equipment, the paper on which degrees are
printed, etc.); and also the established social and cultural practices, institutions, and
conventions (e.g. the classroom setting, the role of professor, the student-teacher
relationship, norms of professionalism, the “school year”, etc.). Without all of these
414

Campbell, Richard. (2009) “A Process-Based Model for an Interactive Ontology,” Synthese: 166. p. 475.
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interworking, overlapping parts causally impinging on each other in a relatively stable
(though far-from-equilibrium 415) way, the university would cease to function as a
university. Its identity as a university depends on the well-functioning of its parts; but it is
not merely the sum of those well-functioning parts, it possesses and bestows its own
capabilities over and above what those parts can contribute individually. As a result of
the particular, dynamic, complex set of relations enacted by the functional parts that
comprise a university, it is capable of emergent action (in this case, conferring a degree).
This is a genuine case of agency. This agency is dynamic and embodied because it is a
far-from-equilibrium, open, recursively self-maintenant system whose actions are
contingent upon the constraints and affordances in the local physical, social, and cultural
environment affecting the execution of its processes.
We may ask, however, whether the university system is capable of error-detection
and flexible learning. Because it incorporates mechanisms of governance among the
dynamic processes of systemic control; and because the processes of deliberations
address and handle chaotic contingencies that arise from both within the systems
workings (e.g. the faculty union attempting to renegotiate their contracts) and outside
influences (e.g. the values of faculty 403Cs plummeting); the university system involves
the appropriate kinds of feedback mechanisms for both error-detection and flexible
learning. The university is able to detect internal and external conditions and
differentially respond to them in order to self-maintain. A university is a Dynamic
Embodied Agent. But is it a person?

415

In order to operate a university depends on a continual in- and out-flow of new resources, including
persons, physical resources, dynamic social relations, etc.
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This is often a difficult question to assess. Certainly universities are taken by both
individuals and other social institutions (e.g. the U.S. legal system) to possess moral
culpability and agency. Universities can act, and can act either in accordance with or in
violation of societal norms. So the personhood conditions of agency and moral
responsibility do not cause any pause. Universities can also unquestionably possess
thematic narratives in the sense that their histories and mission statements establish a
context in light of which the progress of the University can be measured. But who does
the measuring? In considering the temporality and narrativity of persons, narrative unity
was assessed variously by the self for which that unity was in question, as well as
intersubjective others. Can the university self-reflectively measure its own narrative
progress? In order to do so, it seems, the university must possess some form of selfawareness; and this is where our assessment of the university’s personhood becomes
strained 416.
It is important to consider the context of the question being asked. We are now
wondering whether we should consider universities to be self-aware. We are asking this
question from our own perspectives as DEAs, but more specifically as epistemically
constrained persons. When we ask of ourselves whether we are self-aware, we can be
minimally satisfied by a cogito-like response: If I can ask whether I’m self-aware, I can
be certain that I am. However we do not have the same kind of epistemic access to others
– including social institutions in which we may (or may not) directly participate (e.g. by
fulfilling some functional role). The more general “problem of other minds” seems to

416

For a similar observation: Cf. Dewey, J. (1926). “The Historic Background of Corporate Legal
Personality” Yale Law Journal 35:655.
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arise: How can I determine whether any others are self-aware? What are the satisfaction
criteria or possible evidentiary bases?
The phenomenological approach has worked to dissolve the epistemic gulf
between one’s self and others. One’s sense of self is developed from a more primordial
and epistemically direct interaction with others. What it means to be self-aware is a
matter of having developed the appropriate social relationships with general and
particular others. It is a matter of being able to locate one’s self socially. Can a university
locate itself socially? It is difficult to say without the appropriate epistemic access. But
we can turn the question around – in one’s phenomenological assessment of another’s
personhood is the university relevantly different than another individual person on this
score? Can I take the university as another subject—as another person? If so, then we
should be at least as comfortable with claiming that the university is a person as we are in
claiming that of each other. More likely (as I alluded to in chapter 2) our assessment of
subjectivity or personhood comes in degrees – I assess others as more or less persons as a
result of my ability to identify and relate to them socially.
Because my self-perception is the product of my concrete relations with particular
others, which always occurs in contexts of already established and enacted social
practices and institutions; a large part of this assessment is shaped by my self-perception
which itself derives from the embodied significance of social practices. Thus, the
question becomes whether the person, social practice, or institution being assessed is
sufficiently similar 417 to those persons, practices, and institutions that have been

417

The sufficiency of similarity can be qualitatively assessed by the affective phenomenological character
of experience. Something is sufficiently similar if it produces the feeling in the assessor of being “at
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formative in my development. If so, once again we should be comfortable in saying that
social institutions can be persons. If not, not.

home” with it. Again, this is likely a feeling that admits of degrees.
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